Philosophical Question about Consciousness

[willie24]

Scenario:
John Doe dies today. Immediately afterwards, in another part of the world, Jane Smith is concieved.

Philosophy # 1: When John Doe dies, his world has ended. When Jane Smith is concieved, her world has begun (out of nothingness).

Philosophy #2: John Doe is reincarnated as Jane Smith, but without any memory of John Doe, or any physical/psychological connection to him.

Is there a difference between the two philosophies?

[tame_deuces]

Yes.

At X time A ceases to exist and B starts to exist.

does not logically give:

A is B.

Your no memory of past life will only give grounds to conclude that there is no practical difference to the two possible scenarios (no reincarnation or reincarnation). They obviously don't have to be the same.

[willie24]

point taken. you are right.

change question to: Is there any difference in implications between philosophy #1 being true and philosophy #2 being true?

[kerowo]

Without a mechanism for proving #2 it is no different than #1. As long as you can't prove #2 then there is no implication to it being true.

If your memories aren't making the jump what is? If you define that the implications of it being true IF it could be proven would be clearer, as is there isn't much there.

[tame_deuces]

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change question to: Is there any difference in implications between philosophy #1 being true and philosophy #2 being true?

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As you stated the question (no physical or psychological connection) there isn't a difference in implications. If it happens or not is not something that could change our lives to a large degree, you would need faith to believe in it.

If you could prove that this reincarnation actually happened, then the implications would be massive as we would have to redefine how we look at life and death. And by prove I mean fail to find to reasonable doubt. /images/graemlins/wink.gif

[willie24]

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If it happens or not is not something that could change our lives to a large degree

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If you could prove that this reincarnation actually happened, then the implications would be massive

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you appear to contradict yourself. perhaps rephrase in such a way that you don't.

i would say: there is no difference in implications, except in how we think of ourselves. or, said another way: the knowledge of the truth might have implications, but the truth itself would not.

[willie24]

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If your memories aren't making the jump what is?

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million-dollar question? what constitutes "me"? just my physical/biological characteristics? if so, then am a different person at age 30 than i am at age 10?

is there such a thing as "truth" here- as it pertains to the 2 philosophies? can one be any more or less correct than the other? or is it a matter of how we frame it in our minds, a matter of the analogy we use to understand our existence?

[Ringo]

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If your memories aren't making the jump what is?

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million-dollar question? what constitutes "me"? just my physical/biological characteristics? if so, then am a different person at age 30 than i am at age 10?

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I say, yes, you are.

AFAIK, there's not a single atom in your body at age 30 that was there at age 10. The atoms that will make up your body, biomatter, brain, and therefore memories and consciousness, in 30 years from now are out there, somewhere too.

In that way, we are more like a "wave" than an ongoing, "real" thing. That boggles my mind.

[Philo]

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If your memories aren't making the jump what is?

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million-dollar question? what constitutes "me"? just my physical/biological characteristics? if so, then am a different person at age 30 than i am at age 10?

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I say, yes, you are.

AFAIK, there's not a single atom in your body at age 30 that was there at age 10. The atoms that will make up your body, biomatter, brain, and therefore memories and consciousness, in 30 years from now are out there, somewhere too.

In that way, we are more like a "wave" than an ongoing, "real" thing. That boggles my mind.

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You may find this interesting:

http://homepages.nyu.edu/~ts65/papers/recent_work_on_identity.pdf

[foal]

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If your memories aren't making the jump what is?

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Your consciousness.

[Philo]

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If your memories aren't making the jump what is?

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Your consciousness.

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What would individuate your consciousness from other consciousnesses if not memories?

[FortunaMaximus]

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If your memories aren't making the jump what is?

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Your consciousness.

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What would individuate your consciousness from other consciousnesses if not memories?

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Awareness of self is not reliant on memory. Think of the instants after you wake up.

[Philo]

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If your memories aren't making the jump what is?

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Your consciousness.

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What would individuate your consciousness from other consciousnesses if not memories?

