[paradroid12]

My post count will say I'm a noob, and I admit that I'm not a high level poker player, but I think I have a good grasp on theory, as it is discussed here (my problem is that I'm still refining my abilities to implement theory, ie defining accurate ranges for opponents and knowing how they will act on their ranges). That said, I hope you will give my ideas some consideration, as I think I have some things to say about the value-bluff.

I agree that a value-bluff does not exist against a rational opponent, but I think there are opponents against which it does exist. We'll take these one at a time. But first, what is a value-bluff?

As I understand it, a value-bluff is a bet that attempts to coerce an opponent into folding better hands than your holding and calling with hands weaker. For a value-bluff to exist, the INTENT of the bet must be that it causes BOTH of these things to happen, necessarily. Just making a bet with the HOPE an opponent will fold better and call with worse IS NOT a value-bluff. If it is, then almost every bet a fish makes would be a value-bluff. Consider that as we go on...

As I understand it, a rational opponent would take the following sort of action in deciding to call a hand:
1. He would establish a range of holdings for you.
2. He would determine the likelihood of given hands within your range (for example he may believe with the river bet you have a 60% chance of holding a hand stronger than his and a 40% chance of holding a weaker hand).
3. He would compare the strength of your range to the strength of his holding to the size of the pot (the pot is laying me 5-1 to call and I think I'm good 60% of the time, I call. The pot is laying me 2-1 and I think i'm good at a rate of 20% of the time, I fold).

Notice that I did not specify the rational opponent's holding. In the given example (with the TT77x board) he could hold AK or A7 and make this same evaluation. Therefore, if a rational opponent decides that AA is no good, he's going to fold it. If he decides AA is no good, then he's going to make the same decision about KK, 88, and every other hand of lower strength. Therefore, a value-bluff can not exist against this type of opponent, because he will not call with a worse hand than he folds. He will fold every hand that he believes to be +EV and fold every hand he believes to be -EV. The reason for this is that with a rational opponent, his holding does not influence his evaluation of the "facts" at hand (his range of hands for his opponent, the probability of each holding in the range, the pot odds). His evaluation of the hand may be incorrect, but his decision-making will stem from a rational approach. So, if he calls with JJ, he definitely would've called with better, but he may not have called with worse.

So, the bet may succeed in making a rational opponent throw away a better hand (thus it is a bluff) OR it may succeed in making a rational opponent call with a worse hand (a value bet), but if the opponent called with 9s, you can be sure he would've called with Jacks, and thus it can not succeed in making him throw away better hands than he called with.

However, not all opponents act rationally. A value-bluff can exist against an opponent whose hand strength determines his calling range. For example, say an opponent has felt as though he has been bluffed several times when he had a marginal hand, and has shown down losers when he has had relatively strong holdingings. If this opponent decides to act irrationally, he may be more willing to throw away a stronger holding and attempt to make a more "heroic" call with a marginal hand. The question against this opponent looks more like this ...

I'm the hero and I divide my villains range into two subsets: those hands that beat mine, and those hands that I beat. In order to win the pot against the first group, of course, I must make the villain fold. I then go about deciding the proper bet amount to induce a fold. Let's say that I calculate that the proper amount to bet in the situation to induce a fold from the villain is X. However, I am also aware that the villain my have a range of hands he will call with (especially given that the villain is prone to making a marginal call). So I must also decide what an appropriate amount to bet for value is. Let's say that considering the factors (along with the probability of my being beat if villain calls), I decide that the appropriate amount for a value bet is ALSO X.

So I bet X.

If I am correct in my assessment, the villain will now fold the hands in his range that have me beat, and will also call with the range of hands that I can beat. That, my friends, is a value-bluff. I bluff the pot from him when I am losing, and I show down the hand for value when I am winning. Furthermore, it is not an accident or divine providence that causes this to occur, it is rather a careful analysis of the situation that leads a hero to conclude that the bet size is proper to elicit the specific conditions the bet seeks to achieve.

I think much of the confusion on the topic has come from the nature of bet sizing as it relates to perceived hand strength. Sometimes there are conditions (meta-game, play of the specific hand, texture of the board) that make weak bets look strong and vice-versa. However, these are not necessarily value-bluffs. If you make a weak bet against a rational opponent, it should be either to portray strength (he will fold a stronger holding) or to portray weakness (he will call with a weaker holding than yours). A true value-bluff is the result of specific conditions, and because I don't think I have enough experience or knowledge to say how often such conditions arise (a particular bet amount will elicit the desired response from an opponent based on his holding), it seems that the extended conversation on the topic suggests that it's more than once every blue moon.