The Parasite Dilemma

[PairTheBoard]

The Traveler's Dilemma has inspired me to create this Parasite Dilemma. I wonder if it's an innovation or if someone else has already invented it. If it's an innovation you saw it first here on SMP.

The Parasite Dilemma
--------------------
You are part of a group of 100 people. Each person in the group writes down on a piece of paper their decision whether to be a Contributor to the Group or a Parasite on the Group. The Operator of the experiment will add $100 to the Group's Treasury for every Group Contributor. For every Parasite on the Group, $200 will be subtracted from the Group Treasury, which may go into debt. Each Contibutor gets 1 Share and each Parasite gets 2 Shares in the Treasury. The Treasury is then divided amongst the Contributors and Parasites according to their Shares in the Treasury. If the Treasury is positive each Parasite will recieve twice as much of the proceeds as each Contributor. On the other hand, if the Treasury is in Debt each Parasite must pay out twice as much as each Contributor to pay off the Debt.

What is your decision? Do you decide to Contribute to the Group or be a Parasite?

There is also a NonDebt version of the Dilemma where the Treasury cannot fall below zero. What is you decision in the NonDebt Version?

PairTheBoard

[thylacine]

The Contributors band together and eliminate the Parasites.

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
The Contributors band together and eliminate the Parasites.

[/ QUOTE ]

Don't be a Parasite on the Thread.

PairTheBoard

[thylacine]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
The Contributors band together and eliminate the Parasites.

[/ QUOTE ]

Don't be a Parasite on the Thread.

PairTheBoard

[/ QUOTE ]

Actually I was being a Contributor. For cooperation, altruism, etc. to work in social animals there needs to be a way to detect cheats and Parasites, and to ostracise or eliminate them.

But to clarify for posters in this thread, PTB is talking about a kind of multiplayer, but one-off, Prisoner's Dilemma, and I am talking about an iterated version of it.

But I won't iterate my comments in case you get iteration irritation.

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
The Contributors band together and eliminate the Parasites.

[/ QUOTE ]

Don't be a Parasite on the Thread.

PairTheBoard

[/ QUOTE ]

Actually I was being a Contributor. For cooperation, altruism, etc. to work in social animals there needs to be a way to detect cheats and Parasites, and to ostracise or eliminate them.

But to clarify for posters in this thread, PTB is talking about a kind of multiplayer, but one-off, Prisoner's Dilemma, and I am talking about an iterated version of it.

But I won't iterate my comments in case you get iteration irritation.

[/ QUOTE ]

Exactly why I created and want to look at this Dilemma rather than the well known iterated prisoner's dilemma. By removing the easy answer I think the Parasite Dilemma isolates a concept that has been elluding us.

PairTheBoard

[CallMeIshmael]

What do we know of the group of 100?

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
What do we know of the group of 100?

[/ QUOTE ]

You are all motivated to make money.

PairTheBoard

[CallMeIshmael]

Without having given it much thought, and reserving my right to change my answer later, you can take me down to the Parasite City

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
Without having given it much thought, and reserving my right to change my answer later, you can take me down to the Parasite City

[/ QUOTE ]

Remember the Debt factor. If more than 1/3 of the participants decide to be parasites you will end up doing worse than the contributors. You will owe more money than they will.

PairTheBoard

[CallMeIshmael]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Without having given it much thought, and reserving my right to change my answer later, you can take me down to the Parasite City

[/ QUOTE ]

Remember the Debt factor. If more than 1/3 of the participants decide to be parasites you will end up doing worse than the contributors. You will owe more money than they will.

PairTheBoard

[/ QUOTE ]

Im well aware

I just dont think, out of 100 random people, enough of them not contribute for this to be relavent



Look at the percentage of the population that votes, to see evidence for the "what if everyone else did it?" syndrome

[Silent A]

There are 99 other people. A little algebra will show that if 67.6667 of them are contributors than you do just as well being a parasite or a contributor.

Therefore, if you have reason to believe that 68 or more of them will contribute then you're better off being a parasite.

In other words, if most of the other people are Americans, you should contribute. Otherwise, be a parasite. /images/graemlins/laugh.gif

ETA: oops, did the math wrong. I'll post the correct answer in a couple minutes.

ETA part 2: correct math changes the indifference point to about 67.68 contributors (i.e. no real difference at all).

[knowledgeORbust]

[ QUOTE ]

You are all motivated to make money.


[/ QUOTE ]

If this is the only known information, I'm going with contributor. Whatever the case, I don't think there's going to be much money in the fund.

Interesting stipulation: is there any record of the choices individuals made after the fact? If yes, are participants aware of this beforehand?

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
Interesting stipulation: is there any record of the choices individuals made after the fact?

[/ QUOTE ]

No. So no peer pressure is involved.

PairTheBoard

[Nicholasp27]

note: u only wanna go parasite if 31 or less people go parasite...so it's <1/3 as the cutoff point


if 32 go parasite, 67 go contributor...now my choice:

i go parasite: 6700-6600=100; 33*2+67=133 shares

2/133 * 100 = $1.50 for me


i go contributor: 6800-6400=400; 32*2+68=132 shares

1/132 * 400 = $3.03 for me

so it's <=31, not <=1/3 that matters

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
note: u only wanna go parasite if 31 or less people go parasite...so it's <1/3 as the cutoff point


if 32 go parasite, 67 go contributor...now my choice:

i go parasite: 6700-6600=100; 33*2+67=133 shares

2/133 * 100 = $1.50 for me


i go contributor: 6800-6400=400; 32*2+68=132 shares

1/132 * 400 = $3.03 for me

so it's <=31, not <=1/3 that matters

[/ QUOTE ]



Regardless, you don't know what everybody else is going to do. That's what makes it a game. The question remains, what do you do?

I suspect the correct game theory answer is to randomize your choice. Give yourself 1/3 chance to pick Parasite and 2/3 chance to pick Contributor.

If that's correct, and everybody does that then Game Theory ensures an average result of Break Even for everybody. I believe this shows Game Theory to be lacking in some kind of Rationality which has probably not yet been well defined by the professional Theoreticians. Clearly, everyone does better if they all reject Game Theory and decide to be Contributors.

I think this is more than just a theoretical curiousity. It goes to the heart of a lot of phenomenon which allow society to work better than game theory predicts. I also think it is a mistake to blindly promote the mentality of the parasite as logically superior - something I see as almost a given for many on this Forum. While looking out for self interest is important, there can also be benefits to supporting the dynamics of the Group. In my view a Balance between the two is the healthy operating perspective.

Extremism in favor of the Group can lead to self destructive fanaticism, while Extremism in favor of self interest can lead to the life of the criminal or sociopath.

PairTheBoard

[vhawk01]

If there are greater benefits to be had by looking out for the well-being of the group, rather than looking solely after your own self-interest, then...well....you might have to define your terms a little. I think your mixed up. This doesn't show the superiority of group-centered behavior, it just provides and example of where self-centered and group-centered are identical.

