Epistemology

[guesswest]

I'm currently doing a philosophy BA by distance learning with a UK university (which isn't where I am). This basically involves showing up once a year for exams. I'm doing four classes this year, with 3 one hour exam papers for each - so 12 hours total over 12 questions.

Previously I'd been 2 classes short of my phil BA in the US, and before that had 2 years of yet another phil degree programme in the UK. So with a ridiculous 6 years of undergraduate philosophy under my belt, I'd figured these first year exams would basically be a case of 'going through the motions', since it's all stuff I've covered time and again in my aimlessly drifting time in education.

But I was looking through past exam papers last night, and suddenly realized I was being way to cocky figuring I already knew this stuff, and that I actually don't have any kind of well-formed notion on how to answer the kind of questions that show up. I haven't studied at all, and just can't remember a lot of this stuff. To that end, I'm going to stick one of those previous exam questions up on here every few days, and would be hugely grateful if anyone has any tips/suggestions/thoughts on how to answer the questions that show up, both with reference to the kind of arguments that are pertinent, and to the philosophers I should be mentioning. The first one:

Is knowledge justified true belief?

[chezlaw]

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I'm currently doing a philosophy BA by distance learning with a UK university (which isn't where I am). This basically involves showing up once a year for exams. I'm doing four classes this year, with 3 one hour exam papers for each - so 12 hours total over 12 questions.

Previously I'd been 2 classes short of my phil BA in the US, and before that had 2 years of yet another phil degree programme in the UK. So with a ridiculous 6 years of undergraduate philosophy under my belt, I'd figured these first year exams would basically be a case of 'going through the motions', since it's all stuff I've covered time and again in my aimlessly drifting time in education.

But I was looking through past exam papers last night, and suddenly realized I was being way to cocky figuring I already knew this stuff, and that I actually don't have any kind of well-formed notion on how to answer the kind of questions that show up. I haven't studied at all, and just can't remember a lot of this stuff. To that end, I'm going to stick one of those previous exam questions up on here every few days, and would be hugely grateful if anyone has any tips/suggestions/thoughts on how to answer the questions that show up, both with reference to the kind of arguments that are pertinent, and to the philosophers I should be mentioning. The first one:

Is knowledge justified true belief?

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Go through the various TJB theories

Then quote gettier problems:

Then Nozick's counterfactual theory of knowledge.

Chezlaw's dliemma that TJB at best reduces to Knowledge if True which is not what was wanted in the first place. The idea is to know what is true.

chez

[guesswest]

Thanks much /images/graemlins/smile.gif

On the latter, do you view some other approach as not contingent in that way?

[tonysoldier]

Rant about the pitfalls and ever move obvious limitations and failures of normative analytic formulations.

[guesswest]

Thanks both. I'm ok with this stuff post-Gettier, I just couldn't really recall the genesis of TJB.

To that end I just spend today rereading Theaetetus, which I haven't picked up in years. Was expecting it to be about as enjoyable as eating the contents of an ashtray, was pleasantly surprised - is a page turner!

[atrifix]

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Thanks both. I'm ok with this stuff post-Gettier, I just couldn't really recall the genesis of TJB.

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It starts with Plato/Aristotle. Not sure which books it originates in. I'd be surprised if it wasn't somewhere in Republic, though.

[Philo]

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Chezlaw's dliemma that TJB at best reduces to Knowledge if True which is not what was wanted in the first place. The idea is to know what is true.

chez

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The idea is to know what knowledge is, isn't it?

[chezlaw]

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Chezlaw's dliemma that TJB at best reduces to Knowledge if True which is not what was wanted in the first place. The idea is to know what is true.

chez

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The idea is to know what knowledge is, isn't it?

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Sure but as knowledge is about knowing what's true then TJB is not knowledge.

Its a typical philosophers trick. Having recognised that the skeptical argument is correct and that knowing what is true is impossible, they say that knowledge must be something attainable and downgrade the meaning of the word 'knowledge' to fit.

