Sklansky on Selfishness

[PokrLikeItsProse]

I've been reading the 2+2 archives and came across this Sklansky quote in an archive thread (http://www.twoplustwo.com/digests/feb98_msg.html#2206) on Ayn Rand.

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The second case where selfishness is illogical involves all of those situations that can be shown to be analogous to the Prisoner's Dillemma paradox.This deserves a whole article but in a nutshell, the paradox shows that there are times when everybody would be better off if they relinquished control to a higher authority rather than allow everyone the freedom to strive for their own optimum goals.

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Has anyone written the article that Sklansky implies can be written?

[cambraceres]

I must admit first that I can not answer your question, but it seems an interesting conversation can come of the concept itself. It seems that the only time it would be good ethically to give up control is when you have made a value judgement about the potentially controlling party vs. yourself.

Now it would be good to give up control when you are no longer capable of performing what tasks are neccessary for your sustenance, but often people do no know when they "suck" that bad.

The only value I can see in a concept of this type is in it's utility. So what would be the best way to determine in what way and on what scale an individual's rights should be abridged?

[guesswest]

I'm sure that's an excellent thread, unfortunately I'm too lazy to read it through and get the necessary sense of context. But a quick question, if you delegate control to someone else volitionally - doesn't their will just become an extension of your own?

[cambraceres]

I haven't read the whole thread either, same reason, but I trust we can debate your question on it's own merits and in it's own context. I think of questions such as this in terms of what are and are not ethical value judgements. Your will, in your example and in reference to the decision to delegate, ends when you choose to delegate. Each decision you make is a question of ethics. Your will is your will and is really that simple. If you allow someone else to make salient decisions, it is their will that is affecting your life, but their will is only linked to yours in a causal sense.

The decisions they make affect you, and because it is your fault they are making these decisions, you are the cause. This is what I mean by the relationship being a causal one. It does not in any way affect the indentification of one's will.

Cambraceres

What do you think?

[guesswest]

I think we're roughly on the same track.

But I'd suggest that this is something we do everyday, just to varying extents - and in some situations causality does imply ethical responsibility. If I get on a plane I'm delegating control to the pilot - but it's still my choice and my will to take onboard some factors that result. If I make an unethical stock purchase, I'm delegating that purchase to my broker (I don't actually have a broker) - but surely hold some ethical responsibility. With all that in mind, I'd suggest it's a continuum as oppose to a binary allocation, with different situations where we delegate representing differing degrees of causality and thus ethical responsibility. Obviously that's exceedingly difficult to actually quantify, but I think we take a rough stab at doing so when we pass ethical verdicts.

I guess the question then becomes the timeless one - how much (ethically) is in the intention and how much is in the action?

Edit: I just realized I misread your post camb, apologies. I gather you're not arguing the causality bit, just that it's not an extension of 'will'. I'd say sometimes it is, sometimes it isn't, and normally it's somewhere in between. For instance if I vote for a neo-nazi party, and apartheid in the school system results, that's partly an extension of my will. If I vote for some other party who had apartheid nowhere on their manifesto, but it does result, in a situation where I perhaps should have guessed they were lying, that'd probably be an example of ethical responsibility by causality but not an extension of will. And finally, if I vote for a party where I could not possibly expect that would result, where it comes entirely out of leftfield, there is probably causality without ethical culpability. Does that better address what you were getting at?

[cambraceres]

I see your point, I really did see it as more of a this or that, black and white issue though. My idea of will does not extend outside of the self. Now i realize that real world concerns are incredibly complex, and as such individual responsibility is ludicrous. In that way I see what you say. You must blame more than one person for a big, intricate enterprise that goes wrong or right. This means neccessarily that culpability is shared. I do however feel that there is a disconnect between will and culpability

I also believe my articulation in this thread is lacking.

Cambraceres

[guesswest]

I certainly agree there's a disconnect of some kind between will and culpability. But I don't think it's always complete.

If I get wasted and run through a school crossing at 90mph and kill a kid I'm very much ethically responsible - but it's probably not a reflection of my 'will' in so far as I didn't intend to cause that consequence. But if I hire a hitman to take out my ex-wife (sometimes tempting), her death would I think in some meaningful reflect my will manifest.

[cambraceres]

Yeah that's what I was saying, good conversation tho.