AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

I think this is a definition that should please EVERYONE

State-like parties (professional mobs running protection rackets) will spring up almost immediately after the creation of a significant site of ACness. Such mobs have been a fact of life since at least the creation of the city.

In order to combat the threat of extortion or theft from these mobs, ACers will form cooperative leagues for mutual self-defense. These two coalitions (ACers and Mobs), in all their local franchises, will eventually conflict and civilians not party to either that live nearby may suffer collateral damage. If the local ACers lose, it is likely to result in a local monopolistic proto-state, so they'll be sure to fight hard.

Now, before the ACness forms, you don't know who exactly would be at risk from collateral damage, you don't who would play 'Belgium' in this rendition of Recent European History. But in any thought about the possibilities of ACness, each and every person will deduce his risk of suffering in this collateral damage by assessing his entire life, weighting thousands of factors by their importance to him, and computing that to a result. He'll make an economic decision.

Anyone who feels less at risk in the current regime will favor stability over revolution, and will conform to the rules of the state to the degree he finds worthwhile.

ACers must argue that the average person underestimates the current level of threat he faces, or underestimates the savings he'll achieve with ACness. Anti-ACers must argue that ACers overstate the current level of threat people face on average, or overstate the ACness savings. That's fine.

But we should make more allowance for the current state of things, since each and every sane being is a perfect little personal capitalist.


By the by, this is also why I think ACers are particularly dumb: they claim to be capitalists, shouldn't they understand that the current situation is just economics? People don't want to revolt for much the same reason so many ACers still pay their federal income taxes: the gains aren't worth the price.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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People don't want to revolt for much the same reason so many ACers still pay their federal income taxes: the gains aren't worth the price.

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I think most have come to the same conclusion. The state is +EV, and IMO, it's not even close.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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But we should make more allowance for the current state of things, since each and every sane being is a perfect little personal capitalist.

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I like the way you frame the argument, but there is no genetic or behavioral basis for this particular statement... in fact it's one of the most commonly used arguments for capitalism that is really wrong and relies on most peoples' ignorance of cultures and modes of production that are not capitalist. If everyone was 'naturally' a capitalist we wouldn't have to impose it by force on indigenous populations.

NT

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

I like the way you frame the argument, but there is no genetic or behavioral basis for this particular statement... in fact it's one of the most commonly used arguments for capitalism that is really wrong and relies on most peoples' ignorance of cultures and modes of production that are not capitalist. If everyone was 'naturally' a capitalist we wouldn't have to impose it by force on indigenous populations.

I'm using the term 'personal' to argue for a more expansive, non-financial meaning of capitalism.

Sane people are, by definition, rational emotional actors. Financial gain or hardship is just one factor in the multivariable emotional choices that underlie every decision and action we make.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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State-like parties (professional mobs running protection rackets) will spring up almost immediately after the creation of a significant site of ACness.

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Because you say so?

I've explained numerous times why this would not occur in a modern, technologically advanced capitalist society based on a high degree of the division of labor.

The only markets in which criminal mobs and gangs spring up are precisely those markets that are monopolized, i.e. made black, by the central mob, the state. Violence is not +EV when free competition is allowed. It is only when government outlaws free competition that the competition becomes populated with outlaws.

The logic and the lessons of history are clear. If the state does not outlaw free competition in an industry organized gangs of criminals simply cannot compete with legitimate businesses. Witness what happens to every industry that is made black, and then witness what happens when it is made legal again.

Governments arose for particular reasons which are no longer applicable. Hence, if we could manage to get rid of them (without restoring the conditions that led to their emergence, which I am not at all sure is possible), they would not appear again.

Your whole post spins out of control from this false premise, and hence is totally invalid.

But it's nice to see you at least acknowledge that the state is nothing more than a large organized criminal protection racket.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

I'll tell you ahead of time that the ACists will deny that mobs/syndicates/good fellas will ever exist in an AC society because the reasons for their existance will have been wiped out along with the state. They deal in black markets to fund themselves; and barring a black market of illegal goods to exploit, they will lack funding to do anything. Then the ACists will end with a derisive "What, are they going to be a mob of purse-snatchers?"