Dennett does the same with 'free-will' but at least he has the decency to say so /images/graemlins/smile.gif

I suspect pragmatists do the same with the idea of truth but am not sure about that.

chez

[guesswest]

I suspect chezlaw does the same with god /images/graemlins/grin.gif

[Scotch78]

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Is knowledge justified true belief?

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No, but good luck coming up with a better hypothesis.

Scott

[Scotch78]

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Was expecting it to be about as enjoyable as eating the contents of an ashtray, was pleasantly surprised - is a page turner!

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You can't go wrong with Nietzsche, Plato or Kierkegaard, but pretty much everyone else requires drugs.

Scott

[pilliwinks]

You can read Nietzsche without drugs? I'm impressed. I have to suppress the gag reflex after only a few pages.

I'd add Locke to the list of truth-seekers who are readable.

[Philo]

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Chezlaw's dliemma that TJB at best reduces to Knowledge if True which is not what was wanted in the first place. The idea is to know what is true.

chez

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The idea is to know what knowledge is, isn't it?

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Sure but as knowledge is about knowing what's true then TJB is not knowledge.

Its a typical philosophers trick. Having recognised that the skeptical argument is correct and that knowing what is true is impossible, they say that knowledge must be something attainable and downgrade the meaning of the word 'knowledge' to fit.

chez

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I'm not sure I follow. If the JTB analysis were true, i.e., if justified true belief were indeed a correct criterion of knowledge, then the criterion itself would be a bit of knowledge, but since it's not true it's not knowledge. Is that what you're saying?

What is 'the' skeptical argument? Do you mean the general skeptical claim that attaining knowledge is impossible if knowing p entails that p is true? If so, how is the JTB analysis a downgrading of knowledge, since it entails that knowing p means that p must be true?

[chezlaw]

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I'm not sure I follow. If the JTB analysis were true, i.e., if justified true belief were indeed a correct criterion of knowledge, then the criterion itself would be a bit of knowledge, but since it's not true it's not knowledge. Is that what you're saying?

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That's about it. If JTB is knowledge then its not knowledge in the sense originaly meant. It may be the best we can do but if so then its an admission of defeat.

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What is 'the' skeptical argument? Do you mean the general skeptical claim that attaining knowledge is impossible if knowing p entails that p is true? If so, how is the JTB analysis a downgrading of knowledge, since it entails that knowing p means that p must be true?

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The skeptical claim is that JB->T is impossible.

That is, however much justification/evidence you have for a belief being true it is imposible to leap the gap and deduce that it is true.

TJB admits that and just says that the true ones are true. This is trivially true but changes nothing about the ability of the believer to deduce which of their beliefs are true.

chez

[Philo]

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I'm not sure I follow. If the JTB analysis were true, i.e., if justified true belief were indeed a correct criterion of knowledge, then the criterion itself would be a bit of knowledge, but since it's not true it's not knowledge. Is that what you're saying?

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That's about it. If JTB is knowledge then its not knowledge in the sense originaly meant. It may be the best we can do but if so then its an admission of defeat.

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What is 'the' skeptical argument? Do you mean the general skeptical claim that attaining knowledge is impossible if knowing p entails that p is true? If so, how is the JTB analysis a downgrading of knowledge, since it entails that knowing p means that p must be true?

[/ QUOTE ]
The skeptical claim is that JB->T is impossible.

That is, however much justification/evidence you have for a belief being true it is imposible to leap the gap and deduce that it is true.

TJB admits that and just says that the true ones are true. This is trivially true but changes nothing about the ability of the believer to deduce which of their beliefs are true.

chez

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The JTB analysis of knowledge is not about the relationship between evidence and truth. The fact that we cannot deduce the truth from the totality of evidence does not bear on the the JTB analysis of knowledge at all--it's an analysis of what knowledge is supposed to be, not how we arrive at it.

