The Brain Transplant Argument

[Philo]

Animalism is the thesis that each of us is numerically identical to a human animal (e.g., you are identical to the human animal reading this post right now), and that each of us persists just in case the biological functions that sustain the life of the human animal we are identical to continue. Since the persistence conditions for animals in general are biological and not psychological, according to animalism the continuation of our mental lives is irrelevant to our persistence. This is a minority view among philosophers writing about personal identity.

The following argument, called the Brain Transplant Argument (BTA), has been advanced against animalism (its reconstruction here is taken from Paul Snowdon, "Personal Identity and Brain Transplants"):

(1) It is not absolutely impossible that our brains should be transplanted into new receptacles while retaining their intrinsic functions. (The intrinsic functions are the processes that characteristically occur in the brain, and which are assumed to sustain a mentally endowed subject.)

(2) Amongst the brain’s intrinsic functions is that of sustaining a subject with thoughts, apparent memories, beliefs, (etc.), and so such a rehoused and functioning brain will sustain a subject of experience who has psychological links to the donor subject.

(3) The total system, of which the rehoused brain is a functioning part, is not the self-same animal which donated it.

(4) The resulting subject sustained by (or realized by) this system would be the same subject (or person) which that brain previously sustained.

Do you think that BTA shows that animalism is false?

[Phil153]

Man that's some bad prose. Does the writer speak English? Does he have a tumor?

Clarifications needed: "numerically identical"
"just in case"
"the human animal we are identical"?
"persistence conditions"
"persistence"

They seem to be playing with the definition of persistence - basically saying that if the majority of an organism's cell continues to survive and be functional, then the "person" does too. But the leading paragraphs don't define their terms well enough to be able to critique the theory.

[ QUOTE ]
Do you think that BTA shows that animalism is false?

[/ QUOTE ]
No. The whole question is so poorly written and defined that you can't respond to it.

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
Man that's some bad prose. Does the writer speak English? Does he have a tumor?

Clarifications needed: "numerically identical"
"just in case"
"the human animal we are identical"?
"persistence conditions"
"persistence"

They seem to be playing with the definition of persistence - basically saying that if the majority of an organism's cell continues to survive and be functional, then the "person" does too. But the leading paragraphs don't define their terms well enough to be able to critique the theory.

[ QUOTE ]
Do you think that BTA shows that animalism is false?

[/ QUOTE ]
No. The whole question is so poorly written and defined that you can't respond to it.

[/ QUOTE ]

Good questions. To clarify:

"numerically identical": If a and b are numerically identical then a and b are one and the same thing. For example, Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens are numerically identical.

"just in case" is shorthand for the biconditional "if and only if," which expresses a relationship between a and b in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.

Thinking of a and b as events now, "if a, then b" means a's happening is sufficient for b's happening, and b's happening is necessary for a's happening.

So, "a if and only if b" (or "a just in case b") means that if a happens then b will happen, and if b happens then a will happen.

"persistence": to persist is to continue to exist over time. If an object O existed yesterday and also exists today, then that object O has persisted from yesterday to today (and hence the object O today is numerically identical to the object O of yesterday). The "problem of personal identity" is the problem of figuring out what our persistence conditions are, i.e., what constitutes our continued existence over time as the numerically same entity.

So, to say that I persist (or continue to exist) 'just in case' the human animal that I am identical to continues to exist is to say that I will continue to exist if that human animal continues to exist, and that if that human animal continues to exist then so will I.

Since the continued of existence of biological organisms in general does not seem to require psychological continuity (or even the continuation of psychological capacities), the animalist claims that my persistence does not require the continuation of my psychological life. BTA tries to show that this claim is false.

[furyshade]

half the time in this forum i can't tell if what i'm reading is too complex for me to understand or just too poorly written

[Kaj]

If you take out the processor of your computer, is the rest of your computer no longer still your computer? If you put that processor in another computer is it now the previous computer or a different computer? Who cares what you call it. It's one organ in a new body, and the old organs and the rest are in the old body. The whole "what is 'me' and what isn't 'me'" question is the busywork of shallow philosophers.

