Fate and Free Will Are Incompatible

[spoohunter]

If something is fated to happen then, by definition, it must happen.

Free Will implies a choice between two options. If option A is fated to happen than option B cannot happen; as such you cannot choose between the two (since a true choice implies either can happen).

I apologize if this is too basic for you guys but I hear alot of people professing to believe in both and I thought I would clear the air.

[madnak]

Well, other than BCPVP I don't think anyone on the forum believes in both.

[guesswest]

Yes, most people would argue that you can only have one or the other. Soft determinists / compatibilists 'kinda' argue for the possibility of both, have a look at this (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism)

[spoohunter]

Note the same argument is used for an omniscient God (who knows the future) and free will being incompatible. Indeed an omniscient God (that knows the future, although that goes with omniscient I suppose) implies fate.

[jjacky]

[ QUOTE ]
Note the same argument is used for an omniscient God (who knows the future) and free will being incompatible. Indeed an omniscient God (that knows the future, although that goes with omniscient I suppose) implies fate.

[/ QUOTE ]

indeed. that's why i dont understand why most religious people believe in fate AND godly punishment for bad actions. imo that doesn't make any sense at all.

[DougShrapnel]

[ QUOTE ]
Free Will implies a choice between two options.

[/ QUOTE ] Free will requires one to be able to either increase or decrease the options available to him/her. A trival examples is what one has for dinner. If one only know that he can have chicken or steak, regardless of his fate to have steak. He still made the choice. Now if one is able to learn that pork is also a dinner choice he has increased his available options, and hence has free will. Unfortunely the english language doesn't contain "future and past perfect present" tenses or some such tense. To make this arguement much easier to argue against. Is this a valid arguement, One cannot change the past therefore freewill doesn't exist. This is esentially your arguement and has nothing to do with freewill.

[Matt R.]

But what if "fate" only implies having a set of options available to us? As an example, suppose I claim it is "fate" that so-and-so meets his/her soulmate. So it is inevitable that this event will occur (I'm not placing time restrictions on this to make it simple). The person can still choose whether to be with/date/marry the person given the circumstances. Just because it is fate that they met doesn't mean they must end up together. Now if you start saying things like "It is fate that I will become president", then it definitely is incompatible with free will. But what if you say "It is fate that I will have the option to become president"? Would free will and fate still be incompatible?

[spoohunter]

Matt R. yes, if I define fate as something other than fate, it is posssible that fate and free will could be compatible.

[guesswest]

Matt - the problem is, if you believe in fate, unless it's some kind of weird mystical belief, you're essentially saying those events are determined by causality. How then, can some things be determined this way and not other things?

[spoohunter]

Doug, I think you misunderstand my argument. It is you cannot change the future therefor free will does not exist (assuming fate does). Per your example if I was fated to have steak for dinner it does not matter that chicken and pork are on that menu I would have no free will in the matter. I could not order chicken or pork as by defintion I am fated to choose steak.

[Matt R.]

[ QUOTE ]
Matt R. yes, if I define fate as something other than fate, it is posssible that fate and free will could be compatible.

[/ QUOTE ]

So by your definition fate must be a restriction of choice. Yes, I suppose fate and free will are incompantible then. (Duh?)

[spoohunter]

This is not "my" definition of fate. It is the commonly accepted one by English speakers across the corner.

I also agree with you that this point is easy to grasp and obvious.

[Matt R.]

[ QUOTE ]
Matt - the problem is, if you believe in fate, unless it's some kind of weird mystical belief, you're essentially saying those events are determined by causality. How then, can some things be determined this way and not other things?

[/ QUOTE ]

Well, whether you believe in fate or not I'm sure you will agree that we all are placed in specific scenarios which are determined by causality. How we act on those is dependent upon our free will. Belief in fate would imply that those scenarios simply aren't truly random. Of course you can restrict your definition of fate as stuff you must do, which is incompatible with free will. I just don't believe you have to restrict your definition in this way.

Fate isn't necessarily a core part of my belief system or anything, by the way. I'm just offering up some possibilities for debate.

[spoohunter]

"we all are placed in specific scenarios which are determined by causality"

What does this mean?

