I Never Advocated Intemediate Probability Assessments By Juries

[David Sklansky]

Obviously that would be too cumbersome. Continually revising estimates based on new evidence that may or not be correlated with older evidence, is asking too much of them.

An exception would be if an obviously uncorrelated piece of statistical evidence popped up after minds had been made up. But even then it would be hard to prove no correlation. A suspicion that the defendent was framed always implies correlation. A fact that Johnny Cochran exploited well.

So regarding this point I was talking theoretically. And using a trial example to show how Baye's Theorem turns new evidence into new probabilities.

I was misunderstood on that point. But not on my other point. Which is that reasonable doubt should be defined more precisely. Unless you agree with chezlaw that there is nothing wrong with two different juries having the exact same opinion of guilt or innocence yet rendering a different verdict because they have differing opinions about what threshold of doubt is needed for acquittal.

[PairTheBoard]

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I was misunderstood on that point. But not on my other point. Which is that reasonable doubt should be defined more precisely.

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How many threads are you going to start on this topic? Do we now need to go back to the other 3 threads and copy all the posts we've made on them about your idea for the "reasonable doubt" definition? What's going on here? When your position starts to look bad you just start another thread and hope the previous points made about it just go away?

PairTheBoard

[PairTheBoard]

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Obviously that would be too cumbersome. Continually revising estimates based on new evidence that may or not be correlated with older evidence, is asking too much of them.

An exception would be if an obviously uncorrelated piece of statistical evidence popped up after minds had been made up. But even then it would be hard to prove no correlation. A suspicion that the defendent was framed always implies correlation. A fact that Johnny Cochran exploited well.


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It's not just that evidence might be correlated in the sense of a Witness saying a Black person did it when previous evidence had already less conclusively pointed to a possible Black perpetrator. And it's not just that the new evidence might be the result of an illegitimate Frame.

It's the problem that legitimate new coincidental evidence is found for a suspect for no other reason than that the person is a suspect. The correlation is due to the suspicion, not the nature of the evidence. The danger is that some other coincidental evidence could be found for anyone under suspicion if it was looked for. The evidence in front of us might just happen to be that which was found for This suspect. If You had been the suspect they might have found coincidental evidence linking you to the crime.

PairTheBoard

[PairTheBoard]

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So regarding this point I was talking theoretically. And using a trial example to show how Baye's Theorem turns new evidence into new probabilities.


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Maybe you should try applying a theoretical model to a real life situation that doesn't have so many complicating facts of reality that muddle the point.

PairTheBoard

[David Sklansky]

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Obviously that would be too cumbersome. Continually revising estimates based on new evidence that may or not be correlated with older evidence, is asking too much of them.

An exception would be if an obviously uncorrelated piece of statistical evidence popped up after minds had been made up. But even then it would be hard to prove no correlation. A suspicion that the defendent was framed always implies correlation. A fact that Johnny Cochran exploited well.


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It's not just that evidence might be correlated in the sense of a Witness saying a Black person did it when previous evidence had already less conclusively pointed to a possible Black perpetrator. And it's not just that the new evidence might be the result of an illegitimate Frame.

It's the problem that legitimate new coincidental evidence is found for a suspect for no other reason than that the person is a suspect. The correlation is due to the suspicion, not the nature of the evidence. The danger is that some other coincidental evidence could be found for anyone under suspicion if it was looked for. The evidence in front of us might just happen to be that which was found for This suspect. If You had been the suspect they might have found coincidental evidence linking you to the crime.

PairTheBoard

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That last paragraph is incorrect. As long as the prosecution doesn't surpress evidence that helps exonerate.

[TomCowley]

PTB: Enough of the pseudo-nihilist nonsense.

You're actually on the jury now. Your instinct right now is to vote to acquit, but it's close. You get the shoe size evidence. Now you're sent off to deliberate.

What are you going to do, and why, and what explanation are you going to give to explain your point of view to the other 11 people?

[PairTheBoard]

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Obviously that would be too cumbersome. Continually revising estimates based on new evidence that may or not be correlated with older evidence, is asking too much of them.

An exception would be if an obviously uncorrelated piece of statistical evidence popped up after minds had been made up. But even then it would be hard to prove no correlation. A suspicion that the defendent was framed always implies correlation. A fact that Johnny Cochran exploited well.


[/ QUOTE ]

It's not just that evidence might be correlated in the sense of a Witness saying a Black person did it when previous evidence had already less conclusively pointed to a possible Black perpetrator. And it's not just that the new evidence might be the result of an illegitimate Frame.

It's the problem that legitimate new coincidental evidence is found for a suspect for no other reason than that the person is a suspect. The correlation is due to the suspicion, not the nature of the evidence. The danger is that some other coincidental evidence could be found for anyone under suspicion if it was looked for. The evidence in front of us might just happen to be that which was found for This suspect. If You had been the suspect they might have found coincidental evidence linking you to the crime.

PairTheBoard

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That last paragraph is incorrect. As long as the prosecution doesn't surpress evidence that helps exonerate.

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It's not always as clear cut as that. Suppose they find fibre at the scene that doesn't match any fibre they can find in the defendant's home. That's not really very exhonerating and even if the defense had access to that information he might not present it. After all, the defendant could have transfered the fibre from another source. But if the police had identified You as a suspect instead of the defendant, voila, the fibre just happens to match fibre in Your home coincidentally - assuming You didn't do it. Fibre can match to a lot of sources. There's just no telling how much of that might have gone on during the investigation.