[Phil153]

Thanks for the answers, it's clearer now. But the theory is still horribly confused and not at all stated clearly. To summarize:

1. "We" are identical to our biology (nihilism).
2. Persistence of an organism depends on whether its biological functions are sustained.
3. Therefore, our mental life has nothing to do with our persistence

The argument of Animalism basically begs the question by denying the existence of separate thing called "mental life" or identity, reducing everything to biology. It's also ill defined by not defining organism properly. Is it the majority of cells (how does that work for a fat person undergoing liposuction?) Is it certain cells?

Basically, animalism as a theory does not exist because it doesn't define itself.

So the only thing the "brain transplant" scenario shows is "organism" in animalism is poorly defined. It certainly doesn't refute it. You could define a version of animalism in which it's claimed that we are just the biology of our brains, and the rest of our body is just a support function. This would retain the core elements of the theory and get around the brain transplant refutation.

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
Thanks for the answers, it's clearer now. But the theory is still horribly confused and not at all stated clearly. To summarize:

1. "We" are identical to our biology (nihilism).
2. Persistence of an organism depends on whether its biological functions are sustained.
3. Therefore, our mental life has nothing to do with our persistence

The argument of Animalism basically begs the question by denying the existence of separate thing called "mental life" or identity, reducing everything to biology. It's also ill defined by not defining organism properly. Is it the majority of cells (how does that work for a fat person undergoing liposuction?) Is it certain cells?

Basically, animalism as a theory does not exist because it doesn't define itself.

So the only thing the "brain transplant" scenario shows is "organism" in animalism is poorly defined. It certainly doesn't refute it.

[/ QUOTE ]

I've only stated the central theses of animalism. I haven't given a full explication of the view nor have I given any reasons for believing it.

Thus I don't see how you can conclude from my post that animalism begs the question, since I've told you nothing about what arguments have been advanced in its favor, or that the theory doesn't really exist because it doesn't define itself, since I haven't given you a full explication of the theory.

Animalism doesn't deny the existence of the mental lives of human beings, it simply denies that the mental lives of human beings figure into the persistence conditions of human beings.

Animalism defers to biological science when defining what is essential to preserving the life of a biological organism.

Your last suggestion is interesting, because some animalists distinguish between whole-brain transplants, which include transplantation of the brain stem, and cerebrum-only transplants, which do not. Since the brain stem controls respiration, heartbeat, blood pressure, and digestion, and is also vital to basic attention, auditory and visual reflexes, and consciousness, the neurological functions of the brain stem are considered essential to sustaining the life of an animal.

The central theses of animalism are thus consistent with the "brain transplant intuition" (roughly, the intuition that I go where my brain goes), at least in the case of whole-brain transplants.

[Alex-db]

[ QUOTE ]
If you take out the processor of your computer, is the rest of your computer no longer still your computer? If you put that processor in another computer is it now the previous computer or a different computer? Who cares what you call it. It's one organ in a new body, and the old organs and the rest are in the old body. The whole "what is 'me' and what isn't 'me'" question is the busywork of shallow philosophers.

[/ QUOTE ]

Its more like replacing the processor, RAM, hardrive, graphics card, cache etc. - clearly a new pc in your analogy. Or if the old parts are put in a different case, clearly back to the original pc.

[tame_deuces]

The brain does not work separately from your body. Physically it is connected too it through the nervous system. And the body differectly interacts and affects the brain's function (and vice versa) through glands, sensation, perception too name only a few. So if you switch bodies you would be different. We could assume some similar sense of cognition is still there but simply from physical function alone your brain would operate differently from before.

[kerowo]

Does all philosophical discussion sound like wankery or just this one?

IF sci-fi brain transplants are possible
AND IF a person's conscious resides entirely in the brain
THEN that person would inhabit whatever body the brain was in

What is the refutation of this? That the new body wouldn't be the same person because they are in a new body? Even though the new body would have the same memories, personality, and beliefs as the original body? That's a tough argument to make.