In fact, even the way you phrase your insight belies the error and diminishes the revelation. You claim that a better result is achieved by everyone rejecting 'self-interest' and picking contributor. A better result for whom? For the individuals? Thats how we both keep score in these things, right? So you are claiming there are better ways of achieving self-interest than self-interest...that doesn't seem to argue against self-interested strategies at all.

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
you might have to define your terms a little.

[/ QUOTE ]

I leave it to the professional theoreticians to do that.

[ QUOTE ]
I think your mixed up.

[/ QUOTE ]

I would be if I let you define my terms for me.

PairTheBoard

[CallMeIshmael]

PTB,

he brought up a very important point, and your response was certainly glib, at best.

You say that everyone does better if they all contribute, but, why do I care? Why does it matter if other players do well? I just care about how I do. (If you want to introduce an empathy element to the payoff, thats OK, but Im assuming we are working under the typical assumption that this has not been done)

If I feel everyone is going to contribute, why wouldnt I play parasite?



(also, Vhawk, self-centred and group-centred strategies dont align here. They are a mixed strategy and pure-contribute, repsectively)

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
If I feel everyone is going to contribute, why wouldnt I play parasite?


[/ QUOTE ]

Because of a reason you haven't thought of. A reason that depends on creative thinking. A reason that takes you outside your box of logic. A reason that the professional theoreticians are still working on formulating. A reason you will never discover unless you look for it.

PairTheBoard

[ctj]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
If I feel everyone is going to contribute, why wouldnt I play parasite?


[/ QUOTE ]

Because of a reason you haven't thought of. A reason that depends on creative thinking. A reason that takes you outside your box of logic. A reason that the professional theoreticians are still working on formulating. A reason you will never discover unless you look for it.

PairTheBoard

[/ QUOTE ]

It seems to me that you are complaining that game-theoretical analysis of a 1-time Prisoner's Dilemma doesn't apply to iterated Prisoners' Dilemmas. Pure parasite strategies tend to do very badly in iterated scenarios.

[thylacine]

[ QUOTE ]
The Traveler's Dilemma has inspired me to create this Parasite Dilemma. I wonder if it's an innovation or if someone else has already invented it. If it's an innovation you saw it first here on SMP.

The Parasite Dilemma
--------------------
You are part of a group of 100 people. Each person in the group writes down on a piece of paper their decision whether to be a Contributor to the Group or a Parasite on the Group. The Operator of the experiment will add $100 to the Group's Treasury for every Group Contributor. For every Parasite on the Group, $200 will be subtracted from the Group Treasury, which may go into debt. Each Contibutor gets 1 Share and each Parasite gets 2 Shares in the Treasury. The Treasury is then divided amongst the Contributors and Parasites according to their Shares in the Treasury. If the Treasury is positive each Parasite will recieve twice as much of the proceeds as each Contributor. On the other hand, if the Treasury is in Debt each Parasite must pay out twice as much as each Contributor to pay off the Debt.

What is your decision? Do you decide to Contribute to the Group or be a Parasite?

There is also a NonDebt version of the Dilemma where the Treasury cannot fall below zero. What is you decision in the NonDebt Version?

PairTheBoard

[/ QUOTE ]

Getting back to the original problem as formulated, this is a multiplayer game with at least one Nash equilibrium. My guess is that there is just one such equilibrium, namely each player chooses Contributor with exactly the same probability about p=0.6833, and chooses Parasite with probability about q=1-p=0.3167

That way the expected Treasury is about $500, giving a break even choice between getting 1 share of 500+100 or 2 shares of 500-200. Some approximations have been made, so the exact correct value of p would be slightly different.

OK?

NonDebt version: p would be somewhat less such that again the expected Treasury is about $500.

[CallMeIshmael]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
If I feel everyone is going to contribute, why wouldnt I play parasite?


[/ QUOTE ]

Because of a reason you haven't thought of. A reason that depends on creative thinking. A reason that takes you outside your box of logic. A reason that the professional theoreticians are still working on formulating. A reason you will never discover unless you look for it.

PairTheBoard

[/ QUOTE ]


Can you enlighten us?

Or, is your answer, "you're wrong, but I just dont know why you're wrong"?

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
If I feel everyone is going to contribute, why wouldnt I play parasite?


[/ QUOTE ]

Because of a reason you haven't thought of. A reason that depends on creative thinking. A reason that takes you outside your box of logic. A reason that the professional theoreticians are still working on formulating. A reason you will never discover unless you look for it.

PairTheBoard

[/ QUOTE ]

It seems to me that you are complaining that game-theoretical analysis of a 1-time Prisoner's Dilemma doesn't apply to iterated Prisoners' Dilemmas. Pure parasite strategies tend to do very badly in iterated scenarios.

[/ QUOTE ]

But this is not an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. This is a one time multiplayer Parasite Dilemma. I designed it so that it has the flavor of an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma without the interations. So does your observation that pure parasite strategies do poorly in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas have any applicability to this one time Parasite Dilemma?

PairTheBoard

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
If I feel everyone is going to contribute, why wouldnt I play parasite?


[/ QUOTE ]

Because of a reason you haven't thought of. A reason that depends on creative thinking. A reason that takes you outside your box of logic. A reason that the professional theoreticians are still working on formulating. A reason you will never discover unless you look for it.

PairTheBoard

[/ QUOTE ]


Can you enlighten us?

Or, is your answer, "you're wrong, but I just dont know why you're wrong"?

[/ QUOTE ]

I think it's an open question. I doubt I could present a theory that would stand up to the scrutiny of peer review by professional theoreticians. But I don't think the Nash Equilibrium I proposed and which Thylacine refined is the last word on the problem. From the Scientific American article it appears not to be the last word for the Traveler's Dilemma either. It's up to you if you want to participate in some creative thinking that goes beyond the theoretical status quo that many people think is inadequate for the analysis of this kind of problem.

If Thylacine's calculation is correct, everybody makes about $5 playing the Nash Equilibrium randomized choice. And if you are the only 100% contributor you make a few cents less. But suppose we postulate the possibility of the existence of a Super Rational process that goes beyond the logic of Nash. As a rational process it is one that everyone can arrive at independently and which everyone will act on, just as we now think they will act according to Nash's reasoning.

So here's an idea. Suppose we all postulate the existence of this Super Rational process without actually identifying it. What could we say about it? Clearly, it will be one that will make us more money than Nash's reasoning. We will all adopt it because it is rational and it will make all of us more money. Is there a choice for us that would satisfy that criteria? Yes. We all choose to cooperate. Does that universal choice make us all more money? Yes, we all make $100 instead of $5 apiece.

Why would you not then decide to go your own way and be a Parasite if everyone else is cooperating? Because the postulate is that cooperating is a Super-Rational Choice that overrides Nash reasoning and thus overrides your temptation to be a parasite. You participate in the Group Rational because it is superior to Nash reasoning for this kind of Dilemma. We all decide on this Super Rational Process and we all make money.

The more people who act on a Super Rational basis the more money everybody makes, including those who are unable to do so. So your choice is between being a Super Rational person who contributes to the common good or being a parasite. I think it's clear that the Super Rational thing to do is be a Contributor.