[hmkpoker]

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You can read Nietzsche without drugs? I'm impressed. I have to suppress the gag reflex after only a few pages.

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That's how I felt about Keynes /images/graemlins/grin.gif

[luckyme]

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TJB admits that and just says that the true ones are true. This is trivially true but changes nothing about the ability of the believer to deduce which of their beliefs are true.

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I gave up on true a long time ago. Today, I settle for consistancy built from a few untestable premises. I'd settle for the same from others .... true is a bar too high.

luckyme

[chezlaw]

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I'm not sure I follow. If the JTB analysis were true, i.e., if justified true belief were indeed a correct criterion of knowledge, then the criterion itself would be a bit of knowledge, but since it's not true it's not knowledge. Is that what you're saying?

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That's about it. If JTB is knowledge then its not knowledge in the sense originaly meant. It may be the best we can do but if so then its an admission of defeat.

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What is 'the' skeptical argument? Do you mean the general skeptical claim that attaining knowledge is impossible if knowing p entails that p is true? If so, how is the JTB analysis a downgrading of knowledge, since it entails that knowing p means that p must be true?

[/ QUOTE ]
The skeptical claim is that JB->T is impossible.

That is, however much justification/evidence you have for a belief being true it is imposible to leap the gap and deduce that it is true.

TJB admits that and just says that the true ones are true. This is trivially true but changes nothing about the ability of the believer to deduce which of their beliefs are true.

chez

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The JTB analysis of knowledge is not about the relationship between evidence and truth. The fact that we cannot deduce the truth from the totality of evidence does not bear on the the JTB analysis of knowledge at all--it's an analysis of what knowledge is supposed to be, not how we arrive at it.

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Yes, but knowledge was originally supposed to allow you to have something equivalant to JB->T. The skeptics have long argued that that is impossible. TJB has given up on bridging the gap and hence is not knowledge in the original sense.

That's why TJB could be knowledge and yet the skeptical claim that knowledge is impossible is untouched. It's a different meaning of the concept of knowledge.

chez

[chezlaw]

To put it another way:

TJB is possible
The skeptical claim that knowledge is impossible

can both be true. Hence TJB cannot be knowledge in the same sense as that refuted by the skeptical claim.

chez

[Philo]

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To put it another way:

TJB is possible
The skeptical claim that knowledge is impossible

can both be true. Hence TJB cannot be knowledge in the same sense as that refuted by the skeptical claim.

chez

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It seems to me now that you are confusing knowing that you know something with knowing something. The JTB analysis just says that to know p entails that p must be true, not that we must know that p is true.

I don't think that the JTB analysis is compatible with the claim that knowledge is impossible. To claim that there can be a correct criterion of knowledge is to claim ipso facto that knowledge is possible.

[guesswest]

If you don't know the you know something can you fully form belief?

[guesswest]

Let me rephrase that. I agree with what I think is your primary point, that the goal of epistemology is to identify what knowledge is rather than to develop some practical tool for identifying individual instances of knowing. If that's a goal at all you'd think it'd be a secondary (and loftier) one - but it's possible that the two are inseperable.

If it's a simple case of knowledge being TJB where we can't confirm T, then where are we getting J and thus B from in the first place? The only basis for JB in this situation is inferential, which will eventually terminate in all the glaring problems with classical foundationalism. It amounts to saying T is T, which is why I think chez described it as 'trivially true'.

[madnak]

Where did the idea that knowledge and truth are intrinsically related come from in the first place? I've read Plato and Aristotle and they just assume it as a given. "Of course knowledge and truth have something to do with one another. Like, duh."

Has anyone actually tried to justify this belief, or is it just a common premise?

[guesswest]

I think the truth requirement is what distinguishes 'knowledge' from 'belief', no?

[atrifix]

I don't really understand epistemology; perhaps someone can explain it to me. It certainly is useful in other practices to refer to an agent's beliefs, but I am not sure what the interesting implications of an agent's knowledge are.

