gettier and equivocation.

[chezlaw]

This follows from a comment by Luckyme in another thread that gettier examples contain an equivocation. I'm guessing its to do with justification but who knows. Here's a stolen example to disect.


Prof Smith wants to know if Prof Jones is in the building. His not in his office so he looks in the common room and sees Jones sitting at a table.

He has a justified belief that Jones is in the building. In fact Jones is in the building so Smith has a TJB that Jones is in the building.


gettier problem - Jones is playing an acedemic joke. He has made a very lifelike moving coffee drinking waxwork of himself and is hiding under the table chuckling quietly to himself.

I dont thing there's any equivocation error here. Smith is justified in believing Jones is in the building. Justification does not imply truth in TJB.

chez

[guesswest]

He doesn't have sufficient justification?

I don't mean to oversimplify things and I'm aware people much smarter than me spend serious time and energy discussing Gettier problems, so it's likely I'm missing something - but I've never got why it isn't just a simple case of not 'really' having J.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
He doesn't have sufficient justification?

I don't mean to oversimplify things and I'm aware people much smarter than me spend serious time and energy discussing Gettier problems, so it's likely I'm missing something - but I've never got why it isn't just a simple case of not 'really' having J.

[/ QUOTE ]
He doesn't have sufficent justification but SJ is not a requirement of TJB.

chez

[guesswest]

I'd contend SJ and J have to be synonyms for TJB to make any sense. In your example he could look in from a distance, identify an indistinguishable human and conclude Jones is in the building. He has 'some' justification then, just clearly not enough. I believe it has to work on a continuum, and the only way you could get to the end of the line in terms of justification would be by knowing T to start with.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
I'd contend SJ and J have to be synonyms for TJB to make any sense. In your example he could look in from a distance, identify an indistinguishable human and conclude Jones is in the building. He has 'some' justification then, just clearly not enough. I believe it has to work on a continuum, and the only way you could get to the end of the line in terms of justification would be by knowing T to start with.

[/ QUOTE ]
You know I agree with you that TJB isn't knowledge but the idea is to accept the meanings of the words given by the proponants of the theory and go from there. in this example Smith has a TJB using the meanings of TJBers. The gettier examples demonstrate that there's a serious problem even using these meanings.

What's more they're pretty normal meanings. If I believe I see someone in a room I'm justified in believing that they are in the room.

chez

[guesswest]

I recognize that, but let's use your example again.

Say he looked out of the window and couldn't see Jones outside, and concluded that Jones was in the building. In that situation he'd have 'some' justification, but I believe if you asked a TJBer they'd say it was insufficient of flawed justification. And if someone defending this theory of knowledge will accept that, they have to extend that acceptance to rejecting Gettier problems as occuring only where J is not sufficiently present, as best I can tell.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
I recognize that, but let's use your example again.

Say he looked out of the window and couldn't see Jones outside, and concluded that Jones was in the building. In that situation he'd have 'some' justification, but I believe if you asked a TJBer they'd say it was insufficient of flawed justification. And if someone defending this theory of knowledge will accept that, they have to extend that acceptance to rejecting Gettier problems as occuring only where J is not sufficiently present, as best I can tell.

[/ QUOTE ]
I'd rather not argue with you because I agree with your objection to TJB but it's a different objections to gettier's.

You're demonstrating a problem with making clear what is an acceptable justification. gettier shows that any accepted standard for justifcation isn't going to be enough. (unless J->T for both of you)

chez

[luckyme]

[ QUOTE ]
This follows from a comment by Luckyme in another thread that gettier examples contain an equivocation.

[/ QUOTE ]

I wasn't pointing directly to equivocation but this aspect in Gettier ..
[ QUOTE ]
An entity has qualities that define it, so we can't just take the letters of the word and leave the qualities behind. Gettier problems seem to contain a similar issue.

[/ QUOTE ]

Your Gettier problem doesn't touch as well on my unease as some, but I'll tackle it then you'll clear it up ( whether it's justification, or shifting thruth, or blurred entities or ..).

WaxJones has attributes, some of which are "sitting in the chair drinking coffee", attributes which are part of the reasons we think we're looking at ProfJones. Those attributes are left off the claimed 'truth' of the belief when the real situation is revealed.

"I believe ProfJones is drinking a coffee at his desk in the room in Brooklynn wearing a red shirt but no glasses..." can't simply be shortened to "See, I was right! he was in the room." because it also applies "Oops, I was wrong, he has a blue shirt and glasses."

You point to the justification issue in JTB, which is a slippery measurement, but the part I seem to grapple with is the 'what are we claiming is true?' part. It seems "ProfJones is in the room" justified or not, isn't actually what we believe, it's been stripped of attributes that are false, left with attributes that are true. Let ProfJones =P doesn't work because Jones has 10 toes and P doesn't.