PairTheBoard

[Nicholasp27]

if u think at least 69 of the other players are 'super rational' then u should go parasite; it isn't rational, super or otherwise, to contribute if u know that the rest will contribute (which u are saying we will from this yet-undefined thought process)

[CallMeIshmael]

[ QUOTE ]
Why would you not then decide to go your own way and be a Parasite if everyone else is cooperating? Because the postulate is that cooperating is a Super-Rational Choice that overrides Nash reasoning and thus overrides your temptation to be a parasite. You participate in the Group Rational because it is superior to Nash reasoning for this kind of Dilemma. We all decide on this Super Rational Process and we all make money.

[/ QUOTE ]


OK, I'll postulate a few things:

1. "I prefer more money to less money"
2. "I am one of the 100 players"
3. "I am 100% sure the other 99 players will play the superrational choice of cooperate"

Given the above, I can cooperate, and get $100 or be a parasite and get $194. Those are my two options (given the 100% certainty clause). You have the person choosing to cooperate. That is silly.


The error in your logic (and it is a common one) deals with a slight introduction of group thinking (specfically, the willingness to give up very slight bits of utility for yourself if it greatly benefits many others). To demonstrate the flaw, Ill ask you to think of a mind exereriment.

Imagine this scenario:

There are 100 animals in a tribe. For space reasons, 100, and only 100, in each year will survive. Each of the animals is either a contributor or a parasite. During each year, the animals play the game described in the OP. At the end of the year, animals are choosen at random to "reproduce," which will make up the next generation. Assume that the chances that the animal reproduces is proportional to the amount they made in the parasite dilemma game. (also, assume that there is some chance, say 10%, that a mutation occurs, and the offspring of a player switches to the opposing strategy).


(essentially, this is a model of evolution, in which the only gauge of fitness is the organisms strategy in the game).


What will happen?

Will the population find this so-callled "super rational" strategy?


(I bring this up, since evolution by natural selection is perhaps the best example of a situation where the small error you are making is most magnified.)

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
it isn't rational, super or otherwise, to contribute if u know that the rest will contribute

[/ QUOTE ]

By definition, it is Super-Rational. Being Super-Rational makes everybody money. That's what makes it Super-Rational.

PairTheBoard

[Nicholasp27]

and if i go parasite against all the 'super rational' players, everyone will still make money, but i'll make more

what u are advocating is that everyone decides to go for top group gain rather than top personal gain

[CallMeIshmael]

[ QUOTE ]
what u are advocating is that everyone decides to go for top group gain rather than top personal gain

[/ QUOTE ]

exactly


this isnt anything particularily new. You have just changed the payoff for each player from 'how much I get' to 'how much the average player gets.'

Once you do that, the nash equilbrium becomes, not suprisingly, to contribute.

[KipBond]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
it isn't rational, super or otherwise, to contribute if u know that the rest will contribute

[/ QUOTE ]

By definition, it is Super-Rational. Being Super-Rational makes everybody money. That's what makes it Super-Rational.

[/ QUOTE ]

I think the only way this can work, is if a player has some sort of utility outside of this one-time game. Perhaps "feeling good about not being a parasite" is worth more than he would gain if he were a parasite. Perhaps there is a meta-game where players learn about the other players' micro-game strategies, and adjust their behaviors accordingly. These sorts of things are what really happen in the real world.

My "Super Rational" strategy makes me feel good -- and when I talk to other people about their game strategies, if they aren't also a "super rational cooperator", then I don't trust them as much in other games.

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
and if i go parasite against all the 'super rational' players, everyone will still make money, but i'll make more

what u are advocating is that everyone decides to go for top group gain rather than top personal gain

[/ QUOTE ]

What I am saying is that everyone, including you, can recognize the possibility of being Super-Rational and that by acting on the basis of being Super-Rational everybody, including you, will make 20 times more money than if they and you act on the basis of Thylacine's Nash reasoning - randomizing your choice about 1/3 parasite 2/3 contributor.

PairTheBoard

[ctj]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
If I feel everyone is going to contribute, why wouldnt I play parasite?


[/ QUOTE ]

Because of a reason you haven't thought of. A reason that depends on creative thinking. A reason that takes you outside your box of logic. A reason that the professional theoreticians are still working on formulating. A reason you will never discover unless you look for it.

PairTheBoard

[/ QUOTE ]

It seems to me that you are complaining that game-theoretical analysis of a 1-time Prisoner's Dilemma doesn't apply to iterated Prisoners' Dilemmas. Pure parasite strategies tend to do very badly in iterated scenarios.

[/ QUOTE ]

But this is not an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. This is a one time multiplayer Parasite Dilemma. I designed it so that it has the flavor of an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma without the interations. So does your observation that pure parasite strategies do poorly in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas have any applicability to this one time Parasite Dilemma?

PairTheBoard

[/ QUOTE ]

I'm saying that:
1. Your Parasite Dilemma seems like a standard Prisoner's Dilemma; it just has more 'prisoners'.

2. You note that co-operation would be 'better' than basing one's (one-time) play on Game Theory.

3. But co-operation can only evolve when the 'game' is iterated, and only when the 'cheaters' can be identified and punished.

4. Human society is much more like multiple simultaneous iterated Prisoners' Dilemmas (actually Multilemmas). It seems to me that we're well-adapted co-operating (and to detecting and punishing cheats and 'free-riders') in small to medium-sized communities (up to a small village). We're not so well adapated to dealing with human parasites in modern society's mega-communities.

[PairTheBoard]

If members of a species reproduced according to money made at the Nash Equilibrium of the Parasite Dilemma, the species would quickly become extinct.

PairTheBoard

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
I think the only way this can work, is if a player has some sort of utility outside of this one-time game.

[/ QUOTE ]

Or if people just realize that the Smart thing to do is to be Super Rational so that everybody can make money.

PairTheBoard

[CallMeIshmael]

[ QUOTE ]
If members of a species reproduced according to money made at the Nash Equilibrium of the Parasite Dilemma, the species would quickly become extinct.

[/ QUOTE ]

Incorrect.

Honestly man, read something by John Maynard Smith. You have some pretty common misconceptions, and his treatment of game theory in the context of evolutionary biology will really drive home the concept of how "being good for the group" doesnt cut it when the game really counts.

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
3. But co-operation can only evolve when the 'game' is iterated, and only when the 'cheaters' can be identified and punished.


[/ QUOTE ]

That's what the theoretical status quo says. But in this case, as in the Traveler's Dilemma, there is a great deal of incentive for people to find a way to inject their thinking with a kind of virtual evolutionary process that mimics what would actually occur with iterations.

[ QUOTE ]
4. Human society is much more like multiple simultaneous iterated Prisoners' Dilemmas (actually Multilemmas). It seems to me that we're well-adapted co-operating (and to detecting and punishing cheats and 'free-riders') in small to medium-sized communities (up to a small village). We're not so well adapated to dealing with human parasites in modern society's mega-communities.

[/ QUOTE ]

My idea is that we are adapted to the capacity for Super-Rational thinking. What is required to make the Super-Rational work in the Parasite Dilemma is the capacity of people to recognize its superiority and apply it.

