[Dr_Doctr]

Hi all,

I'm new to the forums and am currently studying for a doctorate in philosophy so I was pleased to see all these posts on interesting topics. I'm probably better at philosophy than poker but that wouldn't be saying much [img]/images/graemlins/wink.gif[/img].

David, love the books especially 'Theory of Poker'. This post will be quick but hopefully I can get back to it later. I am particularly interested in the 'free-will' problem and if anyone wants I can send them interesting material on it.

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Anyway, it seems to me that somewhere out there in logicland, a proof of free will can be constructed from the simple fact that PEOPLE WONDER (AND DISCUSS) WHETHER THEY HAVE FREE WILL.


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You seem to be arguing from the conceivability of free-will to it's existence. There are two problems here. The first has already been mentioned - that this seems analogous to the line of argumentation in the various ontological proofs for the existence of God, and hence would be subject to similar criticisms.

But we can ignore this criticism, even if it isn't valid, as there is a second one that is far more serious. Who ever said free-will was conceivable? I think the notion is demonstrably incoherent - it is conceivable only in the manner that square circles are conceivable. Determinism is completely irrelevant to whether we have free-will or not. Notice the structure of that last sentence. Saying things like 'whether we have free-will or not' tricks us into thinking that there is some thing called 'free-will' and some fact in which it is involved. But it is similar to saying 'I wonder if there are any square circles in this office?'.

Free-will is dependent on causa-sui, or self-causation, which is an incoherent notion. Below is a very short argument. This is the general thrust of more complex arguments for the incoherence of free-will, but they are all pretty much the same.

1) For any given event, that event is either determined by prior causes, or it randomly occurs.

2) My actions are composed of a series of events.

3) If my actions are determined by prior causes, then they are not free actions.

4) If my actions are random, then they are not free actions.

5) Therefore, my actions are not free actions.


Notice that true metaphysical randomness, of the kind posited by quantum mechanics, is as irrelevant to the free-will problem as determinism. The issue is not whether we have free-will, but whether anyone can present a coherent formulation of 'free-will'. I have studied this problem for a long time so you can take my word for it - no one ever has. So sorry, we don't have 'free-will', or more correctly, the concept of 'free-will' is incoherent. Like a wall of infinite length, there's no getting around it.

I will try to get back to this thread if anyone replies and please let me know if anyone wants some material to read on this problem.