I don't know much about the mob's actions (despite my extremely Italian-sounding last name), so I don't have anything to add in the way of the validity of the above.

edit: damnit, boro got to it first

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

Bwahahaha!

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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I've explained numerous times why this would not occur in a modern, technologically advanced capitalist society based on a high degree of the division of labor.

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Because you say so?

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The only markets in which criminal mobs and gangs spring up are precisely those markets that are monopolized, i.e. made black, by the central mob, the state. Violence is not +EV when free competition is allowed. It is only when government outlaws free competition that the competition becomes populated with outlaws.

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Because you say so?

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The logic and the lessons of history are clear.

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Because you say so?

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Your whole post spins out of control from this false premise, and hence is totally invalid.

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Because you say so?

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Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

The only markets in which criminal mobs and gangs spring up are precisely those markets that are monopolized, i.e. made black, by the central mob, the state. Violence is not +EV when free competition is allowed. It is only when government outlaws free competition that the competition becomes populated with outlaws.

What is criminalization but enforced restriction of supply?

Syndicates will identify goods and services that they can corner the supply on, providing it only for a higher fee, introducing a price/extortion structure that appeases the majority but offends some. Or they can identify goods that physical force will allow them to steal and sell at prices below their value to the producer.

The gains from this will allow them to corner further markets until a counter-syndicate forms, either with the intent of preserving some markets for relatively free exchanges, or with the intent of competing for the same niche markets that the first syndicate is extorting.


Because you say so?

No. Because it makes sense. If the history of criminality throughout the entire span of human civilization doesn't mean anything to you, I'm sorry.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

Well argued, as always.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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The only markets in which criminal mobs and gangs spring up are precisely those markets that are monopolized, i.e. made black, by the central mob, the state. Violence is not +EV when free competition is allowed. It is only when government outlaws free competition that the competition becomes populated with outlaws.

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I don't think I understand this argument. Are you saying that anytime someone, for example, steals goods and then sells them, this is a result of the existence of the state?

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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I'm using the term 'personal' to argue for a more expansive, non-financial meaning of capitalism.

Sane people are, by definition, rational emotional actors. Financial gain or hardship is just one factor in the multivariable emotional choices that underlie every decision and action we make.

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Okay, this is much more reasonable.

Have you ever read Ulster or rational choice theory? I think some of it is garbage because assuming people make rational choices about their actions gives them credit for clearly understanding and thinking about them. 'Rational emotional choices' is problematic too but less so.

NT

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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Well argued, as always.

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Thanks. I found it particularly funny that Boro even attempted the "Because you say so?" comeback, when it was not too long ago (see: today) he demanded his nonsense be respected because he apparently believes he's the only one on the forum who's cracked a book. In fact, it's a strange comeback coming from any ACist, since they (and the Austrian economists they adore) rely so heavy on "logical deductions", which are by their very nature highly subjective -- and not much more than arguments which rely on "because *I* say so" to carry some compelling weight.

So I'm not sure why Boro said "Because you say so?", other than to give us all a few laughs at his blatant hypocrisy.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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Syndicates will identify goods and services that they can corner the supply on, providing it only for a higher fee, introducing a price/extortion structure that appeases the majority but offends some.

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Lol. Good luck with that. A) "Syndicates" cannot exist in unregulated free markets; the EV to break the syndicate is too high for any individual member (because he could gain massively in market share by dropping his prices), so they are unstable in the absence of government interventions. B) Good luck finding a good or service that you can "corner the supply on" (hint: this is what I was talking about when I said this is impossible in a modern technologically advanced capitalist society based on a high degree of the division of labor; there are always several, if not dozens, hundreds, or thousands of suppliers of any conceivable good, service, resource, or factor of production). C) Good luck appeasing the majority by charging them higher prices.

Great business plan!

I chortle.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

Have you ever read Ulster or rational choice theory? I think some of it is garbage because assuming people make rational choices about their actions gives them credit for clearly understanding and thinking about them. 'Rational emotional choices' is problematic too but less so.