PairTheBoard

[KipBond]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
I think the only way this can work, is if a player has some sort of utility outside of this one-time game.

[/ QUOTE ]

Or if people just realize that the Smart thing to do is to be Super Rational so that everybody can make money.

[/ QUOTE ]

It is Uber-Super-Rational to lead everyone else to believe that it is in everyone's best interest to be Super-Rational, and then be a Parasite.

[Nicholasp27]

yup; like the gameshow friend or foe

the best thing to do is to convince the other that u both need to go friend so u can each win some money; but then go foe

in this case, u wanna play the game with 99 super-rationals and then u go parasite

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
I think the only way this can work, is if a player has some sort of utility outside of this one-time game.

[/ QUOTE ]

Or if people just realize that the Smart thing to do is to be Super Rational so that everybody can make money.

[/ QUOTE ]

It is Uber-Super-Rational to lead everyone else to believe that it is in everyone's best interest to be Super-Rational, and then be a Parasite.

[/ QUOTE ]

There is no "leading everyone else to believe" going on here. Nobody gets to communicate with anyone else. If everyone is Uber everyone ends up owing $200 so Uber-Super is not Rational. It is worse than Nash. Super-Rational is vastly superior to Nash. And people do have the capacity for it.

PairTheBoard

[CallMeIshmael]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
I think the only way this can work, is if a player has some sort of utility outside of this one-time game.

[/ QUOTE ]

Or if people just realize that the Smart thing to do is to be Super Rational so that everybody can make money.

[/ QUOTE ]

It is Uber-Super-Rational to lead everyone else to believe that it is in everyone's best interest to be Super-Rational, and then be a Parasite.

[/ QUOTE ]

There is no "leading everyone else to believe" going on here. Nobody gets to communicate with anyone else. If everyone is Uber everyone ends up owing $200 so Uber-Super is not Rational. It is worse than Nash. Super-Rational is vastly superior to Nash. And people do have the capacity for it.

PairTheBoard

[/ QUOTE ]


The worth of a strategy in a game is not solely based on how it does when everyone plays that strategy.

Much like in the game in the other thread, your choice of strategy doesnt affect what they will do. Just because one player opted to which to parasite, doesnt mean all of them do.


OK, lets strecth that concept a bit: if you somehow change this game to where it is played in order, and the first 99 players all contribute and you can see that they did, is it still super rational to be a contributor? Is that what you would do?

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
I think the only way this can work, is if a player has some sort of utility outside of this one-time game.

[/ QUOTE ]

Or if people just realize that the Smart thing to do is to be Super Rational so that everybody can make money.

[/ QUOTE ]

It is Uber-Super-Rational to lead everyone else to believe that it is in everyone's best interest to be Super-Rational, and then be a Parasite.

[/ QUOTE ]

There is no "leading everyone else to believe" going on here. Nobody gets to communicate with anyone else. If everyone is Uber everyone ends up owing $200 so Uber-Super is not Rational. It is worse than Nash. Super-Rational is vastly superior to Nash. And people do have the capacity for it.

PairTheBoard

[/ QUOTE ]


The worth of a strategy in a game is not solely based on how it does when everyone plays that strategy.

Much like in the game in the other thread, your choice of strategy doesnt affect what they will do. Just because one player opted to which to parasite, doesnt mean all of them do.


OK, lets strecth that concept a bit: if you somehow change this game to where it is played in order, and the first 99 players all contribute and you can see that they did, is it still super rational to be a contributor? Is that what you would do?

[/ QUOTE ]

That would change the symmetry of the game. The logic from your altered game to the real one may not apply the way you think it does. It reminds me of Bostrom's Hybrid Model for the Sleeping Beauty Paradox where he points out that telling Beauty that it's Monday produces new Agent-Parts for Beauty. Ones not bound by conditional probabilities for her originally defined Agent-Parts.

Why are you putting all your efforts into staying inside a box of thinking that fails to make money here, when there is such a clear opportunity to make money.

PairTheBoard

[CallMeIshmael]

Can you answer the question?

What do you do in this altered game? (I never said it wasnt a different game to the OP, hence why I used the term 'altered')



And, if there is a difference between your strategy in the altered game, and the situation wherein you are playing the normal game, but 100% that the other 99 players will all contribute, what makes those answers different?


"Why are you putting all your efforts into staying inside a box of thinking that fails to make money here, when there is such a clear opportunity to make money. "

Im making $194 whereas you are making $100.

[Nicholasp27]

"The worth of a strategy in a game is not solely based on how it does when everyone plays that strategy." is a key point here

even if u could get people to be 'super-rational', it would then be in any given person's best interest to go parasite as there would be <31 parasites...

[m_the0ry]

The problem with this dilemma as with all game theory dilemmas is that we must define the other players' behavior.

Some mixture of rational/irrational/random behavior is to be expected. The exact mixture of these three possible behaviors is very important with respect to how this game should be played by the individual. In other words with the problem phrased as it is now there is no correct answer.

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
Can you answer the question?

What do you do in this altered game? (I never said it wasnt a different game to the OP, hence why I used the term 'altered')



And, if there is a difference between your strategy in the altered game, and the situation wherein you are playing the normal game, but 100% that the other 99 players will all contribute, what makes those answers different?


"Why are you putting all your efforts into staying inside a box of thinking that fails to make money here, when there is such a clear opportunity to make money. "

Im making $194 whereas you are making $100.

[/ QUOTE ]

You're not making $194 in the original game. In the original game your decision to be a parasite cannot be correct. If it were correct and everybody made the same "correct" decision you would all end up losing $200. But the decision to be a contributor does have a chance to be correct in the original game because if it is "correct" and everybody makes that "correct" decision everybody makes more money than they would making any other correct decision including the Nash decision to randomize at (1/3,2/3). Contributing is a Super-Rational Decision that is "correct" for everybody, including you.

PairTheBoard

[CallMeIshmael]

PTB,

this is not that hard. Im asking a question, please answer it:


IF YOU WERE 100% CERTAIN ALL OTHER PLAYERS WOULD CONTRIBUTE, WOULD YOU CHOOSE TO CONTRIBUTE OR BE A PARASITE??

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
even if u could get people to be 'super-rational', it would then be in any given person's best interest to go parasite as there would be <31 parasites...


[/ QUOTE ]

I can't "get" people to do anything. People will decide on their own. The decision to be Super-Rational and Contribute is one that will make everybody the most money. My contention is that everybody, including you and me, has the capacity to realize and act on this insight by Contributing.

PairTheBoard

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
The problem with this dilemma as with all game theory dilemmas is that we must define the other players' behavior.

Some mixture of rational/irrational/random behavior is to be expected. The exact mixture of these three possible behaviors is very important with respect to how this game should be played by the individual. In other words with the problem phrased as it is now there is no correct answer.

[/ QUOTE ]

My contention is that there is a "correct" answer which all participants can come to. That is the decision to Contribute, which then makes everybody money.