Does that help it showing the aspect I'm raising, thanks
luckyme

[guesswest]

[ QUOTE ]
You're demonstrating a problem with making clear what is an acceptable justification. gettier shows that any accepted standard for justifcation isn't going to be enough. (unless J->T for both of you)

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

What I was trying to demonstrate is that if there is such a thing as an 'acceptable' criteria, then there can be no instantiations of it and consequently no J. I don't think many TJBers argue against the former, so IMO have necessarily accepted the latter.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
It seems "ProfJones is in the room" justified or not, isn't actually what we believe, it's been stripped of attributes that are false, left with attributes that are true. Let ProfJones =P doesn't work because Jones has 10 toes and P doesn't.

[/ QUOTE ]
I think Smith believe Jones is in the room and it turns out that this belief is true. that he believs some other things that are false and doesn't believe some other relevent things that are true isn't relevent.

Gambling is the best way to sort these things. Smith bets that Jones is the room, he wins the bet. Would you accept a bookie saying that Smith didn't actually bet that Jones was in the room?

chez

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
You're demonstrating a problem with making clear what is an acceptable justification. gettier shows that any accepted standard for justifcation isn't going to be enough. (unless J->T for both of you)

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

What I was trying to demonstrate is that if there is such a thing as an 'acceptable' criteria, then there can be no instantiations of it and consequently no J. I don't think many TJBers argue against the former, so IMO have necessarily accepted the latter.

[/ QUOTE ]
You have me fearing that I have been making a strawman argument against TJBers. If they are not claiming that J is possible (unles J->T) then my mistake.

chez

[guesswest]

No, of course that's right. I was just suggesting that it's an internally inconsistent position even disregarding the application of skeptical arguments etc.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
No, of course that's right. I was just suggesting that it's an internally inconsistent position even disregarding the application of skeptical arguments etc.

[/ QUOTE ]
Can't they make it consistent by specifying what counts as justication?

chez

[guesswest]

Possibly, but I haven't the first idea how that would be quantified. And it'd certainly have to leave justification fallible, regardless of a causal link from TJ etc.

[luckyme]

[ QUOTE ]
Gambling is the best way to sort these things. Smith bets that Jones is the room, he wins the bet. Would you accept a bookie saying that Smith didn't actually bet that Jones was in the room?

[/ QUOTE ]

But that would be referring to ‘The Bet", which is a very different thing than "The Belief" ( well, I’m still claiming it is J..

Here’s my poker analogy. Big Larry bets $1000 all-in with his 4-9’s. I call with my Royal. Big Larry’s side-kick taps his underarm bulge and whispers to me, "It’s pretty obvious Larry has the best hand.". He showdowns, I muck. sigh. Larry wins the pot.
We could claim he bet because his belief was that he was going to win the pot, and therefore it was true…. Or was it? Wasn’t his belief " I have the best hand’ which we strip down to ‘so will win the pot", if he had a 7 high hand would he still have the same belief when making the bet on an attempted bluff? ( in neither case does he know his henchman is looking out for him).

It seems I’m not pointing at justification directly, but I’m claiming the ‘belief’ is poorly stated, and shorthanded out of meaningful existence, by a stripping process. The exercise seems like a reductionist/holistic problem. Some things can't be reduced. The ‘in the room’ belief isn’t free-floating, nobody actually believes that Jones is ‘in the room’ in some abstract way… like an ephemeral essence.

luckyme

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Gambling is the best way to sort these things. Smith bets that Jones is the room, he wins the bet. Would you accept a bookie saying that Smith didn't actually bet that Jones was in the room?

[/ QUOTE ]

But that would be referring to ‘The Bet", which is a very different thing than "The Belief" ( well, I’m still claiming it is J..

Here’s my poker analogy. Big Larry bets $1000 all-in with his 4-9’s. I call with my Royal. Big Larry’s side-kick taps his underarm bulge and whispers to me, "It’s pretty obvious Larry has the best hand.". He showdowns, I muck. sigh. Larry wins the pot.
We could claim he bet because his belief was that he was going to win the pot, and therefore it was true…. Or was it? Wasn’t his belief " I have the best hand’ which we strip down to ‘so will win the pot", if he had a 7 high hand would he still have the same belief when making the bet on an attempted bluff? ( in neither case does he know his henchman is looking out for him).

It seems I’m not pointing at justification directly, but I’m claiming the ‘belief’ is poorly stated, and shorthanded out of meaningful existence, by a stripping process. The exercise seems like a reductionist/holistic problem. Some things can't be reduced. The ‘in the room’ belief isn’t free-floating, nobody actually believes that Jones is ‘in the room’ in some abstract way… like an ephemeral essence.

luckyme

[/ QUOTE ]
You lost me I'm afraid. The bet and the belief are about the same propositon.

Smith believes that P is true
Smith bets that P is true
(P = Jones is in the room)

If its possible to bet that P is true then it's also possible to believe that P is true. If you're going to deny that (which you might) then we're going to be here a long time before we discuss TJB /images/graemlins/grin.gif

chez

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
He doesn't have sufficient justification?

I don't mean to oversimplify things and I'm aware people much smarter than me spend serious time and energy discussing Gettier problems, so it's likely I'm missing something - but I've never got why it isn't just a simple case of not 'really' having J.