"How we act on those is dependent upon our free will. "
Assuming you believe in free will.

"Belief in fate would imply that those scenarios simply aren't truly random."
Assuming you believe in RANDOM.

[DougShrapnel]

[ QUOTE ]
Doug, I think you misunderstand my argument. It is you cannot change the future therefor free will does not exist (assuming fate does). Per your example if I was fated to have steak for dinner it does not matter that chicken and pork are on that menu I would have no free will in the matter. I could not order chicken or pork as by defintion I am fated to choose steak.

[/ QUOTE ] Spoo I think you misunderstand your argument. It is you cannot change the (futurepast) whatever the furturepast means. I don't really know exaclty what futurepast is, only that not only has the choice not be made yet, but the choice has been made.

[ QUOTE ]
I am fated to choose steak.

[/ QUOTE ] Sounds like even you agree it is compatible, just overly complex and rather uneccesary. We normally dont' talk about things that have both a future(to choose) tense and a past(fated) tense at the same time, making this argument a hard one to digest. The nature of time is what is incompatible. The futurepast tense goes against our conception of time. The incompatiblity that you see is with the nature of time and fate, not with freewill.

[Matt R.]

The first definition of fate on dictionary.com:


The supposed force, principle, or power that predetermines events.
The inevitable events predestined by this force.

Certainly there are some "things" which are out of my control. My genetics, social situations, whatever random occurences you can think of, etc. Now, if these things aren't necessarily *random*, it would follow that they're predetermined in some way (see the English definition on dictionary.com, which is presumably the one you're using). You may then CHOOSE to act how you want in these scenarios, which clearly is compatible with free will.

Once you start saying fate requires specific choices to be made, then yes, it is incompatible. But I'm sure you'll agree that some things happen to you which are independent of choice.

[spoohunter]

I think this thread is going off topic. Whether or not we have free will is not the question... the question is whether or not free will can exist when you accept FATE as true.
If you believe in FATE why would it be true for some things or not others?
If you don't believe in fate their is no issue.

[spoohunter]

Doug : What are you talking about?

[DougShrapnel]

[ QUOTE ]
Doug : What are you talking about?

[/ QUOTE ] The nature of time. Mainly that fate is incompatible with the concept that past - present - future are the only 3 states of time.

Additionly freewill is a red hearing in this question, fate is incompatible with our concept of time, not becuase freewill is obviously so, and mutually exclusive.

[spoohunter]

Why is fate incompatible with the concept that past - present - future are the only 3 states of time?

[DougShrapnel]

Because fate implies the future allready happened. If we wish to rephrase, we could say the future is really the past.

If we wish to rephrase that to align with your argument we could say the the future has been determined(read: past my semantic arguement). If the future has been determined there is not choice. Logically it follows. The symantic arguement I'm making is the the word "future" is used out of context. In order for us to examine fate we must grant the univerese the properties that fate would require for it to be true. Namely, that states of time exist concurrenlty from different perspectives. The easiest way to explain what I'm saying is that a consequence of this property is that. "If the future is known, no other choice can be made, freewill does not exist." = "If the past is known no other choice can be made, freewill does not exist". You see the ridiculousness of the 2nd statement. The concept of fate requires a melding of future and past, and this leaves open a door for fate and freewill compatibility. This of course says nothing about the existance of fate or freewill.

Fate requires an unknown state of time.
Freewill requires learning and consiousness of learning.

Both are compatible.

[Carl_William]

Fate is just a thought. You have to apply probabilities to events to somewhat understand the occurence of events....

[spoohunter]

Yes, for fate to exist the future must be determined.

I don't really understand the rest of your argument.

[Carl_William]

Some scientist might correctly proclaim the fate of our universe is to be sucked into a black hole. But what is the odds of this happening in the next million years?

[DougShrapnel]

My argument is that predetermination is normally used to mean that past actions determine future actions (incompatible with freewill, if all of our actions are predetermined). What your argument is is that future actions determining future actions is the same type of barrier to free will that predetermination is. You are changing the definition of predetermined to include future actions determining those same future actions. It's hard to make this arguement clear. Is that clearer?