PairTheBoard

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
PTB,

this is not that hard. Im asking a question, please answer it:


IF YOU WERE 100% CERTAIN ALL OTHER PLAYERS WOULD CONTRIBUTE, WOULD YOU CHOOSE TO CONTRIBUTE OR BE A PARASITE??

[/ QUOTE ]

I already answered this question. Knowing what the other players will do changes the game. I'm not interested in that scenario. I'm interested in the one I described where we don't know what everybody else will do. In that case I must try to reason out the best decision. First I recognize the Nash (1/3,2/3) randomization decision as the best supplied by game theory. Then I realize it is possible to do better if there exists a Super-Rational process that goes beyond game theory. I decide to postulate such a Super-Rational decision and cast my vote to Contribute. If I can come to this realization, so can everybody else. If they do we all make money.

That's my answer. I realize you don't like it. But don't bother objecting because it doesn't conform to Nash logic. The whole point of it to begin with is to find a way beyond Nash logic.

PairTheBoard

[Nicholasp27]

and i hope i'm in a room with 99 people like u who are 'capable of coming to this realization' so i can make some good money going parasite

[Nicholasp27]

in the traveller's scenario, if nash goes 2, i'm [censored] if i don't go 2

in this case, if u all follow ur plan, then i'm in GREAT shape going parasite

[Nicholasp27]

btw, nash logic works because nothing else is needed to be known for it to work; if the players sit down and work out the possibilities and use logic, they will arrive at nash equilibrium

ur proposal can't be reached with logical conclusions...so it only works if the world is educated about it, which isn't true of nash equilibrium, composed of removing dominated strategies and re-running the game and checking for dominated strategies and re-running the game, etc

[CallMeIshmael]

PTB,

Who does better in the following game:

99 superrational players
1 sub-superrational parasite?

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
and i hope i'm in a room with 99 people like u who are 'capable of coming to this realization' so i can make some good money going parasite

[/ QUOTE ]

If you are correct you may find yourself in a room with 99 people just like you. If so, you will all lose $200.

PairTheBoard

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
PTB,

Who does better in the following game:

99 superrational players
1 sub-superrational parasite?

[/ QUOTE ]

Who does better in the following 3 games?

1. 100 Parasites

2. 100 Nash (1/3,2/3) Players.

3. 100 Super-Rational Contributing Players.

PairTheBoard

[CallMeIshmael]

most certainly the 'super-rational' players

OK, PTB, lets try to take this slowly... Im going to ask you two questions, you seem to like to avoid questions that hurt your position, so would ask that you please answer the following two questions:

1. Who does better in a game of 99 contributers and 1 parasite?

2. Do you agree that it is possible for the game to contain people playing different stragies? As in, 25 parasites, 70 contrinbutors, and 5 Nash people?

EDIT for math

[CallMeIshmael]

Also, while we're at it, in the one shot prisoner's dilemma, is the superrational choice to stay silent?

[KipBond]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
I think the only way this can work, is if a player has some sort of utility outside of this one-time game.

[/ QUOTE ]

Or if people just realize that the Smart thing to do is to be Super Rational so that everybody can make money.

[/ QUOTE ]

It is Uber-Super-Rational to lead everyone else to believe that it is in everyone's best interest to be Super-Rational, and then be a Parasite.

[/ QUOTE ]

There is no "leading everyone else to believe" going on here.

[/ QUOTE ]

Isn't that what you are doing right now?

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
PTB,

this is not that hard. Im asking a question, please answer it:


IF YOU WERE 100% CERTAIN ALL OTHER PLAYERS WOULD CONTRIBUTE, WOULD YOU CHOOSE TO CONTRIBUTE OR BE A PARASITE??

[/ QUOTE ]

I already answered this question. Knowing what the other players will do changes the game. I'm not interested in that scenario. I'm interested in the one I described where we don't know what everybody else will do. In that case I must try to reason out the best decision. First I recognize the Nash (1/3,2/3) randomization decision as the best supplied by game theory. Then I realize it is possible to do better if there exists a Super-Rational process that goes beyond game theory. I decide to postulate such a Super-Rational decision and cast my vote to Contribute. If I can come to this realization, so can everybody else. If they do we all make money.

That's my answer. I realize you don't like it. But don't bother objecting because it doesn't conform to Nash logic. The whole point of it to begin with is to find a way beyond Nash logic.

[/ QUOTE ]

As previously mentioned, if you are all "Super Rational", then I will be "Uber Super Rational" and get more $$.

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
and i hope i'm in a room with 99 people like u who are 'capable of coming to this realization' so i can make some good money going parasite

[/ QUOTE ]

If you are correct you may find yourself in a room with 99 people just like you. If so, you will all lose $200.

[/ QUOTE ]

How do you expect my decision to be "Uber Super Rational" to effect the other 99 player's decision on whether or not to be "Super Rational"?

[CallMeIshmael]

[ QUOTE ]
How do you expect my decision to be "Uber Super Rational" to effect the other 99 player's decision on whether or not to be "Super Rational"?

[/ QUOTE ]

Im starting to think that he believes all 100 people play the same strategy

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
Also, while we're at it, in the one shot prisoner's dilemma, is the superrational choice to stay silent?

[/ QUOTE ]

The difference here and in the Traveler's Dilemma is that there is more incentive to find a way past the Nash Equilibrium. You can't get past the Nash Equilibrium unless you go past the Nash Equilibrium.

PairTheBoard

[CallMeIshmael]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Also, while we're at it, in the one shot prisoner's dilemma, is the superrational choice to stay silent?

[/ QUOTE ]

The difference here and in the Traveler's Dilemma is that there is more incentive to find a way past the Nash Equilibrium. You can't get past the Nash Equilibrium unless you go past the Nash Equilibrium.

PairTheBoard

[/ QUOTE ]

Can you just answer the question?

[Taraz]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
How do you expect my decision to be "Uber Super Rational" to effect the other 99 player's decision on whether or not to be "Super Rational"?

[/ QUOTE ]

Im starting to think that he believes all 100 people play the same strategy

[/ QUOTE ]

I think he's assuming that if there is a single strategy that is the most rational, everyone will figure it out before they act. So yes, all 100 people will play the same "strategy", even if that means randomizing your choice.

[KipBond]

[ QUOTE ]
Can you just answer the question?

[/ QUOTE ]

He took lessons from David Sklansky. If you read a bit of the "Sleeping Beauty" thread, you'll see the strategy there as well. Now, in a minute he'll start asking you questions, and then when you answer them, he'll accuse you of not answering them -- another diversion tactic.

[CallMeIshmael]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
How do you expect my decision to be "Uber Super Rational" to effect the other 99 player's decision on whether or not to be "Super Rational"?

[/ QUOTE ]

Im starting to think that he believes all 100 people play the same strategy

[/ QUOTE ]

I think he's assuming that if there is a single strategy that is the most rational, everyone will figure it out before they act. So yes, all 100 people will play the same "strategy", even if that means randomizing your choice.