I think you'll find that if you qualify statements about people with: 'with what they can see about the present state of the universe' you can say that everyone in every situation always makes rational choices.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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The only markets in which criminal mobs and gangs spring up are precisely those markets that are monopolized, i.e. made black, by the central mob, the state. Violence is not +EV when free competition is allowed. It is only when government outlaws free competition that the competition becomes populated with outlaws.

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I don't think I understand this argument. Are you saying that anytime someone, for example, steals goods and then sells them, this is a result of the existence of the state?

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No. I'm saying the criminal enterprises can only dominate in markets where legitimate businesses are not allowed to compete. Making something illegal does not eliminate the demand for it. Since the demand exists, people will supply it. Those people, by definition, are criminals. The state sends armed thugs to attack those suppliers. Is it any wonder that the most successful of those suppliers are themselves violent? Is it any wonder that those suppliers are high time preference people who are more interested in high short term profits (created by the state, of course) than they are in potential long term risks and consequences?

When the state removes the prohibition, these people simply cannot compete with legitimate businesses. Violence is risky and costly, and costs reduce profits. High time preference thugs do not form plans as well as low time preference businessmen. Their costs are higher and their planning is poorer. They suffer losses and go out of business.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

Great business plan!


You're thinking very narrowly about this. Your imagination for what people do to each other in order to turn a buck is quaint.

You only need to corner the supply locally in order to profit from such cornering. In a lawless society, there is no barrier to making physical threats against rivals in order to reduce supply in the market.

And it doesn't help to drop prices if thieves of your goods can sell them well below your cost. A thief breaks into your room at a hotel while you're out and steals a necklace. How much does he have to sell that necklace for to turn a profit?

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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I think you'll find that if you qualify statements about people with: 'with what they can see about the present state of the universe' you can say that everyone in every situation always makes rational choices.

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Holy [censored]! I agree!

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

Holy [censored]! I agree!

See, I like you cause you're smart. I dislike you cause you're WRONG.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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. In a lawless society, there is no barrier to making physical threats against rivals in order to reduce supply in the market

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Rothbard land is not lawless.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

Rothbard land is not lawless.

How do you punish the breaking of laws without a proto-state? Or do you always just leave it up to the aggrieved parties to settle the matter by whatever means they deem necessary?

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

To put this more plainly: states are a natural monopoly.

ACers want to argue that they're not a natural monopoly, but those ACers are wrong.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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Rothbard land is not lawless.

How do you punish the breaking of laws without a proto-state? Or do you always just leave it up to the aggrieved parties to settle the matter by whatever means they deem necessary?

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This is where I would link the sticky.

But instead:

Rothbard on Police, Law, and Courts

David Friedman on Private Law

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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I think you'll find that if you qualify statements about people with: 'with what they can see about the present state of the universe' you can say that everyone in every situation always makes rational choices.

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Holy [censored]! I agree!

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I don't, but that's cool. I think non-rational behaviors still follow enough of a pattern that we can map most actions to either immediate self-interest or to learned or neurotic behaviors in response to previous experiences. I wouldn't go so far as to qualify them as even emotionally rational, but it's a much better idea than plain rational choice theory, which is junk.

NT

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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Great business plan!


You're thinking very narrowly about this. Your imagination for what people do to each other in order to turn a buck is quaint.

You only need to corner the supply locally in order to profit from such cornering. In a lawless society, there is no barrier to making physical threats against rivals in order to reduce supply in the market.

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Lol.

First off, nice job completely snipping where I totally debunked your argument!

It never ceases to amaze me how you statists constantly continue to reveal exactly how little you understand that which you rail against.

Hint: Stateless != lawless.

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And it doesn't help to drop prices if thieves of your goods can sell them well below your cost. A thief breaks into your room at a hotel while you're out and steals a necklace. How much does he have to sell that necklace for to turn a profit?

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You slay me dude. You really do. So your business plan is that you are going to "corner the market" by stealing all my inventory (which I of course will not invest in protection for at all, I'm sure), then sell it below my cost of production, so that you can drive me out of business, so that you can . . . what? Go out of business? You're not producing anything. [img]/images/graemlins/blush.gif[/img]

This is hilarious. It constantly amazes how statists can convince themselves to believe this [censored]. If it weren't for the state magically protecting us from ourselves, people would all be robbing each other blind, slitting each other's throats, and buggering each other's grandmothers every chance we got. Meanwhile, if this were true, WTF do you think the people controlling the apparatus of the state are doing?