[/ QUOTE ]
He doesn't have sufficent justification but SJ is not a requirement of TJB.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

Nor should it be.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
He doesn't have sufficient justification?

I don't mean to oversimplify things and I'm aware people much smarter than me spend serious time and energy discussing Gettier problems, so it's likely I'm missing something - but I've never got why it isn't just a simple case of not 'really' having J.

[/ QUOTE ]
He doesn't have sufficent justification but SJ is not a requirement of TJB.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

Nor should it be.

[/ QUOTE ]
So does Smith have TJB that Jones is in the building?

chez

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
He doesn't have sufficient justification?

I don't mean to oversimplify things and I'm aware people much smarter than me spend serious time and energy discussing Gettier problems, so it's likely I'm missing something - but I've never got why it isn't just a simple case of not 'really' having J.

[/ QUOTE ]
He doesn't have sufficent justification but SJ is not a requirement of TJB.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

Nor should it be.

[/ QUOTE ]
So does Smith have TJB that Jones is in the building?

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

Yes, which shows why a JTB analysis of knowledge doesn't work. But you can't fix our philosophical understanding of knowledge by requiring justification to be sufficient for the truth of the belief either.

[guesswest]

Why not?

[luckyme]

[ QUOTE ]
You lost me I'm afraid. The bet and the belief are about the same propositon.

Smith believes that P is true
Smith bets that P is true
(P = Jones is in the room)

If its possible to bet that P is true then it's also possible to believe that P is true. If you're going to deny that (which you might) then we're going to be here a long time before we discuss TJB

[/ QUOTE ]

Get yourself comfy :-))

I'm straight out claiming that nobody has THAT belief "jones is in the room" stripped of all other connection with reality, justification, or eyesight. We shorthand Smiths belief and even equate it with a followup act ( like betting on an actual state in the universe), but if we could get inside Smiths head, there'd be no such 'stand-alone' belief or anything foggily resembling it.

We can't take the "jones in the room" and tear it from all the other factors. It's like seeing a red apple on the counter and believing in the red being there even when the apple isn't. That is not the belief that we have --"there's a red on my counter", it's contingent on the whole cast or a good chunk of them.

I'll highlight the target ... Smith never did believe "jones is in the room", he'll bet on it because of his actual belief "Jones is at his desk, sucking on a lemon, etc". When we talk about Smiths 'belief' being 'true' or not we are really refering to an artificially extracted portion ( like the 'red on my counter') and that is the case even if we ask Smith !! We do 'condense' our beliefs for communication purposes, but that doesn't make the 'what we believe' any different.

Smith may well bet on "Jones is in the room" fully certain he is going to win, but that doesn't mean he has a belief "Jones is in the room". He bets because his belief is "I'm looking right at Jones, at his desk, eating a red apple.." I would insist he wins his bet, I deny his belief is true because his belief was never tested by the bet.

chez, you know I'm feeling my way through this, but I'd find it odd if this type of objection isn't raised in various 'truth/knowledge' situations in philosophy. What is the name for this objection I have? so I can find some fellow-travellers :-)

thanks, luckyme

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
You lost me I'm afraid. The bet and the belief are about the same propositon.

Smith believes that P is true
Smith bets that P is true
(P = Jones is in the room)

If its possible to bet that P is true then it's also possible to believe that P is true. If you're going to deny that (which you might) then we're going to be here a long time before we discuss TJB

[/ QUOTE ]

Get yourself comfy :-))

I'm straight out claiming that nobody has THAT belief "jones is in the room" stripped of all other connection with reality, justification, or eyesight. We shorthand Smiths belief and even equate it with a followup act ( like betting on an actual state in the universe), but if we could get inside Smiths head, there'd be no such 'stand-alone' belief or anything foggily resembling it.

We can't take the "jones in the room" and tear it from all the other factors. It's like seeing a red apple on the counter and believing in the red being there even when the apple isn't. That is not the belief that we have --"there's a red on my counter", it's contingent on the whole cast or a good chunk of them.

I'll highlight the target ... Smith never did believe "jones is in the room", he'll bet on it because of his actual belief "Jones is at his desk, sucking on a lemon, etc". When we talk about Smiths 'belief' being 'true' or not we are really refering to an artificially extracted portion ( like the 'red on my counter') and that is the case even if we ask Smith !! We do 'condense' our beliefs for communication purposes, but that doesn't make the 'what we believe' any different.

Smith may well bet on "Jones is in the room" fully certain he is going to win, but that doesn't mean he has a belief "Jones is in the room". He bets because his belief is "I'm looking right at Jones, at his desk, eating a red apple.." I would insist he wins his bet, I deny his belief is true because his belief was never tested by the bet.

chez, you know I'm feeling my way through this, but I'd find it odd if this type of objection isn't raised in various 'truth/knowledge' situations in philosophy. What is the name for this objection I have? so I can find some fellow-travellers :-)

thanks, luckyme

[/ QUOTE ]
I don't know what (or if) its called. Obviously I disagree. I have beliefs like people are in rooms (or at least I believe I do).

