[athought]

How enlightening this conversation is.

I've always been exposed to theological free will as the freedom for a person to choose between doing something their god does or doesn't want them to do. (i.e. or maybe more directly stated as the freedom to disobey one's god). The problem with this notion is of course that direct coercion involved in the very definition.

Now, the argument of pure free will - or whether one can exercise control over his/her own actions seemingly also hinges on the semantics of the definition - and this definition also seemingly prevents us from any sort of proof if I understand correctly.

That is, if determinism implies that the outcome of a "seemingly" random event (a dice roll) is pre-determined? If so that event was not truly random. Something forced a predetermined outcome. But since we lack the tools or understanding of the laws that caused the outcome - it to us is random.

So I guess I'm asking - does this mean that ignorance is a prerequisite of free will. Or rather - As long as one does not have the means or capacity to measures all the forces of the universe at work, free will exist on a relative basis for that person.

Or am I way off?

It feels like some corollary of HUP applies in this discussion.