[mbillie1]

[ QUOTE ]
(1) It is not absolutely impossible that our brains should be transplanted into new receptacles while retaining their intrinsic functions. (The intrinsic functions are the processes that characteristically occur in the brain, and which are assumed to sustain a mentally endowed subject.)

(2) Amongst the brain’s intrinsic functions is that of sustaining a subject with thoughts, apparent memories, beliefs, (etc.), and so such a rehoused and functioning brain will sustain a subject of experience who has psychological links to the donor subject.

(3) The total system, of which the rehoused brain is a functioning part, is not the self-same animal which donated it.

(4) The resulting subject sustained by (or realized by) this system would be the same subject (or person) which that brain previously sustained.

Do you think that BTA shows that animalism is false?

[/ QUOTE ]

the bolded part in "2" is a pretty bold claim. the brain receives signals from the entire body. sensory stimuli, nutrition, etc all have a significant impact on making up our conscious experience / "who we are" ... it's a pretty bold claim to say that the rehoused brain brings the same subject experience from the original body/brain. i'm not convinced whatsoever that "2" is acceptable as a premise.

i'm also not convinced whatsoever that the subject/experience/self in the new body would be the same if the old brain could be transplanted into it. also, unfortunately, there's no way to demonstrate that since we have no ability to experience other subjects directly, even if we could do this dramatic brain transplant process (although obviously we could have some idea or another based on interacting with the new body/brain combination)

[Kaj]

[ QUOTE ]
That the new body wouldn't be the same person because they are in a new body? ... That's a tough argument to make.

[/ QUOTE ]

If you put your old car engine in a new car, is it the same "car"?

How is this a tough argument to make? Read again what I quoted. How can a brain in a new body be the "same person". For one, ITS A WHOLE NEW BODY with a whole new set of physical characteristics. But if you want to confine "person" to just brain activity (which is absolutely arbitrary), just a little tweak in your hormone levels alone can have drastic changes on your personality. And these are produced outside the brain.

Nobody is really making an argument saying that certain traits won't still be present, only pointing out that what you are defining as a "person" is a completely arbitrary definition which includes some parts and excludes other parts.

[StayHungry]

If anytime in the future this is attempted, rest assured there'll be weirder things going on

[madnak]

Identity is just a conceptual convention we use. It's all labels. There is no such thing as identity "really."

Again - I can hardly prove this. But, again - I think these views of identity are unsupportable and nonsensical, based on arbitrary premises that nobody in their right mind actually accepts.

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
Identity is just a conceptual convention we use. It's all labels. There is no such thing as identity "really."

Again - I can hardly prove this. But, again - I think these views of identity are unsupportable and nonsensical, based on arbitrary premises that nobody in their right mind actually accepts.

[/ QUOTE ]

Do you think that objects do not really persist because identity seems incompatible with change? If so, do you reject four-dimensionalism as well?

[mbillie1]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Identity is just a conceptual convention we use. It's all labels. There is no such thing as identity "really."

Again - I can hardly prove this. But, again - I think these views of identity are unsupportable and nonsensical, based on arbitrary premises that nobody in their right mind actually accepts.

[/ QUOTE ]

Do you think that objects do not really persist because identity seems incompatible with change? If so, do you reject four-dimensionalism as well?

[/ QUOTE ]

Objects are not self-identical through time, they're always changing, so in the Platonic/idealistic sense, no they do not persist.

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
(1) It is not absolutely impossible that our brains should be transplanted into new receptacles while retaining their intrinsic functions. (The intrinsic functions are the processes that characteristically occur in the brain, and which are assumed to sustain a mentally endowed subject.)

(2) Amongst the brain’s intrinsic functions is that of sustaining a subject with thoughts, apparent memories, beliefs, (etc.), and so such a rehoused and functioning brain will sustain a subject of experience who has psychological links to the donor subject.

(3) The total system, of which the rehoused brain is a functioning part, is not the self-same animal which donated it.