[guesswest]

Doug - I'm not convinced the 'future' being determined would require that it exists concurrently with the past. Specifically, I'm not sure hard determinism necessitates some kind of time stasis. Surely the actualization of determined events is different from them existing as something which is bound to occur?

[spoohunter]

I'm not really sure why you are re-interpreting / redefining my argument for me?

What I am saying is that fate and freewill are incompatible. Or, that if I am going to do A, and A and B are exclusive, than their is no chance I will do B (by definition). I am still not clear what you are saying but I really am trying to understand, not trying to be a douche here!

[atrifix]

[ QUOTE ]
I apologize if this is too basic for you guys but I hear alot of people professing to believe in both and I thought I would clear the air.

[/ QUOTE ]
Thanks. Studying Wittgenstein, Frankfurt, van Inwagen, Albritton, Kant, Descartes, Spinoza, et. al. was way too difficult for me, but this post totally cleared things up.

On a more serious note, the claim
[ QUOTE ]
Free Will implies a choice between two options.

[/ QUOTE ]
isn't clear at all.

[spoohunter]

Are you nitpicking about the word two there? Do you want me to guess what you think is wrong with that statement? Maybe you could just tell me?

[DougShrapnel]

[ QUOTE ]
I'm not convinced the 'future' being determined would require that it exists concurrently with the past

[/ QUOTE ] No of course not. Well what do you mean by determined? This argument is about two different ways that the 'future' can be determined. On on hand we have a predetermind future that is predetermind by action in the past. Barrier to free will. On the other hand we have a future that is 'predetermined' by knowledge of the future. This second type of 'predetermination' requires someway to view the 'future' and hence requires at least 2 instances of time to be valid perspectives.

[ QUOTE ]
I'm not sure hard determinism necessitates some kind of time stasis.

[/ QUOTE ] I'll have to think about that. I'm pretty sure that it would help, and I don't see how my arguement hinges upon it.

[ QUOTE ]
Surely the actualization of determined events is different from them existing as something which is bound to occur?

[/ QUOTE ] But when does the actualization take place in our fate senarios? This cannot be determined.

[DougShrapnel]

[ QUOTE ]
I'm not really sure why you are re-interpreting / redefining my argument for me?

[/ QUOTE ] In an failed attemp to clarify a very complex senario.

[ QUOTE ]
that if I am going to do A, and A and B are exclusive, than their is no chance I will do B (by definition).

[/ QUOTE ] What I mean is that if you are going to do A, then A has allready happened from a valid perspective of time. Not being able to do B is no more a barrier to free will than not being able to change the past.

[ QUOTE ]
I am still not clear what you are saying but I really am trying to understand, not trying to be a douche here!

[/ QUOTE ] That is the jist of it. I don't think you are trying to be a douche, I am one of the few people(exempting theists) who find this arguemnet less than compelling.

[guesswest]

[ QUOTE ]
No of course not. Well what do you mean by determined? This argument is about two different ways that the 'future' can be determined. On on hand we have a predetermind future that is predetermind by action in the past. Barrier to free will. On the other hand we have a future that is 'predetermined' by knowledge of the future. This second type of 'predetermination' requires someway to view the 'future' and hence requires at least 2 instances of time to be valid perspectives.

[/ QUOTE ]

My mistake, I thought you were going somewhere else. I don't agree with this though, the second kind of predeterminism requires predictability, which we don't have. And even if the availability of predictability is just conceptual...this idea that we could quantify variables sufficiently to identify the future and thus determine the past; I don't see how it being circular removes any barrier to free will? Why is circularity a problem here?

[ QUOTE ]
I'll have to think about that. I'm pretty sure that it would help, and I don't see how my arguement hinges upon it.

[/ QUOTE ]

It doesn't, I misunderstood your original argument.

[ QUOTE ]
But when does the actualization take place in our fate senatios? This cannot be determined.

[/ QUOTE ]

Actualization takes place when the event happens. I don't see how the predictability or inevitability of an event alters the point in the timeline where it occurs? It's no more the future determining the past than me leaving early to avoid traffic on a holiday weekend.