By the way, the first text that deals with JTB is the Theaetetus.

[bunny]

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Where did the idea that knowledge and truth are intrinsically related come from in the first place? I've read Plato and Aristotle and they just assume it as a given. "Of course knowledge and truth have something to do with one another. Like, duh."

Has anyone actually tried to justify this belief, or is it just a common premise?

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I think it's just a common premise - I dont know anybody who thinks you can know something which isnt true. Of course, if you subscribe to TJB definition of knowledge then they are related by definition.

[Philo]

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If you don't know the you know something can you fully form belief?

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Huh?

[Philo]

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Where did the idea that knowledge and truth are intrinsically related come from in the first place? I've read Plato and Aristotle and they just assume it as a given. "Of course knowledge and truth have something to do with one another. Like, duh."

Has anyone actually tried to justify this belief, or is it just a common premise?

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What would it mean to say that you know p, but that p is false?

[chezlaw]

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To put it another way:

TJB is possible
The skeptical claim that knowledge is impossible

can both be true. Hence TJB cannot be knowledge in the same sense as that refuted by the skeptical claim.

chez

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I don't think that the JTB analysis is compatible with the claim that knowledge is impossible. To claim that there can be a correct criterion of knowledge is to claim ipso facto that knowledge is possible.

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Not if knowledge is used with two different meanings which is the problem.

The bit about knowing what you know is a canard. Its a problem caused by the TJB view of knowledge but doesn't exist for the usual meaning of knowledge.

Descartes knows he exists. That's a complete state entailing the fact that he knows that he knows. Using TJB he could know he exists but not know that he knows. This is not contradictory because TJB and the traditional meaning of knowledge are different.

chez

[guesswest]

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If you don't know the you know something can you fully form belief?

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Huh?

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I expanded on that in the subsequent post.

[guesswest]

chez - what is the 'usual' meaning of knowledge?

And I'm not sure Descartes can know he exists by TJB, he can just know 'there is thought' or something like that. Which might seem like a nitpick, but is pretty important in that it's not a foundation for anything because it's a truism.

[madnak]

It makes more sense to me to distinguish knowledge from belief based on volition. I believe something because I choose to, I know something because I can't believe otherwise.

[chezlaw]

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chez - what is the 'usual' meaning of knowledge?

And I'm not sure Descartes can know he exists by TJB, he can just know 'there is thought' or something like that. Which might seem like a nitpick, but is pretty important in that it's not a foundation for anything because it's a truism.

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The point about Descartes is not that he was right about knowing he existed but that he was clearly talking about something other than TJB when he claimed to know he existed.

Knowledge in the traditional sense (as used by Descartes, Ancient Greeks etc etc) is that the knower is in a position to assert the truth of some belief/thought without any doubt.

Descartes claimed he could assert the truth of his existence without any doubt. Like you, many have suggested Descartes was mistaken and that he didn't know he existed, but the criticism is not about his concept of knowledge.

TJB is not about the 'knower' asserting the truth of anything without doubt. 'knowledge' is just a label for the justified beliefs that happen to be true.

chez

[Philo]

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To put it another way:

TJB is possible
The skeptical claim that knowledge is impossible

can both be true. Hence TJB cannot be knowledge in the same sense as that refuted by the skeptical claim.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

I don't think that the JTB analysis is compatible with the claim that knowledge is impossible. To claim that there can be a correct criterion of knowledge is to claim ipso facto that knowledge is possible.

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Not if knowledge is used with two different meanings which is the problem.

The bit about knowing what you know is a canard. Its a problem caused by the TJB view of knowledge but doesn't exist for the usual meaning of knowledge.

Descartes knows he exists. That's a complete state entailing the fact that he knows that he knows. Using TJB he could know he exists but not know that he knows. This is not contradictory because TJB and the traditional meaning of knowledge are different.

chez

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Those who have worked on a JTB analysis have not taken themselves to be talking about a different sense of 'knowledge' than the traditional one, so what is the other meaning you are talking about?