[/ QUOTE ]

no, it goes beyond that

he thinks that IF I choose X, then so will everyone else. If I mention that if a group of people are going to contribute, then it seems that it makes sense that one would like to be a parasite to increase their payoff, and of course he retorts with "well, then you lose 200, since everyone plays parasite"

[Taraz]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
How do you expect my decision to be "Uber Super Rational" to effect the other 99 player's decision on whether or not to be "Super Rational"?

[/ QUOTE ]

Im starting to think that he believes all 100 people play the same strategy

[/ QUOTE ]

I think he's assuming that if there is a single strategy that is the most rational, everyone will figure it out before they act. So yes, all 100 people will play the same "strategy", even if that means randomizing your choice.

[/ QUOTE ]

no, it goes beyond that

he thinks that IF I choose X, then so will everyone else. If I mention that if a group of people are going to contribute, then it seems that it makes sense that one would like to be a parasite to increase their payoff, and of course he retorts with "well, then you lose 200, since everyone plays parasite"

[/ QUOTE ]

I think he's saying that you can't know what anybody else will choose. So all you can do is sit there and think about it, and then act. You can't "know" that some large part of the group is going to contribute. Imagine that everyone is in an isolated booth and that they can only come out once they make their choice. You have no way of knowing what other people will choose, so you have to think it through alone.

I think the flawed assumption that he is making is that everyone will reason to the same conclusion/choice. He isn't accounting for the possibility that people will arrive at different strategies.

[Siegmund]

In a roomful of smart folk, I reach the conclusion that the game is symmetric for all the players; that each of us will be parasitic with probability p; that the pot size is proportional to (1-3p); that my expected share of the pot is 1/100 regardless of p; and that everyone does better by making p as small as possible. I cooperate, and expect a nice profit.

Now, if this were a real world game against 2+2ers... I am convinced more than 31% of you are greedy jerks. Again, I cooperate, expecting to lose money, but lose less than the rest of you.

Others have already pointed out that the evolutionary version forces a moderate defection rate, with considerable loss of EV.

[Nicholasp27]

he wants to create a better solution than the nash equilibrium; that's his goal

the problem is that it can't just be 'created'...it has to already be there and instead be 'discovered'

nash equilibrium can be discovered by a logical player if they simply take the time to logically think through the problem...that is because it is arrived by looking at the various solutions and removing the dominated solutions and then re-doing it with that solution removed and etc etc until down to the equilibrium of 2,2 (in traveller's example)

he wants a solution that makes more money for everyone, but it can't be arrived at through logical reasoning; only through education and by having all players want to 'help the greater good' by all contributing to maximize GROUP payout rather than INDIVIDUAL payout

so he'd have both go 100,100 in traveller's because the 2 make more money that way, but one cannot, in isolation, using logic, arrive at that conclusion, because 99 dominates 100

[thylacine]

[ QUOTE ]
he wants to create a better solution than the nash equilibrium; that's his goal

the problem is that it can't just be 'created'...it has to already be there and instead be 'discovered'

nash equilibrium can be discovered by a logical player if they simply take the time to logically think through the problem...that is because it is arrived by looking at the various solutions and removing the dominated solutions and then re-doing it with that solution removed and etc etc until down to the equilibrium of 2,2 (in traveller's example)

he wants a solution that makes more money for everyone, but it can't be arrived at through logical reasoning; only through education and by having all players want to 'help the greater good' by all contributing to maximize GROUP payout rather than INDIVIDUAL payout

so he'd have both go 100,100 in traveller's because the 2 make more money that way, but one cannot, in isolation, using logic, arrive at that conclusion, because 99 dominates 100

[/ QUOTE ]

On the one hand PTB insists on the problem being as stated, in th OP so that the only thing you can say for sure is the Nash Equilibrium.

On the other hand PTB, demands to get some conclusion other than the Nash Equilibrium, but he refuses to allow any embelishments of the posed problem, despite the fact that thses things have been known for decades.

WTF PTB /images/graemlins/mad.gif

[CallMeIshmael]

[ QUOTE ]
In a roomful of smart folk, I reach the conclusion that the game is symmetric for all the players; that each of us will be parasitic with probability p; that the pot size is proportional to (1-3p); that my expected share of the pot is 1/100 regardless of p; and that everyone does better by making p as small as possible. I cooperate, and expect a nice profit.

[/ QUOTE ]

Why not defect, and make a doubly nice profit?


(I know Im beating a dead horse here, but Im curious to hear responses to this question, and PTB just seems to avoid giving answers)

[ QUOTE ]
Now, if this were a real world game against 2+2ers... I am convinced more than 31% of you are greedy jerks. Again, I cooperate, expecting to lose money, but lose less than the rest of you.

[/ QUOTE ]

Exaclty.

I mean, if you want to argue in favour of contributing, talk about the times when a bunch of others play parasite.

[PairTheBoard]

Suppose all 100 of you are able to communicate before making your decisions. Everyone understands that unless an agreement can be reached the best everyone can do is a Nash Randomization where nobody makes any money. But everyone also understands that if everyone will agree to Contribute then everybody can make $100.

However, nobody is willing to agree to this plan unless everyone agrees to it and gives their word they will Write Down "Contribute" on their decision slip. If anyone opts out of the agreement everyone will fall back on the Nash randomization and nobody will make any money. But all 99 do agree to give their word if everyone else, including you, agrees to give their word to contribute.

Now, what do you do? Do you give them your word that you will Contribute? And if so, do you keep your word? You can make all the assumptions you want about not being punished in any way if you agree and then renege.

PairTheBoard

[Nicholasp27]

in friend or foe u can communicate; u realize that nobody makes any money if u both go NE of foe...so u agree to go friend and give ur word

one person opts out at the same time the other goes friend; that person does better than if he had gone friend



your method is based on wanting to maximize group, rather than individual, return

your desired result cannot be reached without both communication/education and generosity

it's just not a viable strategy...it's communism/socialism

[KipBond]

[ QUOTE ]
Do you give them your word that you will Contribute?

[/ QUOTE ]

Yes.

[ QUOTE ]
And if so, do you keep your word? You can make all the assumptions you want about not being punished in any way if you agree and then renege.

[/ QUOTE ]

Personally, I don't renege unless the utility to me doing so outweighs the negative utility I have by reneging on my word, and living with the knowledge that I'm a lying sack of shiite. So, $1,000,000 would definitely do. /images/graemlins/laugh.gif

But, if I'm a cold-hearted bastard, and there is no recourse for reneging, then I renege.

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
in friend or foe u can communicate; u realize that nobody makes any money if u both go NE of foe...so u agree to go friend and give ur word

one person opts out at the same time the other goes friend; that person does better than if he had gone friend



your method is based on wanting to maximize group, rather than individual, return

your desired result cannot be reached without both communication/education and generosity

it's just not a viable strategy...it's communism/socialism

[/ QUOTE ]

Now who's not answering the question?

All the other 99 agree to give their word to contribute if everyone else gives their word to contribute, but noone will if anyone holds out. You are the last possible holdout.

1. Do you give your word?

2. If you do give your word do you keep it?

PairTheBoard

[Double Ice]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superrationality

[CallMeIshmael]

PTB,

I give my word to contribute. I play parasite (assuming that there is no way for them to find out the identity of players). And the sitution you described is ideal for parasite.