(4) The resulting subject sustained by (or realized by) this system would be the same subject (or person) which that brain previously sustained.

Do you think that BTA shows that animalism is false?

[/ QUOTE ]

the bolded part in "2" is a pretty bold claim. the brain receives signals from the entire body. sensory stimuli, nutrition, etc all have a significant impact on making up our conscious experience / "who we are" ... it's a pretty bold claim to say that the rehoused brain brings the same subject experience from the original body/brain. i'm not convinced whatsoever that "2" is acceptable as a premise.

i'm also not convinced whatsoever that the subject/experience/self in the new body would be the same if the old brain could be transplanted into it. also, unfortunately, there's no way to demonstrate that since we have no ability to experience other subjects directly, even if we could do this dramatic brain transplant process (although obviously we could have some idea or another based on interacting with the new body/brain combination)

[/ QUOTE ]

I like the tack of challenging premise 2 as well. What I would like to do is provide an account of what it is to be a subject of experience that implicates the rest of the body in some way as integral. I know the spinal cord and the central nervous system are crucial to many psychological processes, for example.

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Identity is just a conceptual convention we use. It's all labels. There is no such thing as identity "really."

Again - I can hardly prove this. But, again - I think these views of identity are unsupportable and nonsensical, based on arbitrary premises that nobody in their right mind actually accepts.

[/ QUOTE ]

Do you think that objects do not really persist because identity seems incompatible with change? If so, do you reject four-dimensionalism as well?

[/ QUOTE ]

Objects are not self-identical through time, they're always changing, so in the Platonic/idealistic sense, no they do not persist.

[/ QUOTE ]

There are accounts of persistence that are compatible with change.

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
If anytime in the future this is attempted, rest assured there'll be weirder things going on

[/ QUOTE ]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EdJGlYOL0r4
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/1263758.stm
http://www.mymultiplesclerosis.co.uk/stranger-than-fiction/head-transplant.html

[madnak]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Identity is just a conceptual convention we use. It's all labels. There is no such thing as identity "really."

Again - I can hardly prove this. But, again - I think these views of identity are unsupportable and nonsensical, based on arbitrary premises that nobody in their right mind actually accepts.

[/ QUOTE ]

Do you think that objects do not really persist because identity seems incompatible with change? If so, do you reject four-dimensionalism as well?

[/ QUOTE ]

I think identity is epistemological - no, not even that, linguistic - rather than metaphysical.

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Identity is just a conceptual convention we use. It's all labels. There is no such thing as identity "really."

Again - I can hardly prove this. But, again - I think these views of identity are unsupportable and nonsensical, based on arbitrary premises that nobody in their right mind actually accepts.

[/ QUOTE ]

Do you think that objects do not really persist because identity seems incompatible with change? If so, do you reject four-dimensionalism as well?

[/ QUOTE ]

I think identity is epistemological - no, not even that, linguistic - rather than metaphysical.

[/ QUOTE ]

Ok, but I'm asking why you think that.

[madnak]

Because I'm essentially an empiricist, and based on what we know of physics and my interpretation of that, it seems that the universe is really just a big vibrating field. It's hard to know how or even if it can be legitimately separated. If it can be separated, this is only true to the level of fundamental particles.

Everything we interact with, everything the universe is composed of, is at its most discrete a particular configuration of fundamental particles. Therefore, any identity we ascribe to something above the level of fundamental particles is contingent - the question of whether the identity persists when the configuration of particles changes depends solely on the standard according to which the "identity" of the group of particles is evaluated.

(Note that I suspect that even fundamental particles aren't discrete and that even their "identities" are basically contingent at a physical level. Thus only the universal field can be said to have persistence, but time itself is a property of the univsersal field, so it doesn't really have persistence either.)

[carlo]

[ QUOTE ]
Because I'm essentially an empiricist, and based on what we know of physics and my interpretation of that, it seems that the universe is really just a big vibrating field. It's hard to know how or even if it can be legitimately separated. If it can be separated, this is only true to the level of fundamental particles.