The cogito does not require evidence, at least certainly not empirical evidence, which is precisely why Descartes thought it was indubitable. When you introduced skepticism I thought you were talking about empirically based beliefs, but the cogito is not an empirically based belief. It is not even the sort of claim that is susceptible to skeptical doubt, so there is no gap between knowing it and knowing that you know it. That is not the case with empirically based beliefs in general.

I don't know why you say 'using the JTB analysis he could no that he exists but not know that he knows.' If the cogito is an indubitable truth then thinking in the first person Descartes not only knows he exists, but also knows that he knows, and the JTB analysis does not change this; it just says that if he's justified in believing that he exists and it's true, then he knows it. Why do you think it does?

[chezlaw]

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Those who have worked on a JTB analysis have not taken themselves to be talking about a different sense of 'knowledge' than the traditional one, so what is the other meaning you are talking about?

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I've answered that in my response to guesswest.

I'd go from there because I think the rest of your post is based on a misunderstanding of what i'm saying.

From Wiki

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For most of philosophical history, "knowledge" was taken to mean belief that was justified as true to an absolute certainty. Any less justified beliefs were called mere "probable opinion." This viewpoint still prevailed at least as late as Bertrand Russell's early 20th century book The Problems of Philosophy. In the decades that followed, however, the notion that the belief had to be justified to a certainty lost favour.


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Whilst JTB has a long history, the lack of certainty on the behalf of the believer is a definite modern change from the long held view of what knowledge is.

I'm not sure why you think this is controversial.

chez

[guesswest]

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chez - what is the 'usual' meaning of knowledge?

And I'm not sure Descartes can know he exists by TJB, he can just know 'there is thought' or something like that. Which might seem like a nitpick, but is pretty important in that it's not a foundation for anything because it's a truism.

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The point about Descartes is not that he was right about knowing he existed but that he was clearly talking about something other than TJB when he claimed to know he existed.

Knowledge in the traditional sense (as used by Descartes, Ancient Greeks etc etc) is that the knower is in a position to assert the truth of some belief/thought without any doubt.

Descartes claimed he could assert the truth of his existence without any doubt. Like you, many have suggested Descartes was mistaken and that he didn't know he existed, but the criticism is not about his concept of knowledge.

TJB is not about the 'knower' asserting the truth of anything without doubt. 'knowledge' is just a label for the justified beliefs that happen to be true.

chez

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In the specific case of Descartes, I believe TJB is exactly what he was applying, albeit implicitly. The whole process of Cartesian doubt seems like a very traditional JB->T model to me. I realize you're suggesting otherwise, but I remain unclear as to exactly how you're saying his concept of knowledge was different, except in terms of his confidence that he'd successfully applied JB to arrive at T in a particular situation - perhaps you could clarify for me.

In the case of the ancient greeks, I do agree with you, but I think this might just be a translation problem. The word we've traditionally translated as 'knowledge' is 'episteme' - nowadays it's increasingly being translated as 'understanding'. The idea being that 'knowledge' in the platonic sense, where TJB first emerges, is a specific sub-category of understanding.

As far as accepting different definitions of knowledge goes. Something like JTB (I remain unconvinced that Gettier problems actually apply), seems like a good definition to me. Just because we have words for every other variation that's being discussed here, 'certainty', 'belief', 'understanding' etc. It's not to suggest that knowledge in the TJB sense is somehow holier or more profound, just that it deserves it's own term.

[Hoi Polloi]

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Thanks both. I'm ok with this stuff post-Gettier, I just couldn't really recall the genesis of TJB.

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It starts with Plato/Aristotle. Not sure which books it originates in. I'd be surprised if it wasn't somewhere in Republic, though.

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Plato's Theatetus and Sophist are his richest texts on knowledge/episteme. Justifed true belief is one of the definitions discussed/tested in the Theatetus.