Search for my posts in Riddick's thread "For the ardent ACers" or something like that. I debunk this ridiculous idea that the state provide social order there. It doesn't, and it never did. It acts to destroy order and civilization and sow chaos and destruction.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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You're thinking very narrowly about this. Your imagination for what people do to each other in order to turn a buck is quaint.

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This is pretty much my biggest quarrel with AC as well. And nicely put. It's amazing that people can be so distrustful of the state, and yet place so much trust in capitalists and their integrity and sense of lawfulness and good faith. When recent and historical evidence suggest that both are among the most untrustworthy parties in the history of humanity.

NT

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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Rothbard land is not lawless.

How do you punish the breaking of laws without a proto-state? Or do you always just leave it up to the aggrieved parties to settle the matter by whatever means they deem necessary?

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Why don't you try reading a book?

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

This is where I would link the sticky.

Tendency of man is to use force (initially bought on a market before the leader establishes a state) in order to make gains.

AC land cannot exist without the protection of a true state, because economies of scale dictate that any band willing to arm itself and treat extortion as a professional business is able to outcompete Bob in the fight for the money in Bob's wallet.

A tank is a great weapon. Fantastic weapon. Few individuals can own a tank, and since financial acuity is distributed independent of compassion or empathy, you can expect a few of those people to want to extort. The more people they recruit, the more power they can exert, because eventually, their violence is only ever sporadically applied.

And people will be recruited because, on some level, they think it's worth the money. They don't care enough about the people they hurt to quit.

The only way to avoid the imposition of such a ruler is to form a counter-coalition that must fight a sizeable free rider problem (you have to defend your neighbor because if you don't, it makes an attack on you too expensive to defend against.).

By the way, physically violent people outcompete non-physically violent people in the force market because they don't have to outsource.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

This is hilarious. It constantly amazes how statists can convince themselves to believe this [censored]. If it weren't for the state magically protecting us from ourselves, people would all be robbing each other blind, slitting each other's throats, and buggering each other's grandmothers every chance we got. Meanwhile, if this were true, WTF do you think the people controlling the apparatus of the state are doing?

No. Not everyone. But 3% of the population doing it is enough to make most people want to collectivize their resources and pay for comprehensive security.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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I think this is a definition that should please EVERYONE

State-like parties (professional mobs running protection rackets) will spring up almost immediately after the creation of a significant site of ACness. Such mobs have been a fact of life since at least the creation of the city.

In order to combat the threat of extortion or theft from these mobs, ACers will form cooperative leagues for mutual self-defense. These two coalitions (ACers and Mobs), in all their local franchises, will eventually conflict and civilians not party to either that live nearby may suffer collateral damage. If the local ACers lose, it is likely to result in a local monopolistic proto-state, so they'll be sure to fight hard.

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The piece your story is missing is the emerging proto-state next door. Its much easier to consolidate your racket if such a racket is necessary to protect people from being wiped out by the Goths. In a nutshell, that's the historical experience of European state formation.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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AC land cannot exist without the protection of a true state, because economies of scale dictate that any band willing to arm itself and treat extortion as a professional business is able to outcompete Bob in the fight for the money in Bob's wallet.

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Wrong. Because Bob is a subscriber of an insurance company that has hundreds of billions of dollars worth of assets to protect, and hence enormous resources to devote to protecting its customers. Your gang of thugs cannot compete in the force market and end up freezing their asses of above the arctic circle.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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No. Not everyone. But 3% of the population doing it is enough to make most people want to collectivize their resources and pay for comprehensive security.

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Wrong. Why don't you show how collectivised security (i.e. coercively funded monopoly security) can possibly be more effective than competitive security. All you have to do is show that monopoly is better than competition, that central planning is better than decentralized planning, and that theft and coercion are necessary so that you won't have theft and coercion. That should be easy enough. And then we can all implement your communist Utopia, since if you can show any of that for security, it should apply to any other good or service.