However, there are several questions you have left unanswered in this thread. I see no point in going on if you choose to ignore them.

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
PTB,

I give my word to contribute. I play parasite (assuming that there is no way for them to find out the identity of players). And the sitution you described is ideal for parasite.


However, there are several questions you have left unanswered in this thread. I see no point in going on if you choose to ignore them.

[/ QUOTE ]

Your questions are essentially repeated assertions that Nash Logic must be followed. They amount to rhetorical questions. We are all well aware of the Nash Logic here.

But let's look at the implications of your answer to question #2. You do non hesitate to break your word after giving it and essentially "cheat". Cheating is ok for you as long as you don't get caught or punished for it. You would have done the same thing zeejustin did then when he multitabled online tournies thinking he would not get caught. And your only criticism of ZJ is that he made the mistake of getting caught. Is this what you plan on teaching your kids as well? Cheating is ok, just don't get caught?

PairTheBoard

[CallMeIshmael]

[ QUOTE ]
Your questions are essentially repeated assertions that Nash Logic must be followed. They amount to rhetorical questions. We are all well aware of the Nash Logic here.

[/ QUOTE ]

My attempts to get you to admit that it is possible for players in the game to be playing different strategies isnt "nash logic", whatever that means, it is "attempting to make you you understand how the game works"

[ QUOTE ]
But let's look at the implications of your answer to question #2. You do non hesitate to break your word after giving it and essentially "cheat". Cheating is ok for you as long as you don't get caught or punished for it. You would have done the same thing zeejustin did then when he multitabled online tournies thinking he would not get caught. And your only criticism of ZJ is that he made the mistake of getting caught. Is this what you plan on teaching your kids as well? Cheating is ok, just don't get caught?

[/ QUOTE ]

These questions are irrelevant to the game in the OP

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Your questions are essentially repeated assertions that Nash Logic must be followed. They amount to rhetorical questions. We are all well aware of the Nash Logic here.

[/ QUOTE ]

My attempts to get you to admit that it is possible for players in the game to be playing different strategies isnt "nash logic", whatever that means, it is "attempting to make you you understand how the game works"

[ QUOTE ]
But let's look at the implications of your answer to question #2. You do non hesitate to break your word after giving it and essentially "cheat". Cheating is ok for you as long as you don't get caught or punished for it. You would have done the same thing zeejustin did then when he multitabled online tournies thinking he would not get caught. And your only criticism of ZJ is that he made the mistake of getting caught. Is this what you plan on teaching your kids as well? Cheating is ok, just don't get caught?

[/ QUOTE ]

These questions are irrelevant to the game in the OP

[/ QUOTE ]

That remains to be seen. Regardless, we are now talking about this altered version of the game where communication is possible between players. You have responded you would enter into a social contract with the other 99 players by giving your word that you will Contribute, then renege on your word and be a Parasite. I've presented some of the implications for your position. What is your response? Ignorance?

PairTheBoard

[KipBond]

[ QUOTE ]
But let's look at the implications of your answer to question #2. You do non hesitate to break your word after giving it and essentially "cheat". Cheating is ok for you as long as you don't get caught or punished for it. ... Is this what you plan on teaching your kids as well? Cheating is ok, just don't get caught?

[/ QUOTE ]

What's wrong with cheating (or lying)?

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
But let's look at the implications of your answer to question #2. You do non hesitate to break your word after giving it and essentially "cheat". Cheating is ok for you as long as you don't get caught or punished for it. ... Is this what you plan on teaching your kids as well? Cheating is ok, just don't get caught?

[/ QUOTE ]

What's wrong with cheating (or lying)?

[/ QUOTE ]

So you were not in the camp that condemned zeejustin for what he did? Your only criticism of him was his making the mistake of getting caught?

PairTheBoard

[Nicholasp27]

it's a game; the rules of the game don't say u have to follow what u said

that's not the same as multi-tabling a tourney, where the rules are that u may only enter under one name

[KipBond]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
But let's look at the implications of your answer to question #2. You do non hesitate to break your word after giving it and essentially "cheat". Cheating is ok for you as long as you don't get caught or punished for it. ... Is this what you plan on teaching your kids as well? Cheating is ok, just don't get caught?

[/ QUOTE ]

What's wrong with cheating (or lying)?

[/ QUOTE ]

So you were not in the camp that condemned zeejustin for what he did? Your only criticism of him was his making the mistake of getting caught?

[/ QUOTE ]

I bet Justin would be glad we're still talking about him. /images/graemlins/laugh.gif

But, your line of questioning brings me back to my original response to your game (http://forumserver.twoplustwo.com/showthreaded.php?Number=10935650):

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
it isn't rational, super or otherwise, to contribute if u know that the rest will contribute

[/ QUOTE ]

By definition, it is Super-Rational. Being Super-Rational makes everybody money. That's what makes it Super-Rational.

[/ QUOTE ]

I think the only way this can work, is if a player has some sort of utility outside of this one-time game. Perhaps "feeling good about not being a parasite" is worth more than he would gain if he were a parasite. Perhaps there is a meta-game where players learn about the other players' micro-game strategies, and adjust their behaviors accordingly. These sorts of things are what really happen in the real world.

My "Super Rational" strategy makes me feel good -- and when I talk to other people about their game strategies, if they aren't also a "super rational cooperator", then I don't trust them as much in other games.

[/ QUOTE ]

The condemnation of Justin was a meta-game; his getting caught had real consequences including those outside of the specific tournament he cheated in. All of these things are motivating factors that your OP game did not allow. It's now a completely different game: one that is not a "one-time, no-consequences" type.

[CallMeIshmael]

[ QUOTE ]
That remains to be seen.

[/ QUOTE ]

No it doesnt.

Discussing philosophical/moral ramifications are not relevant. They change the payoffs. If I attach some moral loss to "cheating" by decieiving my feloow players, then I am no longer receiving the utility of $194, I am receiving the utility of $194 - (cost of personal feelings of having cheated).

Once you change the payoffs, you change the game.

Since you are trying to change the game, I think my claim of "this is not relevant to the game in the OP" is very clearly correct.


If you want to get into the realm of morality, and start to look at how attaching values to honesty and deceit, thats totally OK. Obviously, we all add take into account morality when making our decisions. But it changes the game.


However, I would still like an answer to the questions that you seem to be unwilling to answer.


1) Does your decision affect the decisions of others playing the game. That is, if you choose to contribute rather than defect, does it have any affect on what the other 99 do.

2) Is it possible for the players in the game to play different strategies. For example, 80 choose to contribute and 20 choose to be a parasite.


If you are unwilling to answer these questions, I will take it as a sign that you feel they will lead to the destruction of your position in this thread.

[Silent A]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
But let's look at the implications of your answer to question #2. You do non hesitate to break your word after giving it and essentially "cheat". Cheating is ok for you as long as you don't get caught or punished for it. ... Is this what you plan on teaching your kids as well? Cheating is ok, just don't get caught?