[chezlaw]

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In the specific case of Descartes, I believe TJB is exactly what he was applying, albeit implicitly. The whole process of Cartesian doubt seems like a very traditional JB->T model to me. I realize you're suggesting otherwise ...

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I'm not suggesting otherwise, help, you've got me confused now /images/graemlins/smile.gif

Descartes is very much doing something like JB->T that's the traditional view of knowledge.

TJB is not JB->T.

Edit: I'm happy with different definitions/meanings of knowledge as you say its ok. I object to the confusion caused by not making clear they are different. I offer this thread in evidence /images/graemlins/grin.gif

chez

[guesswest]

Ah, I did misunderstand you.

Still, I'm not convinced TJB and JB->T are any different, for the same reason I reject the Gettier problems. JB->T requires perfect knowledge of J to work, so requires omniscience. In either case J and B are essentially redundant, since should you have sufficient knowledge to fully access J you already know T. I don't think it's possible to refute the skeptical argument in either instance.

[chezlaw]

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Ah, I did misunderstand you.

Still, I'm not convinced TJB and JB->T are any different, for the same reason I reject the Gettier problems. JB->T requires perfect knowledge of J to work, so requires omniscience. In either case J and B are essentially redundant, since should you have sufficient knowledge to fully access J you already know T. I don't think it's possible to refute the skeptical argument in either instance.

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JB->T being impossible is the skeptical argument which I agree with (excluding cases that require no justification such as I'm in pain where B->T)

JTB arguably does allow knowledge but only because it requires a much weaker standard.

Gettier attacks cases where we have TJB but because the justification is kinda correct but faulty (you know what I mean) it can't be seen as knowledge. Gettier problems may be resolvable or not - interesting stuff imo.

but whether or not gettier problems are resolved JB->T and JBT are different:

Suppose we have no gettier type problems and if the belief is true then the justification is always correct and non-faulty.

Then JTB is knowledge but JB doesn't imply T as the justfication is only neccesarily correct when the belief is true.

I stuggle to think of a realistic example so here's a contrived one:

I have a justified belief that my car is in the garage

Unknown to me the only way the car isn't in the garage is when its stolen in which case it will not be returned.

So when the cars in the garage I have TJB that its in the garage.

but my JB doesn't imply that the car is in the garage.

chez

[guesswest]

JB->T being impossible is the most obvious application of the skeptical argument, but I think the same argument does equal damage to TJB because they end up meaning the same thing. My reasoning would be something like this:

JTB appears to allow knowledge where JB are realized and T 'happens' to take place (and I'm assuming it's the 'happens' bit that is cause for you terming it a 'weaker standard). But I'd suggest that J can't take place without some other T, so it's susceptible to the regress problem. With that in mind, TJB is only distinguishable from JB->T if you can establish foundational truths (which is what made me think to start that other thread). But I don't think you can.

As far as the Gettier problems go, I agree it's a hugely interesting area - but IMO the flaw is accepting the problems as something which need resolved in the first place. If I believe something as a result of evidence, and the evidence turns out to be bogus but my belief correct - then it's just a failure of justification, I didn't have J. That's why I was suggesting that J needs knowledge of T in the first place, and is a redundant step because of it. For the same reason I'd suggest that in your example you just don't have enough J to get to T - but if you did you wouldn't need any.

[chezlaw]

The problem with this disgareement is that we both agree (I hate that /images/graemlins/wink.gif)

You are arguing that TJB is the same as the original view of knowledge and hence no-one has TJB's.

That may be right but I think TJBers are claiming that TJB is possible and is knowledge. To do this they are using a weaker concept od knowledge.

I think we both agree that:

Those who claim TJB is possible are talking about TJB in a way that is not the same as knowledge in the traditional sense.

I don't think others agree with this. Evidence that they don't is gettier type arguments. As you say if TJB is supposed to be knowledge in the original sense then gettier type examples are redundent.

chez