[ QUOTE ]
I'll highlight the target ... Smith never did believe "jones is in the room", he'll bet on it because of his actual belief "Jones is at his desk, sucking on a lemon, etc". When we talk about Smiths 'belief' being 'true' or not we are really refering to an artificially extracted portion ( like the 'red on my counter') and that is the case even if we ask Smith !! We do 'condense' our beliefs for communication purposes, but that doesn't make the 'what we believe' any different.

[/ QUOTE ]
The same analysis will apply to the belief that 'Jones is at his desk' so you have to deny that is a belief as well, don't you. Can you give an example of a belief that survives or are you claiming that we have no beliefs at all.

chez

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
Why not?

[/ QUOTE ]

In the case of empirical beliefs, for example, how could justification ever entail truth? Suppose I have some belief that p for some empirical proposition p that is based on perceptual (say, visual) experience. How could the perceptual justification for my belief that p ever entail the truth of p?

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Why not?

[/ QUOTE ]

In the case of empirical beliefs, for example, how could justification ever entail truth? Suppose I have some belief that p for some empirical proposition p that is based on perceptual (say, visual) experience. How could the perceptual justification for my belief that p ever entail the truth of p?

[/ QUOTE ]
It can't. That's why skeptics say knowledge is impossible.

Doesn't follow that that's not what we mean by knowledge.

It does follow that anyone who calls TJB knowledge is talking about something other than the original meaning of knowledge.

We've got back to the previous thread but I think we all know what we're talking about now.

chez

[guesswest]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Why not?

[/ QUOTE ]

In the case of empirical beliefs, for example, how could justification ever entail truth? Suppose I have some belief that p for some empirical proposition p that is based on perceptual (say, visual) experience. How could the perceptual justification for my belief that p ever entail the truth of p?

[/ QUOTE ]

It doesn't, and as a skeptic I believe knowledge is impossible for this reason alone.

What I was suggesting though, is that even if you accept TJB as given, with or without modifications for Gettier problems, you're going into run into this issue before you even get to the skeptical argument. Here's an example:

Say I read someones posts on here, lets make the unfortunate victim of this example chezlaw since he's the last post.

I see chez post something and conclude that he's bitter and angry. I conclude from this that chez must be losing massive amounts of money at the tables. I further conclude that he may have resorted to crime to pay his bills. I start to worry that he's going to break into my house and steal my furniture. I start to worry he's robbing me right now. I run to the window, look out and see he isn't on my driveway. That must mean he's in my house!

These are all inferences that are only flawed on account of them being insufficient, not contradictory or non-linear. For instance, by looking on my driveway I've ruled out one of the places he could be other than in my house. But the conclusion is clearly insane.

Even the most diehard TJBer will say in such a case my justificiation simply isn't sufficient, it's not that I have none. And if that admission can be made, it has to continue right through all the Gettier examples and up until the point where J=T. That's why I was suggesting SJ and J are necessarily identical in a TJB model, and in Gettier type problems it's a simple case of J being absent.

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Why not?

[/ QUOTE ]

In the case of empirical beliefs, for example, how could justification ever entail truth? Suppose I have some belief that p for some empirical proposition p that is based on perceptual (say, visual) experience. How could the perceptual justification for my belief that p ever entail the truth of p?

[/ QUOTE ]


Even the most diehard TJBer will say in such a case my justificiation simply isn't sufficient, it's not that I have none. And if that admission can be made, it has to continue right through all the Gettier examples and up until the point where J=T.

[/ QUOTE ]

Why is that the case? Why can't justification be a matter of degree or probability (perhaps relative probability)?

[guesswest]

It can be, and I'm suggesting it is.

But if it is a continuum, the Gettier problems don't apply because all they're saying is that J is insufficient - it's not a problem with J's causal relationship to T etc, or any of the other amendments people have proposed to 'solve' the Gettier problems. And J always will be insufficient without direct access to T.

[luckyme]

Ah, maybe this will help..

[ QUOTE ]
I have beliefs like people are in rooms (or at least I believe I do).

[/ QUOTE ]

Setting aside your parethetical comment. Let's say Smith has the belief as given in your example. I just talked to Jones on the phone, and he said he was in his office and would be for the next hour. Do Smith and I have the same belief? Would you tell somebody, "when it comes to Jones being in his office, Smith and luckyme have the same belief."
That seems to be part of my view... We don't.

Maybe the area I was targeting is 'truth' or 'knowledge' but you're slowly making me question the nature of belief. This comment helped a lot..

[ QUOTE ]
The same analysis will apply to the belief that 'Jones is at his desk' so you have to deny that is a belief as well, don't you. Can you give an example of a belief that survives or are you claiming that we have no beliefs at all.

[/ QUOTE ]

You're certainly swaying me in that direction. It's not like we walk around with a million beliefs filed away, yet if I asked you a million belief questions you'd have an answer for them.
In that sense, beliefs are not something we 'Have', but are something we produce in response to belief questions, many self-induced. There is a constant stream of interactive and very recursive processes going on, and nothing is static enough to qualify as a 'state of belief'.