[/ QUOTE ]

What's wrong with cheating (or lying)?

[/ QUOTE ]

So you were not in the camp that condemned zeejustin for what he did? Your only criticism of him was his making the mistake of getting caught?

PairTheBoard

[/ QUOTE ]

Why do you insist on going off on these irrelevent tangents? If you want to point out the benefits of "not cheating" (actually, "not lying" - the two are not the same) then all you have to do is put this game in an itterated environment (which, BTW, is far more relevent to practical applications).

It's true that a 100% contribute strategy is be best universal strategy, and it's the one the group would most want to approximate.

The lesson you want to draw from this, however, is not "therefore the best strategy is to contribute" but rather that it's in the group's interest to reconstruct the rules of the game such that contribution can be more heavily encouraged.

Perhaps the most effective way to do this is to allow for discussion and then change the "voting" procedure from secret to open and simultaneous (assuming the dollar values must stay fixed).

[Siegmund]

Fools rush in, etc etc... I'll take a stab at those two questions:

[ QUOTE ]

1) Does your decision affect the decisions of others playing the game. That is, if you choose to contribute rather than defect, does it have any affect on what the other 99 do.

2) Is it possible for the players in the game to play different strategies. For example, 80 choose to contribute and 20 choose to be a parasite.

[/ QUOTE ]

1) No. However, I have an awareness that whatever decision I am facing, the other players in the game are facing the same decision. My opponents have the same awareness. That is, if I am considering defecting, I know others are also considering defecting (and hoping for 99 people to cooperate while I defect is unrealistic.)

2) Ill-posed question: the first and second sentences use "strategy" differently. Here are three sub-answers:

2a) Trivially, yes, real-world players might make all sorts of stupid plays; but our interest is in sensible plays (where 'sensible' has not been firmly defined.)

2b) No; to answer your first sentence, for all sensible definitions of 'sensible', symmetric games have symmetric solutions. That is, everyone will play the same, possibly mixed, strategy.

2c) But 'playing the same (mixed) strategy' does not mean 'making the same move.' It's perfectly possible, for instance, for everyone to randomly choose parasite with probability .25 and cooperate with probability .75, and for this to result in 80 cooperators and 20 parasites.

The only dispute, really, is whether you are imagining each player optimizing only by partial derivatives, or imagining one big optimization where all the players' defection probabilities move at once. As we've seen, we arrive at different answers, both symmetric - a Nash solution of defection 31% of the time, or the superrational / "diagonally optimal" solution of defection 0% of the time.

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
it's a game; the rules of the game don't say u have to follow what u said

that's not the same as multi-tabling a tourney, where the rules are that u may only enter under one name

[/ QUOTE ]

I contend that when you gave your word to Contribute you made a social contract with the other players by which you agreed to a new Rule. That new Rule being that everybody will Contribute.

This raises questions. Do you think people in general are incapable of entering into and honoring a social contract on bond of their word? Evidently you don't believe that or else you would not be so eager to take advantage of them when they do.

So, assuming you do believe people are capabable of entering into and honoring a social contract on bond of their word, why are you incapable of doing so as well? Is your incapacity due to superior rationality? Or is it in fact a sign that you suffer from a lack of rationality.

PairTheBoard

[PairTheBoard]

[ QUOTE ]
Fools rush in, etc etc... I'll take a stab at those two questions:

[ QUOTE ]

1) Does your decision affect the decisions of others playing the game. That is, if you choose to contribute rather than defect, does it have any affect on what the other 99 do.

2) Is it possible for the players in the game to play different strategies. For example, 80 choose to contribute and 20 choose to be a parasite.

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1) No. However, I have an awareness that whatever decision I am facing, the other players in the game are facing the same decision. My opponents have the same awareness. That is, if I am considering defecting, I know others are also considering defecting (and hoping for 99 people to cooperate while I defect is unrealistic.)

2) Ill-posed question: the first and second sentences use "strategy" differently. Here are three sub-answers:

2a) Trivially, yes, real-world players might make all sorts of stupid plays; but our interest is in sensible plays (where 'sensible' has not been firmly defined.)

2b) No; to answer your first sentence, for all sensible definitions of 'sensible', symmetric games have symmetric solutions. That is, everyone will play the same, possibly mixed, strategy.

2c) But 'playing the same (mixed) strategy' does not mean 'making the same move.' It's perfectly possible, for instance, for everyone to randomly choose parasite with probability .25 and cooperate with probability .75, and for this to result in 80 cooperators and 20 parasites.

The only dispute, really, is whether you are imagining each player optimizing only by partial derivatives, or imagining one big optimization where all the players' defection probabilities move at once. As we've seen, we arrive at different answers, both symmetric - a Nash solution of defection 31% of the time, or the superrational / "diagonally optimal" solution of defection 0% of the time.

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That is essentially what I have been trying to say as well. See also "Superrationality" here,

Wikipedia entry for Superrationality (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superrationality)

as well as Douglas Hofstadter's compilation of his Scientific American Articles,

Metamagical Themas (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metamagical_Themas)

PairTheBoard

[CallMeIshmael]

Your answer seems to be assuming that we are working in a situation where the assumption of common knowledge of rationality. This was never stated.



Also,

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2) Ill-posed question: the first and second sentences use "strategy" differently.

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No they dont.

First part of the sentence: "Is it possible for the players in the game to play different strategies."

Here I use strategy to mean "decision doublet, which prepresents the players chance of playing P or C, (probs for each range from 0 to 1)"

Second part: For example, 80 choose to contribute and 20 choose to be a parasite

Here, contribute and parasite represent pure strategies (ie, prob = 1), which are of course, decision doublets [0 1] and [1 0]

(this, perhaps, would have been more clear if you had read the first and second times I asked PTB the question, since I, for the fun of it, made the group (70 people play P, 25 play C, and 5 play the nash mixed))

[Gregatron]

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I think the only way this can work, is if a player has some sort of utility outside of this one-time game.

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Or if people just realize that the Smart thing to do is to be Super Rational so that everybody can make money.

PairTheBoard

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This is similar to points political sociologist Robert Putnam made in his book Making Democracy Work. He called norms of civic trust and horizontal social networks "social capital." Cliff notes: having mutual trust in people helps overcome collective action problems, be they group formation (Mancur Olson) or the tragedy of the commons (Elinor Ostrom). I would think it would work the same for this sort of altered prisoner's dilemma.

Knowing what I do about rational choice theory, aside from the super rationality being mentioned, I think the concept of minimaxing is relevant. That is where a rational actor does NOT seek to maximize his utility by maximizing his maximum gains, but rather minimizing his maximum losses. This would be a reason to choose to contribute.

[borisp]

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If I feel everyone is going to contribute, why wouldnt I play parasite?


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Because of a reason you haven't thought of. A reason that depends on creative thinking. A reason that takes you outside your box of logic. A reason that the professional theoreticians are still working on formulating. A reason you will never discover unless you look for it.

PairTheBoard

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I haven't read the rest of the thread, but this occurs to me as some of the most truthful and insightful commentary I have seen on this forum.