Morality poll

[A_C_Slater]

Question #1.

A trolley is coming down a track, and it's going to run over and kill five people if it continues. A person standing next to a track can flip a switch and turn the trolley onto a side track where it will kill one but save the five. Do you flip the switch and kill one to save the five?


Question #2.

A nurse comes up to a doctor and says "Doctor we've got five patients in critical care; each one needs an organ to survive. We do not have time to send out for organs, but a healthy person just walked into the hospital. We can take his organs and save the five. Is that OK?"

[RoundGuy]

#2 is obvious. If you flip the switch in #1, you have committed murder. Mitigating circumstances? Perhaps. But murder nonetheless.

[chezlaw]

1) is a fairly easy flip the switch. 2) is a stunningly easy not ok.

chez

[samsonite2100]

I assume the person making the decision would have no fear of getting caught?

[Bigdaddydvo]

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1) is a fairly easy flip the switch. 2) is a stunningly easy not ok.



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[RoundGuy]

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1) is a fairly easy flip the switch. 2) is a stunningly easy not ok.

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How so? What's the difference between the two?

[chezlaw]

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1) is a fairly easy flip the switch. 2) is a stunningly easy not ok.

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How so? What's the difference between the two?

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I'd start from the other way round. I can't see any similarity between the two. What similarities do you see?

chez

[RoundGuy]

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1) is a fairly easy flip the switch. 2) is a stunningly easy not ok.

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How so? What's the difference between the two?

[/ QUOTE ]
I'd start from the other way round. I can't see any similarity between the two. What similarities do you see?

[/ QUOTE ]
In both cases you are choosing to sacrifice one to save five. Is it really that difficult to figure out?

In both cases you are killing someone who, without your intervention, would otherwise remain alive. Get it now?

[CallMeIshmael]

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1) is a fairly easy flip the switch. 2) is a stunningly easy not ok.

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How so? What's the difference between the two?

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I'd start from the other way round. I can't see any similarity between the two. What similarities do you see?

[/ QUOTE ]
In both cases you are choosing to sacrifice one to save five. Is it really that difficult to figure out?

In both cases you are killing someone who, without your intervention, would otherwise remain alive. Get it now?

[/ QUOTE ]

The meta-type consquences of the two are very different. If people knew that, when they entered a hospital, there was a chance Doctors would just kill you for your organs, people would be less likely to enter hospitals, which would more than compesate for the gain in lives in these rarer circumstances.

[chezlaw]

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1) is a fairly easy flip the switch. 2) is a stunningly easy not ok.

[/ QUOTE ]
How so? What's the difference between the two?

[/ QUOTE ]
I'd start from the other way round. I can't see any similarity between the two. What similarities do you see?

[/ QUOTE ]
In both cases you are choosing to sacrifice one to save five. Is it really that difficult to figure out?

In both cases you are killing someone who, without your intervention, would otherwise remain alive. Get it now?

[/ QUOTE ]
but its a morality problem not a maximise existence problem.

and morally the two situations aren't remotely similar as far as I can see.

So morally in which way do you think they are similar?

chez

[RoundGuy]

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which would more than compesate for the gain in lives in these rarer circumstances.

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I have no idea what this means. You seem to be avoiding my essential question to chezlaw -- why is one ok, and the other not?

[RoundGuy]

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So morally in which way do you think they are similar?


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You are choosing to kill an innocent person, who has every right to live as the other five.

Is that so difficult to understand?

[pokerbobo]

Number one I need more info.

has someone tied them to the tracks, where they cannot move? In that case I switch to save five and have one die.
If it is five dumb people standing in the way and one smart person knowing he will not be hit...I let the trolley hit the 5 dummies, because it is obvious the one is standing there for his own protection. It would be murderous to make the trolly hit him.

Number two is easy...no one has the right to someone elses body parts. Why not take them from the nurse? Why not pick one of the dying to save the other 4? This is just a dumb example IMO.

[chezlaw]

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So morally in which way do you think they are similar?


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You are choosing to kill an innocent person, who has every right to live as the other five.

Is that so difficult to understand?