Everything we interact with, everything the universe is composed of, is at its most discrete a particular configuration of fundamental particles. Therefore, any identity we ascribe to something above the level of fundamental particles is contingent - the question of whether the identity persists when the configuration of particles changes depends solely on the standard according to which the "identity" of the group of particles is evaluated.

(Note that I suspect that even fundamental particles aren't discrete and that even their "identities" are basically contingent at a physical level. Thus only the universal field can be said to have persistence, but time itself is a property of the univsersal field, so it doesn't really have persistence either.)

[/ QUOTE ]

As far as I can see, you're presenting a pantheistic/deterministic position. All is in flux, all is in flow, you are part of the immortal all. You have no ego and if you think you do, it is illusory. You are not a discrete being and if anyone says you are it is only a word, a nominal li9ngui9stic extension, but not the real you who isn't but is only when one is not looking but really aren't. Do I have this right about you, who aren't, but are, when not looking but really aren't?

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
Because I'm essentially an empiricist, and based on what we know of physics and my interpretation of that, it seems that the universe is really just a big vibrating field. It's hard to know how or even if it can be legitimately separated. If it can be separated, this is only true to the level of fundamental particles.

Everything we interact with, everything the universe is composed of, is at its most discrete a particular configuration of fundamental particles. Therefore, any identity we ascribe to something above the level of fundamental particles is contingent - the question of whether the identity persists when the configuration of particles changes depends solely on the standard according to which the "identity" of the group of particles is evaluated.

(Note that I suspect that even fundamental particles aren't discrete and that even their "identities" are basically contingent at a physical level. Thus only the universal field can be said to have persistence, but time itself is a property of the univsersal field, so it doesn't really have persistence either.)

[/ QUOTE ]

I am very sympathetic to the claim that everything in the universe is composed of fundamental particles. So let us suppose that everything in the universe is composed of fundamental particles.

Those who believe in the existence and persistence of macro physical objects need not deny this (and probably most often do not), since composition is not the same relation as identity.

So how do we get from the claim that everything is composed of fundamental particles, to the claim that nothing persists that isn't at the level of fundamental particles?

It seems like you are, in fact, saying that persistence is incompatible with change. Is that the problem?

It also looks as though you aren't just making a claim about the persistence of objects, but also about the existence of objects. Is your view that the only objects that really exist are the fundamental particles (assuming they can be 'separated'), or the universe as a whole (if it's all just a big vibrating field, and the fundamental particles cannot be separated)?

[madnak]

[ QUOTE ]
It also looks as though you aren't just making a claim about the persistence of objects, but also about the existence of objects. Is your view that the only objects that really exist are the fundamental particles (assuming they can be 'separated'), or the universe as a whole (if it's all just a big vibrating field, and the fundamental particles cannot be separated)?

[/ QUOTE ]

That's basically my position. We can ascribe "existence" to them, and it's perfectly valid in a contingent sense, but the only basis for this conception of existence is the set of criteria applied to determine that quality.

There are many ways to cut a cake. I can cut a cake into 8 pieces, and then there are indeed 8 pieces in the cake. Those pieces matter, because they'll determine who gets what part of the cake (and where crumbs will be left behind). But there is nothing special or fundamental that separates piece 1 from piece 2 - I just happened to divide the cake at a certain location. I could have divided the cake at another location, and it would have been equally valid. The individual pieces of cake are a function of my slicing, not a property of the cake itself.

When the cake hasn't yet been sliced, asking about where slice 1 and slice 2 are seems arbitrary and nonsensical. That all depends on where you slice it. In the same sense, a person or object's identity depends on how we choose to assign the property of identity - that property doesn't exist in the universe itself, it's a function of how we choose to divide the universe. I view animalism as a way of assigning idenity - it's just a method of slicing the cake, it's no more "true" or "false" than any other method. The dilemma presented in the OP strikes me as a different method of slicing - or maybe a question of "what should we do with the crumbs?" I don't think there's a right answer.