Oh, wait, here comes the part where security is magically "different".

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

all the things you've said have been done before and answered satisfactorily/exhaustivly (delete depending on viewpoint) though I'm interested in the answer to my post about transaction costs I've either forgotten the answer or none was forthcoming.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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No. Not everyone. But 3% of the population doing it is enough to make most people want to collectivize their resources and pay for comprehensive security.


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There would be security in Rothbard land, too. Law and security.

In fact, there is plenty of private security even with the government monopolization of police.

I can hire a security guard or team of security guards, an alarm system for my house, buy a shotgun, buy a rottweiler, build a gate, hire a bodyguard, buy padlocks, lo-jack, the club, mace or pepper spray, learn kung fu, and the list goes on...

Note that private firms will also employ a heavy mixture of the above as well to protect not only their stock, their warehouses, and their outlets, but their customers purchasing their goods as well.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

Wrong. Because Bob is a subscriber of an insurance company that has hundreds of billions of dollars worth of assets to protect, and hence enormous resources to devote to protecting its customers. Your gang of thugs cannot compete in the force market and end up freezing their asses of above the arctic circle.

Insurance companies have a market incentive to punitively enforce restrictions on behavior, so that they see a lower claim rate. Someone will decide that if Bob goes BASE jumping, he needs to go to insurance company jail. Who stops them from doing that?

Or if a man steals $1,000,000 each from two neighbors who are subscribers to different insurance plans, and he dies with only $730,000, who arbitrates the split? Who ensures that one party doesn't bribe the arbiter (or even the entity that disburses the funds to the claimants) to overpay them?

If the stakes are sufficiently large, a person only has to break a deal once to be set for life.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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Insurance companies have a market incentive to punitively enforce restrictions on behavior, so that they see a lower claim rate. Someone will decide that if Bob goes BASE jumping, he needs to go to insurance company jail. Who stops them from doing that?


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He was referring to private security insurance. Which is different from your health insurance.

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Or if a man steals $1,000,000 each from two neighbors who are subscribers to different insurance plans, and he dies with only $730,000, who arbitrates the split? Who ensures that one party doesn't bribe the arbiter (or even the entity that disburses the funds to the claimants) to overpay them?


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Arbiters who accept bribes go out of business. Imagine if PriceWatersHouseCoopers was exposed by accepting bribes from Paradise to keep its "rigged cards" under wraps. Who would ever hire PWHC after that?

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If the stakes are sufficiently large, a person only has to break a deal once to be set for life.

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This is true with or without a state. Not getting caught is the key [img]/images/graemlins/wink.gif[/img]

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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Arbiters who accept bribes go out of business. Imagine if PriceWatersHouseCoopers was exposed by accepting bribes from Paradise to keep its "rigged cards" under wraps. Who would ever hire PWHC after that?

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Well, PWHC wouldn't be accepting bribes, Joe Blo in the claims department would be. After accepting bribes and resigning, he'd go on to lead a happy and healthy life and let PWHC deal with his mess.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

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Arbiters who accept bribes go out of business. Imagine if PriceWatersHouseCoopers was exposed by accepting bribes from Paradise to keep its "rigged cards" under wraps. Who would ever hire PWHC after that?

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Well, PWHC wouldn't be accepting bribes, Joe Blo in the claims department would be. After accepting bribes and resigning, he'd go on to lead a happy and healthy life and let PWHC deal with his mess.

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What makes Joe Blo immune from "prosecution"?

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

He was referring to private security insurance. Which is different from your health insurance.

Gary is a lawyer. Gary is rich and is afraid of theft, so he hires a bodyguard, Bob. Sara and Gary broke up and now, during Bob's lunchbreak, she walks up to Gary in his office and shoots him.

Gary's family feels that Bob broke his contract and will pay to get his last month's wages revoked.

In order for insurance companies and clients to trust that each will hold up their end of the deal, they've gotta be willing to resort to force as punishment, or subsidize a watchful arbiter who is.

Re: AC: The Economics of Revolutions
 

What makes Joe Blo immune from "prosecution"?

What if Joe's family thinks he was wrongly prosecuted? They find a way to retaliate.