At your prodding, I'm coming around to beliefs being a bit like the quantum effects ( but unrelated ), they're only there when we look.
Do I believe the Queen is asleep right now? hmmmmm.

thanks chez, I'll see if I can google anything helpful to use some terminology you'd recognize,
luckyme

[bunny]

[ QUOTE ]
In that sense, beliefs are not something we 'Have', but are something we produce in response to belief questions, many self-induced. There is a constant stream of interactive and very recursive processes going on, and nothing is static enough to qualify as a 'state of belief'.

[/ QUOTE ]
What about "A state of belief is a propensity to answer a belief question in a particular way." If it remains constant over time it becomes more and more "cherished" if you like. My answer to "What do you believe your name is?" has not changed, nor is it likely to in the foreseeable future so it is a deeply held belief.

[ QUOTE ]
At your prodding, I'm coming around to beliefs being a bit like the quantum effects ( but unrelated ), they're only there when we look.

[/ QUOTE ]
I know you only said a bit like but this doesnt accord with my understanding of beliefs at all. Although I may only notice them when I look - I dont get any idea that they werent there, or that it was only decided at that instant.

[luckyme]

[ QUOTE ]
I dont get any idea that they werent there, or that it was only decided at that instant.

[/ QUOTE ]

My calculator always gives the answer 4 when I punch in 2+2, but I'm not confident that the answer is in there when I'm not asking. Treat that as whatever level of analogy you think fits.

In general, I'm very suspicious of, or at least see no reason to put much weight on the "I experience it as X" when it comes to figuring things out. Heck, it always seems to me that they're dealing off the top of the deck before the sun rises in the sky.

Do you think you have beliefs about these topics before I ask them?
- Is there a dead mouse under your fridge?
- Is Paris higher than Denver?
- Is there an eclipse occuring now?

The empirical evidence indicates a lot of making it up as we go.

Back to the underlying issue- Is your belief the prince will die tonight of measles, the same as my belief that he will die tonight by falling down the stairs, if we both express it as, "I believe the prince will die tonight." If he dies tonight by being hit by a truck, does that prove both our beliefs 'true' in a meaningful sense?

thanks, luckyme

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
It can be, and I'm suggesting it is.

But if it is a continuum, the Gettier problems don't apply because all they're saying is that J is insufficient - it's not a problem with J's causal relationship to T etc, or any of the other amendments people have proposed to 'solve' the Gettier problems. And J always will be insufficient without direct access to T.

[/ QUOTE ]

It's pretty much impossible to come up with informative logically necessary and sufficient conditions for anything--this is true for an analysis of knowledge or of personal identity, IMO.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
You're certainly swaying me in that direction. It's not like we walk around with a million beliefs filed away, yet if I asked you a million belief questions you'd have an answer for them.
In that sense, beliefs are not something we 'Have', but are something we produce in response to belief questions, many self-induced. There is a constant stream of interactive and very recursive processes going on, and nothing is static enough to qualify as a 'state of belief'.


[/ QUOTE ]
Beliefs only exist while we have them. It doesn't follow that they aren't static enough (whilst they are being had) to qualify as a state of belief.

It seems obvious that a state of belief exists whilst it has being had. If I consider 3*3 then I believe the answer is 9 - this is a conclusion reached by thinking (or recalling from memory or some combination) and seems to have a short but definite persistance in time.

Even if this is a trick of the mind I cant see it has any relevence to TJB. Whatever the mental construct that results in me 'having' the answer 9 is, it is this that we mean by belief when talking about TJB.

Far from having millions of belief, I've heard say that the maximum is 7. Personally, I struggle to cope with 2.

chez

[luckyme]

Perhaps a 'desire' analogy will help -
We ask 10 people, "Do you want to go to NY for the weekend?"
They all answer, "Yes, I desire to go to NY for the weekend."
Do they have the same desire? Is the desire to go to NY of the 16yr old girl the same desire of the retired father of 3 boys has? They give the same answer.

It's that loss of clarity and reasons in the shorthand version of beliefs ( or desires) that caught my attention. I found some Wiki on a Robert Nozick's gettier comments, that seem related to the aspect that caught my attention. I'm not sure what Nozick reasoning is, but he seem to dispute that "I see a barn" has the same validity as the bigger view "I see a red barn".

These 'shortened' belief statements remind of the lawyer insisting " Just answer yes or no !!" and the defendant protesting, "Yes, but.... "

[ QUOTE ]
Even if this is a trick of the mind I cant see it has any relevence to TJB. Whatever the mental construct that results in me 'having' the answer 9 is, it is this that we mean by belief when talking about TJB.

[/ QUOTE ]

Chez calculates the answer, luckyme sneaks a peek . Both answer "9". Do we have the same belief that the answer is 9?

JTB/gettier have to grapple with the problems of distilled answers to belief questions. I don't have a solution, in fact, I just freshly passed the 'hey, what's going on here stage' but looking at the nature of belief does seem to be a route worth exploring.

To do that, perhaps it helps to know what the actual process is when we believe. It may serve philosophy well to have it's claims built on what is actually occuring rather than on idealized but non-realistic assumptions. Maybe not. Perhaps I'm too influenced by the great improvement in science once it was empirically grounded.