[madnak]

[ QUOTE ]
As far as I can see, you're presenting a pantheistic/deterministic position. All is in flux, all is in flow, you are part of the immortal all. You have no ego and if you think you do, it is illusory. You are not a discrete being and if anyone says you are it is only a word, a nominal li9ngui9stic extension, but not the real you who isn't but is only when one is not looking but really aren't. Do I have this right about you, who aren't, but are, when not looking but really aren't?

[/ QUOTE ]

Essentially, but I don't like describing macro properties as "illusions." The properties are valid at the macro level, and the whole can be more than the sum of its parts (in that organized properties can arise from how fundamental particles interact). So I'd say our view of the ego is a conceptual context rather than a recognition of an underlying reality. And I think any view of the ego will likely start to crumble when we try to determine exactly where my ego ends and the rest of the world begins. Maybe it's a semantic point, but I think it's important. The reductionistic perspective may have more to do with the basic underpinnings of reality, but that doesn't make it more correct.

Consciousness is an interesting problem. I consider it most useful to view my personal awareness as a discrete and fundamental aspect of reality, but I don't think this is actually a correct view. I think my awareness "acts like" an aspect of reality, in the sense that fundamental particles sometimes "act like" billiard balls. So it's practical to think of it that way at the macro level - so long as I recognize the limitations of that view, and recognize its contingent nature.

[tame_deuces]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
It also looks as though you aren't just making a claim about the persistence of objects, but also about the existence of objects. Is your view that the only objects that really exist are the fundamental particles (assuming they can be 'separated'), or the universe as a whole (if it's all just a big vibrating field, and the fundamental particles cannot be separated)?

[/ QUOTE ]

That's basically my position. We can ascribe "existence" to them, and it's perfectly valid in a contingent sense, but the only basis for this conception of existence is the set of criteria applied to determine that quality.

There are many ways to cut a cake. I can cut a cake into 8 pieces, and then there are indeed 8 pieces in the cake. Those pieces matter, because they'll determine who gets what part of the cake (and where crumbs will be left behind). But there is nothing special or fundamental that separates piece 1 from piece 2 - I just happened to divide the cake at a certain location. I could have divided the cake at another location, and it would have been equally valid. The individual pieces of cake are a function of my slicing, not a property of the cake itself.

When the cake hasn't yet been sliced, asking about where slice 1 and slice 2 are seems arbitrary and nonsensical. That all depends on where you slice it. In the same sense, a person or object's identity depends on how we choose to assign the property of identity - that property doesn't exist in the universe itself, it's a function of how we choose to divide the universe. I view animalism as a way of assigning idenity - it's just a method of slicing the cake, it's no more "true" or "false" than any other method. The dilemma presented in the OP strikes me as a different method of slicing - or maybe a question of "what should we do with the crumbs?" I don't think there's a right answer.

[/ QUOTE ]

I'm just quoting this because it is a true gem of a post.

[carlo]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]

That's basically my position. We can ascribe "existence" to them, and it's perfectly valid in a contingent sense, but the only basis for this conception of existence is the set of criteria applied to determine that quality.

There are many ways to cut a cake. I can cut a cake into 8 pieces, and then there are indeed 8 pieces in the cake. Those pieces matter, because they'll determine who gets what part of the cake (and where crumbs will be left behind). But there is nothing special or fundamental that separates piece 1 from piece 2 - I just happened to divide the cake at a certain location. I could have divided the cake at another location, and it would have been equally valid. The individual pieces of cake are a function of my slicing, not a property of the cake itself.

When the cake hasn't yet been sliced, asking about where slice 1 and slice 2 are seems arbitrary and nonsensical. That all depends on where you slice it. In the same sense, a person or object's identity depends on how we choose to assign the property of identity - that property doesn't exist in the universe itself, it's a function of how we choose to divide the universe. I view animalism as a way of assigning idenity - it's just a method of slicing the cake, it's no more "true" or "false" than any other method. The dilemma presented in the OP strikes me as a different method of slicing - or maybe a question of "what should we do with the crumbs?" I don't think there's a right answer.