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Awareness of self is not reliant on memory. Think of the instants after you wake up.

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I didn't say awareness of self was dependent on memory. I asked what would individuate one consciousness from another if not for memories. Being self-aware could not serve as a criterion of individuation between one consciousness and another.

But it does seem that if consciousness "a" is the the same consciousness as consciousness "b" then "a" would remember the things that "b" did, thought, etc., and so genuine cases of memory could serve as a criterion of individuation for consciousnesses. At least that's the standard sort of view since Locke. I, however, think there is no non-circular way to individuate consciousnesses. (I think that individual consciousnesses are ontologically dependent on the sort of entity that they are consciousnesses of. In other words, there is no such thing as a "pure consciousness".)

[foal]

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If your memories aren't making the jump what is?

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Your consciousness.

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What would individuate your consciousness from other consciousnesses if not memories?

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Memories have meaning because 'we' experience them. That 'experiencing of something' is what consciousness is and it has nothing to do with memory. E.g. we can imagine an entity being constructed with our exact same memories, yet we still would not expect to experience what that entity experiences.

[foal]

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I didn't say awareness of self was dependent on memory. I asked what would individuate one consciousness from another if not for memories. Being self-aware could not serve as a criterion of individuation between one consciousness and another.

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True, there's really no way of judging this in entities that aren't ourselves. We can't confirm that anyone besides our self is actually conscious. But we can confirm our own consciousness (debatable?) and based on that we can speculate on what it would mean for that consciousness to be transfered.

[vetiver]

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What would individuate your consciousness from other consciousnesses if not memories?

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Memories have meaning because 'we' experience them. That 'experiencing of something' is what consciousness is and it has nothing to do with memory. E.g. we can imagine an entity being constructed with our exact same memories, yet we still would not expect to experience what that entity experiences.

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In the instant the doppelganger is created I would view him as me, exactly. He's only differentiated in the time after his instant creation. Your example just duplicates me and creates another me existing in a separate, external space to me, but it doesn't disprove memories individuating consciousness.

[Philo]

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If your memories aren't making the jump what is?

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Your consciousness.

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What would individuate your consciousness from other consciousnesses if not memories?

[/ QUOTE ]

Memories have meaning because 'we' experience them. That 'experiencing of something' is what consciousness is and it has nothing to do with memory. E.g. we can imagine an entity being constructed with our exact same memories, yet we still would not expect to experience what that entity experiences.

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Memory requires consciousness, and if there are such things as individual consciousnesses, then experiential memories would be a way to individuate consciousnesses and differentiate one consciousness from another, and also a way to reidentify the same consciousness over time.

[Piers]

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Philosophy # 1: When John Doe dies, his world has ended.

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Sure.

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When Jane Smith is concieved, her world has begun (out of nothingness).

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I think the process by which consciousness evolves in a growing embryo/infant is a biological question not a philosophical one.

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John Doe is reincarnated as Jane Smith, but without any memory of John Doe, or any physical/psychological connection to him.

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Sorry I don’t understand; the sentence does not mean anything to me, urgently need definition of reincarnated.

[willie24]

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I think the process by which consciousness evolves in a growing embryo/infant is a biological question not a philosophical one.


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fair enough.

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Sorry I don’t understand; the sentence does not mean anything to me, urgently need definition of reincarnated.

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reincarnated: born anew in another body.

what makes these contrasting sentences "philosophies," as opposed to (true or false) statement of fact, is that they are two ways of thinking about the exact same thing.

from the biological perspective of your biological self - when you are dead everything is over.

from an outside perpective, the process that defines "you" continues with or without you. your consciousness was created by the process of the world, and that process will create more consciousness regardless of whether or not "you" exist. "you" isn't even real (to an outside observer). it is an abstract idea that a body applies to itself in a given moment to better accomplish its biological mission. a body's memory serves to aid it's logic, and in doing so gives the ever-changing body the illusion that it is one persistent entity.

it doesn't matter whether another body labels itself "you" or something else - its just another manifestation of the same process that "you" are part of.