will need .pdf to view. too long to post here. here's an excerpt:
"The agencies have declined to state which internet gambling transactions are unlawful and have recognized the difficulty of doing so for reasons including "the fact that the legality of a particular Internet gambling transaction might change depending on the location of the gambler at the time the transaction was initiated, and the location where the bet or wager was received." Although the agencies are not required to list a set of restricted transactions, the proposed rule de facto requires designated payment systems and non-exempt processors to determine what is and is not a restricted transaction in each jurisdiction in which they do business. Without such a determination, which underlies all identification/blocking tasks, the entire set of policies and procedures would be useless, lack practical utility and, thus, could not be approved by OMB. The agencies have recognized the significant burden associated with determining what is and is not a restricted when they indicated that determining which internet wagers are unlawful would require formally interpreting "the various Federal and State gambling laws in order to determine whether the activities of each business that appears to conduct some type of gambling-related function are unlawful under those statutes. Therefore, each designated payment system and/or non-exempt transaction provider will need to retain competent counsel to draft a defensible legal opinion specifying, for each state/locality in which they transact business, exactly which internet wagers are unlawful and which are permitted. The legal and management costs associated with: 1) determining what is an unlawful transaction in a given locality; and 2) incorporating that information into commercial agreements, computer systems, and other policies and procedures is clearly a "burden" as defined in 44 U.S.C. §3502 with respect to "reviewing instructions," "adjusting the existing ways to comply with any previously applicable instructions and requirements," and "transmitting, or otherwise disclosing the information." The substantial burden associated with the task, which underlies all enforcement under the UIGEA, needs to be included in the ICR."
Quote: they're from omb (federal agency: office of management and budget)???
how much sway in the regulatory process do they have? is this good news for us? it seems to me they are boldly against the current version of the regs.
Nice find but I don't think CRE is 'from omb'.
maybe, hence the many question marks. i do think they provide regulatory analysis to congress about omb in some fashion, which is why thought they're from omb. maybe the experts can clear this part up when they read this thread.
The Center for Regulatory Effectiveness (CRE) was established in 1996, after the passage of the Congressional Review Act, to provide Congress with independent analyses of agency regulations. From this initial organizing concept, CRE has grown into a nationally recognized clearinghouse for methods to improve the federal regulatory process.
The CRE has two paramount goals:
To ensure that the public has access to data and information used to develop federal regulations, and
To ensure that information which federal agencies disseminate to the public is of the highest quality.
CRE also conducts analyses of the activities of the OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs and serves as a regulatory watchdog over Executive Branch agencies. In this capacity, CRE reports on agency compliance with a number of "Good Government Statutes" including, Data Quality, Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Review), the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Unfunded Mandates Act and the Congressional Review Act. See the CRE Report Card below.
CRE has no members, but it receives, from time to time, financial support, services in kind, and work product from foundations, trade associations and private firms. Consequently, at any one time, CRE benefits from the input or advice of literally hundreds of small and large firms.
In a nutshell, they are stating that the regs implementing the UIGEA violate some federal law requiring estimates of a cost for a proposed regulation and do not meet the statutory requirements in the UIGEA itself. Of course, completing all the steps that they propose to estimate all the costs of compliance with the regs would take years. Essentially, this shows that the UIGEA is unworkable. IMO iMEGA should have waited until the proposed regs were published. This comment would form the basis for a good argument against the UIGEA. Namely, implementing it violates other federal laws requiring cost estimates and paperwork reduction. Maybe these problems are part of the reason for the delay in the decision in the iMEGA case. Definitely, this whole comment helps our side.
The CRE is headed by Jim Tozzi, a former Reagan aide who has since gone into the business of killing regulations. I probably oppose him on most things, but the CRE seems to be an excellent ally in this fight. It would be interesting to learn why they are involved.
CRE sent out a letter a couple of months ago on this issue. We had an action item concerning it, in fact. Here's my post on that from July:
The Center for Regulatory Effectiveness sent a letter to several government officials concerning UIGEA regulatory burdens. It's at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/McInerney_Letter.pdf. The points brought up in the analysis may be good for us to use in our letters and in our comments on the proposed regulations (once they are released, starting the comment period.
There is strong evidence that a substantial number of credit card issuers are small businesses.
Census Bureau data strongly suggests that a substantial number small companies are in engaged in financial transaction processing services.
Small, innovative American technology companies will be directly and/or indirectly impacted by the rule.
The rule will place significant direct and indirect burdens on a substantial number of small entities, potentially altering the competitive situation in financial transactions industries and leading to further consolidations in already highly concentrated industries.
The letter also contains a number of people to whom we may consider writing, including:
Ms. Roberta K. McInerney Assistant General Counsel for Banking and Finance Room 2304 Department of the Treasury 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW. Washington, DC 20220
The Honorable Robert J. Portman, Director, The Office of Management and Budget
The Honorable Thomas M. Sullivan, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration
Mr. Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel, The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Mr. Peter A. Bieger, Deputy Assistant General Counsel, Banking and Finance
Dennis W. Carlton, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economic Analysis
Quote: The CRE is headed by Jim Tozzi, a former Reagan aide who has since gone into the business of killing regulations. I probably oppose him on most things, but the CRE seems to be an excellent ally in this fight. It would be interesting to learn why they are involved.
Quote: Soon enough, Tozzi's domain became known as the "black hole" of the regulatory process for its reputation of sucking in rules proposed by agencies and never letting them see light again.
Jim Tozzi has now moved onto my heros in government list. Anyone who spends his career trying to kill intrusive, social engineering types of government regulation is, in my opinion, a person that should be held up as an example.