PairTheBoard

[PLOlover]

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It's not always as clear cut as that. Suppose they find fibre at the scene that doesn't match any fibre they can find in the defendant's home. That's not really very exhonerating and even if the defense had access to that information he might not present it. After all, the defendant could have transfered the fibre from another source. But if the police had identified You as a suspect instead of the defendant, voila, the fibre just happens to match fibre in Your home coincidentally - assuming You didn't do it. Fibre can match to a lot of sources. There's just no telling how much of that might have gone on during the investigation.

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I think that's the gist of it.

Assume that 10 pieces of evidence are found and 4 of them are consistent with you, the defendant, and the other 6 are inconclusive.
It would be a major mistake to assume, hey 4/4 pieces of evidence point to the defendant being guilty, and there is no exonerating evidence.

[TomCowley]

And in the american legal system, barring corruption, the defense will be able to present the case that 4-0-6 is not such a strong match (where 4-0-0 would have been). What's your point?

[luckyme]

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Obviously that would be too cumbersome. Continually revising estimates based on new evidence that may or not be correlated with older evidence, is asking too much of them.

An exception would be if an obviously uncorrelated piece of statistical evidence popped up after minds had been made up. But even then it would be hard to prove no correlation. A suspicion that the defendent was framed always implies correlation. A fact that Johnny Cochran exploited well.


[/ QUOTE ]

It's not just that evidence might be correlated in the sense of a Witness saying a Black person did it when previous evidence had already less conclusively pointed to a possible Black perpetrator. And it's not just that the new evidence might be the result of an illegitimate Frame.

It's the problem that legitimate new coincidental evidence is found for a suspect for no other reason than that the person is a suspect. The correlation is due to the suspicion, not the nature of the evidence. The danger is that some other coincidental evidence could be found for anyone under suspicion if it was looked for. The evidence in front of us might just happen to be that which was found for This suspect. If You had been the suspect they might have found coincidental evidence linking you to the crime.

PairTheBoard

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That last paragraph is incorrect. As long as the prosecution doesn't surpress evidence that helps exonerate.

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A jury can only deliberate on evidence that is given to them. For them not to use the best possible approach in evaluating the reasonable doubt ( whatever it is) because
a) the police started by checking out the husband rather than her grade 3 school chum who now lives in Latvia, or
b) the prosecution may be holding back on some exculpatory pieces,

both seem red herrings. What could a jury do about either of those no matter what method they used to come to their conclusions. The jury is aware the prosecution is trying to convict and is presenting evidence that points to it, and the defense is going the other way.
They can disregard DNA or blood evidence or eye witnesses if they don't like the smell of it. That's why we have a jury, if it was just 'the facts as presented' one sober bookie would be enough. Isn't that why appeal courts only consider the law and the trial establishes the 'facts'.

One role of the defense is to point out all those possible issues raised in a&b and even create confusion and misdirection within the judges boundaries.

luckyme

[PairTheBoard]

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A jury can only deliberate on evidence that is given to them. For them not to use the best possible approach in evaluating the reasonable doubt ( whatever it is) because
a) the police started by checking out the husband rather than her grade 3 school chum who now lives in Latvia, or
b) the prosecution may be holding back on some exculpatory pieces,

both seem red herrings. What could a jury do about either of those no matter what method they used to come to their conclusions.

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I think prosecutorial misconduct is a bit of a red herring. Although there is always some chance of it. The jury can factor in their feeling for that chance when weighing the evidence.

I think the accumulation of possibly coincidental circumstantial evidence focused on the suspect is something that naturally happens due to the investigative process. The jury gets a feeling for this from their sense of the coincidental nature of some of the evidence. They then do the proper thing and give the totality of circumstantial evidence less weight than would be indicated by Sklansky's Parlay Theory for the evidence.

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They can disregard DNA or blood evidence or eye witnesses if they don't like the smell of it.

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Right. Or they can discount it and give it some but not full weight.

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That's why we have a jury, if it was just 'the facts as presented' one sober bookie would be enough.

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Exactly.

PairTheBoard

[David Sklansky]

One sober bookie who knows what he is doing would almost cetainly be less likely to come to the incorrect vedict than a jury of average people. In fact merely semi competant bookies would be less likely. Otherwise known as judges. The only reason this isn't obvious is that the vast majority of cases are pretty much slam dunks. Perhaps two percent of all cases would the judge and the jury disagree. If the judge is right seventy percent of the time, that would mean that out of 1,000 trials there would be an improvement of eight verdicts. Again I am talking about WHODONIT cases.

Maybe you can argue that making incompetants feel more competant is worth this risk.

[PLOlover]

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One sober bookie who knows what he is doing would almost cetainly be less likely to come to the incorrect vedict than a jury of average people. In fact merely semi competant bookies would be less likely. Otherwise known as judges. The only reason this isn't obvious is that the vast majority of cases are pretty much slam dunks. Perhaps two percent of all cases would the judge and the jury disagree. If the judge is right seventy percent of the time, that would mean that out of 1,000 trials there would be an improvement of eight verdicts. Again I am talking about WHODONIT cases.

Maybe you can argue that making incompetants feel more competant is worth this risk.

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If you're talking about 8/1000 cases in terms of competence, I think you can pretty much guarantee more than 8/1000 cases in terms of corruption.