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No that's very easy to understand. However I don't understand why you think that its relevent to the moral question here or why its means we should ignore these significantly different moral scenarios.

chez

[CallMeIshmael]

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which would more than compesate for the gain in lives in these rarer circumstances.

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I have no idea what this means.

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It means that the 4 lives gained in the incident are offset by all the people that would die because they are now afraid of going to hospitals

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You seem to be avoiding my essential question to chezlaw -- why is one ok, and the other not?

[/ QUOTE ]

Im most certainly not avoiding the quesiton

If Option 1 is made the "standard behavor" then little negative will come of it

However, if option 2 is made the standard, then people will be less likely to go to hospitals, and thus will die of disease more often.

Lives are saved in option 1, they are not in option 2. Thats the difference.

[RoundGuy]

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Number one I need more info.

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Take #1 at face value. All 6 are oblivious to the on-coming trolley, or that the tracks/trolley even exist. No fault of their own, they just didn't know.

What's your choice?

[RoundGuy]

CallMe, I accept your premises. Now, please tell me what gives you the right to kill the innocent bystander in #1? Doesn't he have just as much right to live as the other five? He must die, just because he was in the wrong place at the wrong time, at your discretion?

I call it murder.

[CallMeIshmael]

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CallMe, I accept your premises. Now, please tell me what gives you the right to kill the innocent bystander in #1? Doesn't he have just as much right to live as the other five? He must die, just because he was in the wrong place at the wrong time, at your discretion?

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I value 4 lives more than 1.

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I call it murder

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So do I, but that doesnt make it immoral

[RoundGuy]

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No that's very easy to understand. However I don't understand why you think that its relevent to the moral question here or why its means we should ignore these significantly different moral scenarios.

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Ok, then. You're turn. How are they different?

[RoundGuy]

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I value 4 lives more than 1.

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Which, I assume, means that if it was you who was going to be sacrificed for strangers, you would allow it, correct?

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So do I, but that doesnt make it immoral

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Murder can have mitigating circumstances, but it is never moral.

[CallMeIshmael]

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I value 4 lives more than 1.

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Which, I assume, means that if it was you who was going to be sacrificed for strangers, you would allow it, correct?

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Just because you wouldnt like it, if someone committed an act, doesnt, by itself, make the act immoral.

Of course I would fight it, but I wouldnt call the act immoral.

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So do I, but that doesnt make it immoral

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Murder can have mitigating circumstances, but it is never moral.

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You cant say things like this about morality. Its a highly subjective area, and you really need to look at things on a case by case basis instead of catch-all rules.

[chezlaw]

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No that's very easy to understand. However I don't understand why you think that its relevent to the moral question here or why its means we should ignore these significantly different moral scenarios.

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Ok, then. You're turn. How are they different?

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I am not turn

but two simple questions will I hope make the point.

1) do you want to live in a world where the pilot of a crashing plane wont divert its course from the heavily populated areas to an area where some people definitely exist.

2) do you want to live in a world where if you vist hospital you are available for harvesting if required to save more than one life? Would you work there?, would you live nearby? Would you let your wife/daughter give birth there?

chez

[Ben K]

Wow, I'm surprised at how some people think these are similar.

1. People(s) WILL die.

2. People(s) MIGHT die.

It's the difference between knowing and guessing at. The 5 in 2. will die if not helped but helping them via the 1 does not guarantee their survival or their ongoing usefullness to society. On the other hand, by killing the 1, you have definately destroyed a useful individual.

[chezlaw]

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Wow, I'm surprised at how some people think these are similar.

1. People(s) WILL die.

2. People(s) MIGHT die.

It's the difference between knowing and guessing at. The 5 in 2. will die if not helped but helping them via the 1 does not guarantee their survival or their ongoing usefullness to society. On the other hand, by killing the 1, you have definately destroyed a useful individual.

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I share your suprise but I preferred that to the repulsive idea of deciding based on usefullness to society.

maybe that's just me, but what is the purpose of this society against which you're judging usefullness?

chez

[Ben K]

Minor sideline, I'm not judging based on that at all. That was just padding. The point was the uncertainty.

[TimWillTell]

[ QUOTE ]
Question #1.