Simply, if we're going to talk about people's beliefs, should our claims be based on how they believe? Or does it matter to philosophy?

thanks chez. luckyme

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
Chez calculates the answer, luckyme sneaks a peek . Both answer "9". Do we have the same belief that the answer is 9?

[/ QUOTE ]
I don't think it matters. We both believe the answer is 9 and we mean the same thing by '9'.

[ QUOTE ]
These 'shortened' belief statements remind of the lawyer insisting " Just answer yes or no !!" and the defendant protesting, "Yes, but.... "

[/ QUOTE ]
That's a different problem caused by lawyers asking questions that aren't true or false. If they ask the defendent if his wearing underwear then there's not normally a problem.

[ QUOTE ]
JTB/gettier have to grapple with the problems of distilled answers to belief questions. I don't have a solution, in fact, I just freshly passed the 'hey, what's going on here stage' but looking at the nature of belief does seem to be a route worth exploring.

[/ QUOTE ]
The beliefs are exactly the sort of beliefs people have: 'cars in garage', 'beer's in the fridge', 'elvis is in the building'. there's nothing distilled about them.

I think looking at the nature of belief is a big mistake when doing epistemology /images/graemlins/smile.gif

chez

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
Beliefs only exist while we have them.
chez

[/ QUOTE ]

You mean all beliefs must be occurrent beliefs? Why? Wouldn't that make folk-psychological explanatons of intentional behavior impossible? How could I explain my driving in a certain direction and getting to the store at location x if we can't say that while I was driving I had the belief that the store was at location x?

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Beliefs only exist while we have them.
chez

[/ QUOTE ]

You mean all beliefs must be occurrent beliefs? Why? Wouldn't that make folk-psychological explanatons of intentional behavior impossible? How could I explain my driving in a certain direction and getting to the store at location x if we can't say that while I was driving I had the belief that the store was at location x?

[/ QUOTE ]
out of my depth here but if that's a belief (which seems possible) then whilst you're doing the driving the belief is happening. You're just not aware that its happening.

Of the top of my head I rather call that something other than a belief and if this 'belief' is certain, TJ or whatever, I'd rather call it something other than knowledge.

Interesting point, does it make any difference to the question in hand?

chez

[bearly]

lacking some form of notation paragraphs 2 and 4 only further confuse what ever the issue may turn out to be.............b

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Beliefs only exist while we have them.
chez

[/ QUOTE ]

You mean all beliefs must be occurrent beliefs? Why? Wouldn't that make folk-psychological explanatons of intentional behavior impossible? How could I explain my driving in a certain direction and getting to the store at location x if we can't say that while I was driving I had the belief that the store was at location x?

[/ QUOTE ]
out of my depth here but if that's a belief (which seems possible) then whilst you're doing the driving the belief is happening. You're just not aware that its happening.

Of the top of my head I rather call that something other than a belief and if this 'belief' is certain, TJ or whatever, I'd rather call it something other than knowledge.

Interesting point, does it make any difference to the question in hand?

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

No, it has no bearing on the JTB stuff.

You said that beliefs 'only exist while we have them', which I took to mean that one has to be in some way entertaining the belief (aware of the belief) in order for the belief 'to exist'. But then you say that we can have some beliefs that we're not aware of (and I agree, I think there is a subconscious and that we can have non-occurrent beliefs, or beliefs that we are not cognizant of when we have them); so if that's the case what does it mean to say that beliefs only exist when we have them? If it just means the belief exists only when we have it either subconsciously or consciously, when else would it exist?

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
lacking some form of notation paragraphs 2 and 4 only further confuse what ever the issue may turn out to be.............b

[/ QUOTE ]
I disagee, although the terms could be interpreted ambiguously its pretty clear what the intending meaning is.

e.g. Someone could nitpick that he doesn't see Jones sitting at the table but it would just be a nitpick.

chez

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
I dont get any idea that they werent there, or that it was only decided at that instant.

[/ QUOTE ]

My calculator always gives the answer 4 when I punch in 2+2, but I'm not confident that the answer is in there when I'm not asking. Treat that as whatever level of analogy you think fits.

In general, I'm very suspicious of, or at least see no reason to put much weight on the "I experience it as X" when it comes to figuring things out. Heck, it always seems to me that they're dealing off the top of the deck before the sun rises in the sky.

Do you think you have beliefs about these topics before I ask them?
- Is there a dead mouse under your fridge?
- Is Paris higher than Denver?
- Is there an eclipse occuring now?

The empirical evidence indicates a lot of making it up as we go.

Back to the underlying issue- Is your belief the prince will die tonight of measles, the same as my belief that he will die tonight by falling down the stairs, if we both express it as, "I believe the prince will die tonight." If he dies tonight by being hit by a truck, does that prove both our beliefs 'true' in a meaningful sense?

thanks, luckyme

[/ QUOTE ]

"Treat that as whatever level of analogy you think fits."