[spoohunter]

"What I mean is that if you are going to do A, then A has allready happened from a valid perspective of time. Not being able to do B is no more a barrier to free will than not being able to change the past."

I agree with the first part of your post but disagree with the second. How can we have free will for the future (the ability to choose between two options) if we cannot choose between two options, but must be forced into one?


Edited in :

There is no fundamental difference to which determinism you choose for a determined future (of the two you outlined, that influenced by the past or that because someone knows it) in either of them free will is impossible.

[DougShrapnel]

[ QUOTE ]
I don't agree with this though, the second kind of predeterminism requires predictability, which we don't have. And even if the availability of predictability is just conceptual...this idea that we could quantify variables sufficiently to identify the future and thus determine the past; I don't see how it being circular removes any barrier to free will? Why is circularity a problem here?


[/ QUOTE ] I still think that's the 1st kind of predetemination. To clarify the 2nd type that I am tlaking about, I mean that there is no predictiablity used to determine the future. The future is known, or fated, soley because prespectives of times overlap, or a method of viewing the future is enabled.

But at this time I don't think I can do any better than the actual philosphers regarding the prediction aspects of freewill v determinism.

[ QUOTE ]
Actualization takes place when the event happens.

[/ QUOTE ] But when does the event happen, in the OP senario the event happens once when the viewing of the future happens and agian when the event takes place. Both are valid. Fate and God knowing the future, require a perspective outside of traditional time. I'm trying to make the distinction between predictabilty and enivitableness. I guess I'm not really argueing for determinism or freewill, I don't believe I'm qualified to do so. Just that fate, or Omni-God and freewill are perfectly compatable. I would also like to state that the 3omni god is probably the most ridiculous concept I've heard off. But the reason the OP gives for why don't seem to persuade me at all.

[guesswest]

[ QUOTE ]
But when does the event happen, in the OP senario the event happens once when the viewing of the future happens and agian when the event takes place. Both are valid.

[/ QUOTE ]

I think this is the central point on which we disagree - I don't think both are valid. Anymore than me thinking that the sun will rise in the morning means it rises twice. I don't think the future is a valid epistemic access point, because it's not the future we're accessing, it's a representation of the future. It may be a wholly accurate representation, but the distinction is still important because it retains the continuity of time, which is necessary for EITHER free will or determinism since both depend on some amount of causality.

[DougShrapnel]

[ QUOTE ]
How can we have free will for the future (the ability to choose between two options) if we cannot choose between two options, but must be forced into one?


[/ QUOTE ] let me try again. Pertainly only to a fate, all-knowing god senario.
If you are going to do A, A has all ready happened in a sense.
You can just as correctly refer to the action of A in future and past tense.
thus
How can we have free will for the future (the ability to choose between two options) if we cannot choose between two options, but must be forced into one?

=
How can we have free will (the ability to choose between two options), if we can't change the past?

These two statements can be equivalent in a fate or all-knowing god senario.

Can you explain how not being able to change the past is a barrier to free will, or how the two statement are not equivlent when granting fate, or all knowing gods.

[bearly]

the excecise of fw could involve a choice (or choices) among many alternatives. the good old "possible world" model should help you out here.................b

[guesswest]

Hold on........you're using this model to argue AGAINST free will??

[atrifix]

My point is merely that it is not obvious--at least to me, but probably to a number of other people as well--that the the notion of free will entails a "choice" between "options". "Choice" or "free will" may simply refer to a certain psychological state.

Albritton's piece, Freedom of will and freedom of action, expresses the point better than I could hope to do:

"Most philosophers seem to think it quite easy to rob a will of some freedom. Thus Elizabeth Anscombe ... appears to suppose that a man who can't walk because he is chained up has lost some freedom of will. He 'has no 'freedom of will' to walk,' she says, or, again; no 'freedom of the will in respect of walking.' 'Everyone will allow,' she says, 'that 'A can walk, i.e. has the freedom of will in respect of walking' would be gainsaid by A's being chained up.' . . . I don't allow it. I don't see (do you?) that my freedom of will would be reduced at all if you chained me up. You would of course deprive me of considerable freedom of movement if you did that; you would thereby diminish my already unimpressive capacity to do what I will. But I don't see that my will would be any the less free. What about my 'freedom of will to walk,' you will ask (or perhaps you won't, but there the phrase is, in Anscombe's essay); what about my 'freedom of the will in respect of walking'? I reply that I don't understand either of those phrases. They seem to me to mix up incoherently two different things: free will, an obscure idea which is the one I am after, on this expedition, and physical ability to walk, a relatively clear idea which has nothing to do with free will."