A trolley is coming down a track, and it's going to run over and kill five people if it continues. A person standing next to a track can flip a switch and turn the trolley onto a side track where it will kill one but save the five. Do you flip the switch and kill one to save the five?


Question #2.

A nurse comes up to a doctor and says "Doctor we've got five patients in critical care; each one needs an organ to survive. We do not have time to send out for organs, but a healthy person just walked into the hospital. We can take his organs and save the five. Is that OK?"

[/ QUOTE ]

So the first I thought, well lets pull the switch, save the five and kill the one.
The second, I thought, no cannot take the organs.

But the way my logic reasoning works, it says that if you pull the switch, then you should also take the organs.

Nice dilemma!

[nepenthe]

[ QUOTE ]
Question #1.

A trolley is coming down a track, and it's going to run over and kill five people if it continues. A person standing next to a track can flip a switch and turn the trolley onto a side track where it will kill one but save the five. Do you flip the switch and kill one to save the five?


Question #2.

A nurse comes up to a doctor and says "Doctor we've got five patients in critical care; each one needs an organ to survive. We do not have time to send out for organs, but a healthy person just walked into the hospital. We can take his organs and save the five. Is that OK?"

[/ QUOTE ]

Problems like these are laced with multiple levels of cost-benefit analysis even if not immediately apparent. The similarities are clear enough: at the basest level, it's a 1-for-5 exchange, assuming we are dealing with innocent strangers throughout. In both cases, we are presented with a situation whereby the death of the 5 is imminent and near-certain if we choose not to act.

The crucial difference between the two problems lies in the extent and gravity of the action - given the scenario - required to save the greater number of people, and whether said extent and gravity are warranted in light of individual and societal implications. Once you understand this simple distinction, you should also understand why people who would choose to flip the switch in problem #1, but also choose not to harvest the innocent for organs in problem #2, are not necessarily contradicting themselves.

That said, I don't flip the switch.

[RoundGuy]

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I am not turn

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Nice catch, thank you.

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1) do you want to live in a world where the pilot of a crashing plane wont divert its course from the heavily populated areas to an area where some people definitely exist.

[/ QUOTE ]
No, but that's not really a comparable scenerio. In the plane scenerio, there is a greater chance the pilot can crash without killing anyone by diverting to a less populated area. This is common sense. The goal of the pilot is to kill no one, not kill less. In the trolley scenerio, someone will die.

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2) do you want to live in a world where if you vist hospital you are available for harvesting if required to save more than one life? Would you work there?, would you live nearby? Would you let your wife/daughter give birth there?

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No.

[RoundGuy]

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Wow, I'm surprised at how some people think these are similar.

1. People(s) WILL die.

2. People(s) MIGHT die.

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Please re-read the scenerios. It is quite clear that the five hospital patients will die.

[RoundGuy]

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But the way my logic reasoning works, it says that if you pull the switch, then you should also take the organs.

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Your logic and reasoning are impeccable. That is why you shouldn't throw the switch, just like you shouldn't take the organs.

[AWoodside]

I'm going to be a nit for a minute here. Sure there are a lot of external problems associated with the doctor case (trust in doctors, future profit loss, etc) that serve to differentiate it, if it were happening in the real world, for what it's worth this is not the way these types of ethics hypotheticals are meant to be done.

Most philosophers of ethics would say the relevant moral difference between the two cases is something called "double effect" (I think the name is right). In the train case you are diverting the train away from five people, the person on the other track just happens to be there. It was an unintended result and you could have made the decision regardless of whether or not he was there. In the doctor case the 1 person being killed to save 5 is intimately involved with the act, necessary for it's execution. If that patient weren't there, the other 5 would just be out of luck. So in that case you are using that person's life to save the other 5, in the train case the 1 person dies incidentally.

You can further discuss whether or not you think this difference is relevant... but it is this difference that should be under discussion, not external factors grafted onto the problem such as probabilities and profit margins (at least that is typically the intent of philosophers who pose these types of dillemas).

[Sephus]

your tone in this thread is obnoxious.