I don't think there is a relevant analogy here that makes the point you're trying to make. Calculators are not thinkers--they are instruments that run entirely by syntactic rules, not semantic, and certainly not as reflective and self-reflective agents.

We standardly individuate beliefs linguistically in propositional clauses--'that clauses'--as in, the belief "that Mt. Everest is taller than the Empire State building." Indeed, there seems to be no other way to individuate beliefs since they are expressed linguistically and propositionally. So, it would seem to me that my belief "that Mt. Everest is taller then Mt. Blanc" is the same belief (token wise) as your belief "that Mt. Everest is taller then Mt. Blanc." But my belief "that Lincoln was killed in a hunting accident" is not the same belief as your belief "that Lincoln was killed in Ford's Theatre by an assassin."

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Beliefs only exist while we have them.
chez

[/ QUOTE ]

You mean all beliefs must be occurrent beliefs? Why? Wouldn't that make folk-psychological explanatons of intentional behavior impossible? How could I explain my driving in a certain direction and getting to the store at location x if we can't say that while I was driving I had the belief that the store was at location x?

[/ QUOTE ]
out of my depth here but if that's a belief (which seems possible) then whilst you're doing the driving the belief is happening. You're just not aware that its happening.

Of the top of my head I rather call that something other than a belief and if this 'belief' is certain, TJ or whatever, I'd rather call it something other than knowledge.

Interesting point, does it make any difference to the question in hand? Until the brain accesses the memories that

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

No, it has no bearing on the JTB stuff.

You said that beliefs 'only exist while we have them', which I took to mean that one has to be in some way entertaining the belief (aware of the belief) in order for the belief 'to exist'. But then you say that we can have some beliefs that we're not aware of (and I agree, I think there is a subconscious and that we can have non-occurrent beliefs, or beliefs that we are not cognizant of when we have them); so if that's the case what does it mean to say that beliefs only exist when we have them? If it just means the belief exists only when we have it either subconsciously or consciously, when else would it exist?

[/ QUOTE ]
That's what I was saying. although I was only thinking about conascious beliefs it extends to unconscious ones as well.

It was a response to LuckyMe's defense of no beliefs because we didn't have billions floating in our brains.

chez

[guesswest]

If that's the case how are we maintaining a level of constancy in beliefs over periods where we aren't accessing them?

Of course, it's difficult to identify exactly what constitutes subconscious thought, but seems like however far reaching it is it's not enough to account for my constant (or recurrent) belief since childhood that Paris is the capital of France. That particular examples seems significant in so far as it is (as best I can tell) a non-inferential belief.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
If that's the case how are we maintaining a level of constancy in beliefs over periods where we aren't accessing them?

Of course, it's difficult to identify exactly what constitutes subconscious thought, but seems like however far reaching it is it's not enough to account for my constant (or recurrent) belief since childhood that Paris is the capital of France. That particular examples seems significant in so far as it is (as best I can tell) a non-inferential belief.

[/ QUOTE ]
I think that's a real toughie. When I perceive green how do I recognise it as being similar to last time I perceived green. What stops grass appearing to be red next time I look at it?

I think that's the same question as to how I recognise a belief as being the same as an earlier belief.

Never studied philosophy of mind so maybe someone else can answer.

chez

[Bork]

[ QUOTE ]
If that's the case how are we maintaining a level of constancy in beliefs over periods where we aren't accessing them?

Of course, it's difficult to identify exactly what constitutes subconscious thought, but seems like however far reaching it is it's not enough to account for my constant (or recurrent) belief since childhood that Paris is the capital of France. That particular examples seems significant in so far as it is (as best I can tell) a non-inferential belief.

[/ QUOTE ]

You have a disposition to assent to the proposition that Paris is the capital of France. That disposition is your non-occurent belief that Paris is the capital of France. The disposition persists physically in your brain the same way a knifes sharpness persists while it sits on a table.

[luckyme]

[ QUOTE ]
I don't think it matters. We both believe the answer is 9 and we mean the same thing by '9' .

[/ QUOTE ]
the bold part is the issue that caught my attention on this topic originally.
Chezlaw and luckyme both comment, " Wetcourt is a good school." In order to know if we have the same belief we'd need to hear a lot more. Attributes for "good school" for one could well mean 'bad school' to the other.

In the '9' example, if I was illiterate and had been fudging thru life, but I copied your answer '9', believing that strange symbol with the german sounding name was the right answer because Chezlaw always gets 100% in math class. Would you still claim we have the same belief ... " ..the answer is 9." ?

You reasonably assumed "we both mean the same thing with 9" but if the contextual strings that all beliefs have don't matter then it shouldn't matter in this case either, and when two people respond with "Nine" and "Nein" or "9" we'll simply say, "same answer = same belief".

luckyme

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
In the '9' example, if I was illiterate and had been fudging thru life, but I copied your answer '9', believing that strange symbol with the german sounding name was the right answer because Chezlaw always gets 100% in math class. Would you still claim we have the same belief ... " ..the answer is 9." ?