[DougShrapnel]

[ QUOTE ]
I think this is the central point on which we disagree - I don't think both are valid. Anymore than me thinking that the sun will rise in the morning means it rises twice. I don't think the future is a valid epistemic access point, because it's not the future we're accessing, it's a representation of the future. It may be a wholly accurate representation, but the distinction is still important because it retains the continuity of time, which is necessary for EITHER free will or determinism since both depend on some amount of causality.

[/ QUOTE ] The logic in the OP is normaly used to argue against the existance of Gods. The knowledge of the future is entirely different that the knowledge that the sun will rise tommorow. Of course in the sun example the sun isn't rising twice. But in the case of all knowing gods, both perspectives are valid ones. I should have made it clear that it's not happening twice but both perspectives of the event being the future and the past are valid.

[ QUOTE ]
because it's not the future we're accessing, it's a representation of the future.

[/ QUOTE ] I honestly have no idea about the mechanism for access, but if it is a representation of the future or a systematic extrapolation of causal processes, that not what I'm arguing about. I'll let the philosphers handle that.

[ QUOTE ]
retains the continuity of time, which is necessary for EITHER free will or determinism since both depend on some amount of causality.

[/ QUOTE ] A bit beyond what I'm speculating. I'm simple arguing, for all the reasons not to believe in a 3 Omni-God, the OP isn't one of them.

[DougShrapnel]

[ QUOTE ]
Hold on........you're using this model to argue AGAINST free will??

[/ QUOTE ] I'm simple arguing, for all the reasons not to believe in a 3 Omni-God, the OP isn't one of them.

[guesswest]

Right - I wasn't aware you were discussing a 3omni god here at all, I thought you were just talking epistemology as it relates to free will. I don't really disagree with what you said in that case.

And yes, certainly an omniscient god would have instant access to past, present and future - whether that access would be predictive or whether time distinctions just wouldn't exist is a different (and probably impossible to answer) question.

Finding logical contradictions in 3 Omni-God theory is like finding hay in a haystack.

[DougShrapnel]

Damn, I wish I knew more about the freewill v determinism so I could have that debate with you. I'm just not well versed enough to say anything that hasn't all ready been said, and said much better than I anything I could hope to even speculate froming an opinion on saying about the subject.

[guesswest]

I wish I knew more about FW vs determinism so I could have that debate with myself. /images/graemlins/grin.gif

Not my area of expertise either.

[bunny]

[ QUOTE ]
Note the same argument is used for an omniscient God (who knows the future) and free will being incompatible. Indeed an omniscient God (that knows the future, although that goes with omniscient I suppose) implies fate.

[/ QUOTE ]
The argument is used but is not valid as God is usually not regarded at existing at one point in time. All times are equally accessible.

I think this is similar to the point Doug was making - the past is accessible to me but the fact that I know what you chose yesterday doesnt mean you had no choice. Similarly God knows what I chose yesterday (and it doesnt mean I had no choice) he also knows what I chose tomorrow (and it doesnt mean I had no choice). We speak of God existing and doing things "now" but that is an incorrect phrasing - he experiences all times at once.

[guesswest]

I think the barrier to free will perhaps emerges when you couple that omniscience with other attributes, like the notion that god created all things. It's not the omniscience per se that's problematic.

[spoohunter]

This is a good point, ASSUMING WE HAD A CHOICE IN THE PAST. Take that assumption away and it falls like a house of cards.

[DougShrapnel]

[ QUOTE ]
This is a good point, ASSUMING WE HAD A CHOICE IN THE PAST. Take that assumption away and it falls like a house of cards.