[nepenthe]

[ QUOTE ]
I'm going to be a nit for a minute here. Sure there are a lot of external problems associated with the doctor case (trust in doctors, future profit loss, etc) that serve to differentiate it, if it were happening in the real world, for what it's worth this is not the way these types of ethics hypotheticals are meant to be done.

Most philosophers of ethics would say the relevant moral difference between the two cases is something called "double effect" (I think the name is right). In the train case you are diverting the train away from five people, the person on the other track just happens to be there. It was an unintended result and you could have made the decision regardless of whether or not he was there. In the doctor case the 1 person being killed to save 5 is intimately involved with the act, necessary for it's execution. If that patient weren't there, the other 5 would just be out of luck. So in that case you are using that person's life to save the other 5, in the train case the 1 person dies incidentally.

You can further discuss whether or not you think this difference is relevant... but it is this difference that should be under discussion, not external factors grafted onto the problem such as probabilities and profit margins (at least that is typically the intent of philosophers who pose these types of dillemas).

[/ QUOTE ]

I must take exception with the "unintended result" of which you speak. I think the problem must be understood with the premise that the decisionmaker already knows there is a person on the other track, and that if ve decides to pull the switch, ve's doing it with the full knowledge that ve is engaging in an act to kill one for the benefit of the five.

Now, you could say that even if this is a knowing act, it is still not "intentional" (and we could go into a side-discussion on what is "knowing" and what is "intentional"), but the way you phrased it, it appears you aren't making that distinction anyway, because you say that "you could have made the decision regardless of whether or not he was there" - meaning you believe the one person isn't even a relevant factor.

As for the "external factors" and "profit margins" you mention, we don't even have to get into that to recognize that there are cost-benefit analyses involved with these decisions outside of simply juxtaposing lives and weighing the numbers. Flipping a switch, in a vacuum, is a fairly simple act that doesn't cost you much energy or time. Imagine the same situation, though, except you were chained to a lamppost 3 feet away from the switch and the only way to get to the switch was to amputate your hand, arm, etc.

[chezlaw]

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I am not turn

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Nice catch, thank you.

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1) do you want to live in a world where the pilot of a crashing plane wont divert its course from the heavily populated areas to an area where some people definitely exist.

[/ QUOTE ]
No, but that's not really a comparable scenerio. In the plane scenerio, there is a greater chance the pilot can crash without killing anyone by diverting to a less populated area. This is common sense. The goal of the pilot is to kill no one, not kill less. In the trolley scenerio, someone will die.

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2) do you want to live in a world where if you vist hospital you are available for harvesting if required to save more than one life? Would you work there?, would you live nearby? Would you let your wife/daughter give birth there?

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No.

[/ QUOTE ]
Its a nitpick on 1) but you seem to agree the basic point which is that we want the pilot to take the action that minimises life loss. In 2) we do not.

1) doesn't change in nature if some number of deaths is certain.

chez

[AWoodside]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
I'm going to be a nit for a minute here. Sure there are a lot of external problems associated with the doctor case (trust in doctors, future profit loss, etc) that serve to differentiate it, if it were happening in the real world, for what it's worth this is not the way these types of ethics hypotheticals are meant to be done.

Most philosophers of ethics would say the relevant moral difference between the two cases is something called "double effect" (I think the name is right). In the train case you are diverting the train away from five people, the person on the other track just happens to be there. It was an unintended result and you could have made the decision regardless of whether or not he was there. In the doctor case the 1 person being killed to save 5 is intimately involved with the act, necessary for it's execution. If that patient weren't there, the other 5 would just be out of luck. So in that case you are using that person's life to save the other 5, in the train case the 1 person dies incidentally.

You can further discuss whether or not you think this difference is relevant... but it is this difference that should be under discussion, not external factors grafted onto the problem such as probabilities and profit margins (at least that is typically the intent of philosophers who pose these types of dillemas).

[/ QUOTE ]

I must take exception with the "unintended result" of which you speak. I think the problem must be understood with the premise that the decisionmaker already knows there is a person on the other track, and that if ve decides to pull the switch, ve's doing it with the full knowledge that ve is engaging in an act to kill one for the benefit of the five.