You reasonably assumed "we both mean the same thing with 9" but if the contextual strings that all beliefs have don't matter then it shouldn't matter in this case either, and when two people respond with "Nine" and "Nein" or "9" we'll simply say, "same answer = same belief".

[/ QUOTE ]
I think we agree here. If your saying that 'nein' meaining 'no' is not the same answer as '9' but 'nein' meaning '9' is then I think we agree.

The words, spelling, language etc etc are not what's important. As long as we both mean the same thing then we have the same belief.

chez

Edited big time.

[luckyme]

[ QUOTE ]
The words, spelling, language etc etc are not what's important. As long as we both mean the same thing then we have the same belief.

[/ QUOTE ]

Yes. It's not what the person says, it's what the statement is representing for them ( not to me) that is their belief. That applies to all belief statements.

When 2 eyewitnesses testify, "A female did it" but one based on seeing a blonde teenager in torn jeans and the other a brunette middle-aged lady in a tutu, why would we want to claim that their belief is "A female did it" and they have the same belief, just because that's what they say?

I'm still digging through it, but gettier seems to prey on this disconnect between philosophical 'belief' and how actual belief works.

thanks, luckyme

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
When 2 eyewitnesses testify, "A female did it" but one based on seeing a blonde teenager in torn jeans and the other a brunette middle-aged lady in a tutu, why would we want to claim that their belief is "A female did it" and they have the same belief, just because that's what they say?

[/ QUOTE ]
We agree that they mean something different and so have different belief but I can't see how this relates to the gettier problem. gettier doesn't rely on this disconnect as far as I can see.

When Smith believes he see Jones he means that he thinks what he sees is the person Jones.

There's never a problem of him saying he sees Jones when he means that he sees a waxwork. He is mistaken but that's different.

chez

[bearly]

"pretty clear" makes for poor logic and "c'mon, we all know what he means to say" keeps the beer flowing in the pubs...............b

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
"pretty clear" makes for poor logic and "c'mon, we all know what he means to say" keeps the beer flowing in the pubs...............b

[/ QUOTE ]
There's no barrier to understanding in this case. Are you saying that you couldn't take what I wrote and put it in whatever notation you think matters?

chez

[bearly]

1)you think you know what smith is up to, 2) you know what smith is up to, 3)a silly maxim is introduced, 4)you postulate that smith did something, 5)you ask our opinion about the thoughts of bookies. 6) you are not stupid , therefore you must be very, very tired...........or there must be some equally convincing explanation for the above rambling.........b

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
1)you think you know what smith is up to, 2) you know what smith is up to, 3)a silly maxim is introduced, 4)you postulate that smith did something, 5)you ask our opinion about the thoughts of bookies. 6) you are not stupid , therefore you must be very, very tired...........or there must be some equally convincing explanation for the above rambling.........b

[/ QUOTE ]
So its not a problem of notation? You're saying you don't understand something.

Have a go at telling me which bit you don't understand and I'll try to explain.

chez

[bearly]

is it the case that the folks on this forum who enjoy this sort of speculation don't know how to diagram an argument, or do they feel doing that would take all the fun out of things?.................................b

[bearly]

sorry, but your remarks are simply too precious to take seriously. i understand very clearly that if your series of "statements" were not written under some sort of duress, then, as someone who is (at least) capable of clarity of thought, i can find nothing worth "putting under the microscope" so to speak. perhaps you could explain your thoughts (in this case) simply and clearly. some form of informal notation might not hurt. i would really enjoy seeing this topic (op) discussed/debated between the two (or more) of you w/ the seriousness you would reserve for those who appreciate the beautiful simplicity that comes w/ a true understanding of the argument. not a snippit.......................................b

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
sorry, but your remarks are simply too precious to take seriously. i understand very clearly that if your series of "statements" were not written under some sort of duress, then, as someone who is (at least) capable of clarity of thought, i can find nothing worth "putting under the microscope" so to speak. perhaps you could explain your thoughts (in this case) simply and clearly. some form of informal notation might not hurt. i would really enjoy seeing this topic (op) discussed/debated between the two (or more) of you w/ the seriousness you would reserve for those who appreciate the beautiful simplicity that comes w/ a true understanding of the argument. not a snippit.......................................b

[/ QUOTE ]
here;s the example I nicked from wiki (seen it before not sure of the original source)

[ QUOTE ]
Smith walks into a room and seems to see Jones in it; she immediately forms the justified belief, "Jones is in the room." But in fact, it is not Jones that Smith saw; it was a life-size replica propped in Jones's chair. Nevertheless, Jones is in the room; she is just hiding under the desk reading comic books while her replica makes it seem as though she is in. So Smith's belief is not only justified but also true.

[/ QUOTE ]
Makes sense to me. If you would be happier with 'seems to see' rather than 'see' then ok it is clearer. Can't really see you're problem.

chez

[guesswest]

bear - this is primarily a discussion of terms, what constitutes J etc, so it's not easy to diagram it in a way that'd be useful. And if you feel it's missing that kind of formal analysis, you could perhaps suggest some notation yourself.

[bearly]

thanks chez, your last sentence freed me of the frustration (or maybe agitation) i was experiencing..............b