[/ QUOTE ]

OK I've read your reply to me but feel that responding to this post would be more considerate. It appears you are presenting a type of solipsistic/Kantian type view of knowledge and the world.





In your presentation of "the cake" You are saying that your particular viewpoint of the external world has a validity and that another also may have a validity depending upon "how the cake is cut". You make no mention of the possibility that the cake has an existence of its own.You say it is not discrete, and knowledge of it is dependent upon your particular viewpoint. I'm sure this could be stated better but I believe the drift is apparent.





Let's look at a tree as I see it is a better way to examine the character of the issue. the tree is large, tall, has many branches and reaches to the sky. It is the fall/winter and leaves are not apparent. I would say that the tree speaks for itself and its discrete existence is undeniable and that any truths about this tree will be offered by the tree. There can be differences in our perspectives about the tree as for example if we are sitting around the tree but are a 150 angle from each other. We have what might be called a mathematical difference in perspective but no matter how you cut it it is undeniable that the tree contains its own truth even if we haven't an iota of understanding or in fact are totally incorrect in our thinking. The truths about the tree are not about "opinions" by you and I but are contained within the tree. One might believe that this tree is within the "immutable all" but that in no way comes to the reality of the tree. It seems that one should work with the tree first and leave open the possibility of the "immutable all" for if this is so it will be found in the work. It is not found in the work ,at present, for the naive look at the tree presents discreteness and if you will, an individual tree, via our senses.The tree exists, I know it exists, and refuse to deny my senses.





Now , back to Kant who stated that "you cannot know the thing in itself". Kant looks at the tree and is naively perceiving the tree, a perception. The moment he turns away from the tree he is left with a"memory" of a tree which is not the tree. the drift is that in all of our thinking we work with the "memory' of the tree, an imagination that is actually a condensed picture of the reality but IS NOT THE TREE. This is the Kantian viewpoint and one can see its similarity to yours. I believe that Kant then posited the "categorical imperative" which is common to all and acts as a basis for knowledge and through this we can come to some type of agreement as to our "apparent truths" for after all, we are all 'working within our heads". So if you add a stability factor as Kant did(this is not a justification of Kant), then we can come to agreement. The categorical imperative has its own difficulties but this hasn't stopped modern men from espousing Kant in substance and form.





Now the scientist comes along and states 'I can find the truth of the tree". He immediately begins to chip at the bark, perhaps even cut the tree in half and viola we have knowledge based upon the mineral kingdom. No doubt potassium, sodium, sulfur, etc. will be found and in this the naive man is befuddled for when the chips are made there is no longer a tree. A flower is a flower in the earth and if cut and placed on your dinner table it ceases to be a flower. In the scientific viewpoint the machine gives the relevance to the finding. Man is divorced from the finding for if man begins to think on these things we are back to the "categorical imperative" . This hasn't stopped scientists from thinking, thankfully.





The question is, how does one know the thing in itself?This question can only come about after denying the reality of the tree but it should be asked. What is it that disproves Kant but better yet makes us able to know the "thing in itself"? I'll take a break here and will follow up in another post.













[/ QUOTE ]

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
It also looks as though you aren't just making a claim about the persistence of objects, but also about the existence of objects. Is your view that the only objects that really exist are the fundamental particles (assuming they can be 'separated'), or the universe as a whole (if it's all just a big vibrating field, and the fundamental particles cannot be separated)?

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That's basically my position. We can ascribe "existence" to them, and it's perfectly valid in a contingent sense, but the only basis for this conception of existence is the set of criteria applied to determine that quality.

There are many ways to cut a cake. I can cut a cake into 8 pieces, and then there are indeed 8 pieces in the cake. Those pieces matter, because they'll determine who gets what part of the cake (and where crumbs will be left behind). But there is nothing special or fundamental that separates piece 1 from piece 2 - I just happened to divide the cake at a certain location. I could have divided the cake at another location, and it would have been equally valid. The individual pieces of cake are a function of my slicing, not a property of the cake itself.

