Questioning Compatibilism

[Pharcyde]

The following is an excerpt from a paper I recently wrote. I was attempting to discredit compatibilism in this section.

If God predetermined all human beings to make morally correct decisions, the choice to make these decisions would be insignificant because always making morally correct decisions would be necessary to everyone’s essence. If making morally correct decisions was a property of every person’s essence, then those decisions would not be decisions at all. They would be actions resulting from a state of affairs; specifically, the state of affairs in which human beings were incapable of making morally incorrect decisions, or committing moral evil. Therefore, the predestination outlined by compatibilism would negate the possibility of free will.

Thoughts, comments, and correcetions would be greatly appreciated.

[guesswest]

Am on my way to bed so not a very detailed or well-formed response, probably not a very intelligent one either - but one thing that jumps out at me here:

I'm not quite sure, in this model of compatibilism, how you're getting from inclinations towards certain actions, whether implanted by god or not, to those inclinations resulting in decisions 'not being decisions at all'. I'm don't see how a tendency to act in a certain way entails the that you must act in that way. Is this 'essence' anymore than a lifelong democrat who chooses to vote republican has 'democrat' as their essence? A common argument from compatibilists is that you need some degree of determinism for the idea of free will to even be sensible - if your actions aren't determined by your beliefs, observations etc - they're not free at all.

Edit: And just to clarify - you are saying here that in this model it's a tendency towards morally correction action that we have innately? Because the language suggests you possibly mean more than a tendency, a necessity - but if that's the case I don't see how it'd be compatibilism at all, it'd be regular determinism...

[Pharcyde]

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I'm not quite sure, in this model of compatibilism, how you're getting from inclinations towards certain actions, whether implanted by god or not, to those inclinations resulting in decisions 'not being decisions at all'.

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The need for oxygen is a property of everyone's essence (The essence is the sum of all of the properties that define a person. So, a person is merely the actualization of their essence.). Therefore, needing oxygen to survive is a universal truth about human beings. Similarly, if human beings were predestined to always make morally correct decisions, this would be a property of every person's essence. We would have another universal truth about human beings. Making morally incorrect decisions would not be a possibility in this world. Thus, the "decision" to commit a morally good act would not be a decision at all. It would be an action resulting from a state of affairs. The word "choice" inherently implies at least two options from which a decision is made. Being determined to always make morally correct decisions would eliminate the concept of choice with respect to moral good/evil, thereby eliminating free will.

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A common argument from compatibilists is that you need some degree of determinism for the idea of free will to even be sensible - if your actions aren't determined by your beliefs, observations, they're not free at all

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But if those beliefs, observations, etc. are influenced by God, are they still free?

[guesswest]

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The need for oxygen is a property of everyone's essence (The essence is the sum of all of the properties that define a person. So, a person is merely the actualization of their essence.). Therefore, needing oxygen to survive is a universal truth about human beings. Similarly, if human beings were predestined to always make morally correct decisions, this would be a property of every person's essence. We would have another universal truth about human beings. Making morally incorrect decisions would not be a possibility in this world. Thus, the "decision" to commit a morally good act would not be a decision at all. It would be an action resulting from a state of affairs. The word "choice" inherently implies at least two options from which a decision is made. Being determined to always make morally correct decisions would eliminate the concept of choice with respect to moral good/evil, thereby eliminating free will.


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What you're describing here is garden variety determinism, not compatibilism. If you're trying to argue that compatibilism isn't viable because it necessarily results in hard determinism that's probably a reasonable argument - but I'd suggest it might be in your interests to make that point clear for your paper.

In the model you have depicted, and for the above reasons I'd normally restrict this criticism to a strictly determinist picture - if that's so, what if anything does it mean to identify a choice as morally right/wrong? ie if there's no legitimate choice involved how are the ethical qualities attached to these actions not neutral, in fact how can we even conceptualize morality as it refers to human action?

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But if those beliefs, observations, etc. are influenced by God, are they still free?

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Well, I'd say no, but I'm a determinist, so probably not the one to ask. A compatibilist would probably argue that the concept of free will means nothing without some degree of determinism, eg I'm not free to hit the mugger back because that action would be determined by the fact that he's mugging me.

[Sharkey]

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Making morally incorrect decisions would not be a possibility in this world. Thus, the "decision" to commit a morally good act would not be a decision at all.

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Nor would it be a morally good act. The concept of morality requires a decision be made.