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The bolded part is an incorrect interpolation by you of my statement. You make it seem like I am saying some piece of evidence exists which points to the simpler theory being more likely than the other. That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that given the same evidence, a simpler theory that adequately explains all that evidence is LITERALLY more likely to be correct than less simple alternatives tha adequately explain that same evidence. This is why parsimony and Occam's Razor are useful in the first place.
I repeat, if the simpler explanation is NOT more likely to be correct, WHAT IS THE JUSTIFICATION OF OCCAM'S RAZOR IN THE FIRST PLACE? The simpler theory requires fewer keystrokes?
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Perhaps this will help, from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam's_Razor
"Empirical justification
One way a theory or a principle could be justified is empirically; that is to say, if simpler theories were to have a better record of turning out to be correct than more complex ones, that would corroborate Occam's razor. However, this type of justification has several complications.
First of all, even assuming that simpler theories have been more successful, this observation provides little insight into exactly why this is, and thus leaves open the possibility that the factor behind the success of these theories was not their simplicity but rather something that causally correlates with it (see Correlation vs. Causation). Second, Occam's Razor is not a theory; it is a heuristic maxim for choosing among theories, and attempting to choose between it and some alternative as if they were theories of the regular sort invokes circular logic. We rely on the razor when we justify induction; by attempting to in turn rely on induction when we justify the razor, we are begging the question.
There are many different ways of making inductive inferences from past data concerning the success of different theories throughout the history of science; inferring that "simpler theories are, other things being equal, generally better than more complex ones" is just one way of many, and only seems more plausible to us because we are already assuming the razor to be true (see e.g. Swinburne 1997). Inductive justification for Occam's razor being a dead-end game, we have the choice of either accepting it as an article of faith based on pragmatist considerations or attempting deductive justification."
I posted one such deductive justification earlier, here it is again, by Jerrold Katz:
"If a hypothesis, H, explains the same evidence as a hypothesis G, but does so by postulating more entities than G, then, other things being equal, the evidence has to bear greater weight in the case of H than in the case of G, and hence the amount of support it gives H is proportionately less than it gives G."
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This ALL seems wrong. Firstly, an empirical justification is of no use or interest of me, as per my OP; secondly, like i said earlier, one could posit the alternatives to OR and easily find examples that support each; thirdly, induction does not need justification by OR, it stands up (as far as induction will stand up) by itself, and I don't see how it would be possible to justify OR without induction; fourthly, with regards to Katz's deductive justification, the fact that we give more weighting to the evidence of a simpler theory does not mean that the simpler theory is more likely to be true.