When the cake hasn't yet been sliced, asking about where slice 1 and slice 2 are seems arbitrary and nonsensical. That all depends on where you slice it. In the same sense, a person or object's identity depends on how we choose to assign the property of identity - that property doesn't exist in the universe itself, it's a function of how we choose to divide the universe. I view animalism as a way of assigning idenity - it's just a method of slicing the cake, it's no more "true" or "false" than any other method. The dilemma presented in the OP strikes me as a different method of slicing - or maybe a question of "what should we do with the crumbs?" I don't think there's a right answer.

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This is the view that Michael Dummett describes as "the picture of reality as an amorphous lump." Dummett is sympathetic to the view, and I am as well.

If you are not familiar with four-dimensionalism it is the view that objects have temporal parts as well as spatial parts, and was motivated in large part by the change in our conception of space and time due to relativity theory.

It is complementary to the "cookie cutter" metaphor (that we carve up reality ourselves), since four-dimensionalists usually believe that every matter-filled region of space-time contains an object, and in that sense the world does not come ready-made but is carved up ontologically by us relative to our own interests. (This was W.V.O. Quine's view, a staunch empiricist with a very parsimonious ontology-see Quine's "Ontological Relativity," "On What There Is," and "Identity, Ostension and Hypostasis." To see how four-dimensionalism is applied to the problem of personal identity see David Lewis' "Survival and Identity.")

It is certainly a philosophically convenient view since it deflates most philosophical problems (though it brings new ones in its wake). I would not go so far as to say that "nobody in their right mind" accepts the alternative view that the natural sciences study genuine natural kinds/objects though.

[carlo]

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Continuing on with the idea of not knowing the “thing in itself” we can see that this is relevant to the fact that the mental picture of the tree is not the tree and it is then assumed that Man, in his thinking, works with this mental picture of the tree but not the ‘real tree”. Further consideration reveals this to be faulty for the “real tree” is a perception which is limited by our being as we are limited beings in the world. Each man is individually limited by nature else we would be able to perceive the entire world complex in one fell swoop. The other consideration is that our “mental picture” is also a perception as the worldly tree percept is equally. In fact our entire being is a “percept” within our nature. One could therefore give no more credence to the “mental picture “as basis for knowledge than the original tree percept. Because of this some have posited that life is illusion, at best a dream, in which all men dream equally.




So how does “limited man” gain knowledge of the world? He does this through thinking. In each of the mental gyrations we go through thinking is assumed but not studied. If I throw a ball into the air a distance and watch it fall we will obtain a parabolic path and after pondering the presentation we, as mathematician, come up with the “concept” of the parabola. This “concept” is brought to us by thinking and in this the percept of the world which does not display the whole reality is complete by that part brought to us by thinking, the "concept". Because of Man’s limitations his percepts only display half of the reality while the concept, which is the part not observed by the senses is present and completes the whole. Likewise the concept “tree” or “animal kingdom” are concepts brought to us via thinking. In thinking we piece the world together connecting concepts to their respective percepts and to other concepts and therefore expanding our world knowledge vis a vis our precepts.




Of course, the idea of thinking must be considered. One must study thinking but can only do this in hindsight. To study or observe thinking while in the act of thinking is not tenable. One studies thinking at the completion of the act and in this thinking is studied and placed in our complex of concepts. The study of thinking reveals that thinking is that which is the part of the universal world process presented to all. Thinking is not individual but our substance in which truth is common to all of mankind, not the specific individual. In that an individual man is limited by his being as for example feelings or will which block perfect thought impulses the truths accomplished will display variations of multiplicity due to the fact that an individual man will obfuscate (depending upon the individual ,of course) the truth in reality, again secondary to his limited being. He works this worldly universe piecemeal and passes this to his brothers who in following the thought gain an appreciation of the world. Thinking is universal and in this we can all appreciate the truths involved and through thinking we can all come together. My feelings and will impulses are not common to all men but my thinking most certainly is so.





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