[/ QUOTE ] Now we are getting somewhere. I am just a retard about explaining things? You seem to understand when bunny said it.

[bunny]

The only point I am making is it is not inconsistent. I do believe we had a choice in the past (and that we will in the future) this is not contradicted by me also believing that God knows what I chose yesterday and that he knows what I will choose tomorrow.

[bunny]

[ QUOTE ]
I think the barrier to free will perhaps emerges when you couple that omniscience with other attributes, like the notion that god created all things. It's not the omniscience per se that's problematic.

[/ QUOTE ]
It seemed that the claim was omniscience coupled with free will led to a contradiction. I dont accept that argument unless the omniscient being exists within time also.

[guesswest]

I don't accept it either, I would have agreed with doug much earlier if I'd realized he was talking about god. I don't accept that argument even if god exists within time, I can't see how it's crucial for this debate.

But there is a problem maintaining free will when you couple that omniscience with the notion that god created you. Because then your actions have been chosen by him, no?

[bunny]

This seems like a topic for another thread? (Although my net etiquette is fairly rudimentary). It is certainly a problem a theist (like me) has to answer in some way.

[spoohunter]

I almost understood it from you, it must have been the pickle jar effect. You "loosened it up" metaphorically, bunny just popped it off : )

[guesswest]

Good point - I have a bad habit of hijacking threads. I'll start another one /images/graemlins/smile.gif

[atrifix]

FWIW, I didn't understand your argument either until now.

[Piers]

It’s a matter of levels.

You are making the erroneous assumption that it is not usefull to simultaneously use mutually inconsistent models.

When considering the universe on a microscopic the assumption of a deterministic universe makes the most sense. However when we view the universe at the level of human experience the assumption of free will is effectively mandatory.

Free will might be no more than an hallucination, however that hallucination is nevertheless a real effect, and its acceptance necessary to maintain sanity.

[DougShrapnel]

[ QUOTE ]
FWIW, I didn't understand your argument either until now.

[/ QUOTE ] Thanks, I can take the constructive critism. Is it neccessary to posit God in the argument? This topic gets brought up alot here in SMP and I'm wodering if next time I should just cut to the chase? Allthought, I'd rather be able to create a convincing arguement without a god posited.

[Brom]

[ QUOTE ]

When considering the universe on a microscopic the assumption of a deterministic universe makes the most sense. However when we view the universe at the level of human experience the assumption of free will is effectively mandatory.

[/ QUOTE ]

Wouldn't it be the other way around?

At the quantum level we can only guess at probabilities that something will happen, and we are never able to know. It can be said that "free will" is more dominant in this realm.

At our level, Newtonian interactions are almost certainly 100% correct, and therefore all actions are based on the past, indicating causality and determinism.

[atrifix]

[ QUOTE ]
Thanks, I can take the constructive critism. Is it neccessary to posit God in the argument?

[/ QUOTE ]
Philosophically, I don't think so. But I think it makes the dialectic a lot clearer.

[ QUOTE ]
This topic gets brought up alot here in SMP and I'm wodering if next time I should just cut to the chase? Allthought, I'd rather be able to create a convincing arguement without a god posited.

[/ QUOTE ]
Let's see...the best thing I can tell you is that in debates about free will there is an incredible amount of confusion and conflation of issues, much more than in other areas of philosophy. It helps all parties if both the conjectures and the replies are made absolutely clear.

[siegfriedandroy]

Just b/c your thinking is too superficial to understand how both can exist together, doesnt mean both do not exist together.

[Piers]

No I don’t believe so.

I suspect you are confusing predictable with deterministic.

I do not believe it is possible for us to exactly predict the future, however whatever happens, is what was always fated to happened and there is nothing we could have done to prevent it.

The uncertainties of quantum mechanics are a red herring, I don’t see what Newtonian mechanics has to do with anything.

By the level of human experience, I am thinking in terms of social iteration. To interact at an expectable level with other humans it is necessary to assume free will.

Hence a model of human behaviour that incorporates free will is useful. All we as humans are able to handles are different models with different levels of usefulness. Depending on the needs of the moment it is perfectly acceptable to use both models that incorporate free will, and ones that are incompatible with free will.