Now, you could say that even if this is a knowing act, it is still not "intentional" (and we could go into a side-discussion on what is "knowing" and what is "intentional"), but the way you phrased it, it appears you aren't making that distinction anyway, because you say that "you could have made the decision regardless of whether or not he was there" - meaning you believe the one person isn't even a relevant factor.

As for the "external factors" and "profit margins" you mention, we don't even have to get into that to recognize that there are cost-benefit analyses involved with these decisions outside of simply juxtaposing lives and weighing the numbers. Flipping a switch, in a vacuum, is a fairly simple act that doesn't cost you much energy or time. Imagine the same situation, though, except you were chained to a lamppost 3 feet away from the switch and the only way to get to the switch was to amputate your hand, arm, etc.

[/ QUOTE ]

I suppose I wasn't clear in what I meant. I don't mean unintended in the sense that you didn't know about it, I meant something closer to incidental. The point is that the action taken to save 5 in the train case doesn't necessarily have to kill anyone else, it just so happens that a person is on the other track. You could take the same action (flipping the switch) even in the case were nobody else got killed. In the doctor case, it is absolutely necessary that another person dies because the action you're taking to save the 5 is the act of taking the guy's organs. That's where the key difference lies. In the train case you are flipping a switch to save 5 lives, and another dude happens to get killed. In the doctor case you are killing another dude to save 5 lives, if the guy you were killing weren't around, there just simply wouldn't be a "switch" available for you to flip, the person being killed is the switch.

As far as external factors go, all I meant was that you shouldn't add to a hypothetical. Ethics hypotheticals are meant to isolate a single issue and evaluate it (I think it's the issue between direct and indirect killing in this case). They might not be totally explicit by saying something like, "there is a doctor, and five patients, and they're in a vacuum where there is no hospital, and they all have memory loss and get transported back to earth after, so there is absolutely nothing more to the case than what is being presented here...", but this is definitely the spirit in which the excersise is constructed.

Basically, unless something is explicitly stated in one of these situations, be very wary of introducing it in your answer, because then you're probably just answering a different, more convoluted question.

*edit* Note that I haven't stated what my opinion is on how much moral weight we should ascribe to direct vs. indirect killing, I'm just trying to make sure the philosophy is done correctly

[RoundGuy]

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your tone in this thread is obnoxious.

[/ QUOTE ]
Nice contribution. Would you like the discuss the OP, or is a comment on my tone the only thing you can come up with....

[RoundGuy]

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Its a nitpick on 1) but you seem to agree the basic point which is that we want the pilot to take the action that minimises life loss. In 2) we do not.

[/ QUOTE ]
Yes, of course I agree, and as I'm struggling with this issue, I'm trying to figure out why. Your pilot example is a problem for me because it essentially throws out my argument for not throwing the switch.

What right does the trolley guy have to kill the one for the sake of the five? What right does the pilot have to kill those in a sparsely populated area for the sake of the populated area?

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1) doesn't change in nature if some number of deaths is certain.

[/ QUOTE ]
Well, it does in my mind -- to an extent. Unfortunately, not enough to make my argument valid at this point.

[RoundGuy]

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The point is that the action taken to save 5 in the train case doesn't necessarily have to kill anyone else, it just so happens that a person is on the other track. You could take the same action (flipping the switch) even in the case were nobody else got killed. In the doctor case, it is absolutely necessary that another person dies because the action you're taking to save the 5 is the act of taking the guy's organs. That's where the key difference lies.

[/ QUOTE ]
Key difference indeed. So then, should we even go so far as to say that not throwing the switch would actually be immoral?

[Sephus]

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[ QUOTE ]
your tone in this thread is obnoxious.

[/ QUOTE ]
Nice contribution. Would you like the discuss the OP, or is a comment on my tone the only thing you can come up with....

[/ QUOTE ]

obviously i wouldn't like to discuss the OP else i would have.

thank you for recognizing my contribution toward helping you not suck.

[nepenthe]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
I'm going to be a nit for a minute here. Sure there are a lot of external problems associated with the doctor case (trust in doctors, future profit loss, etc) that serve to differentiate it, if it were happening in the real world, for what it's worth this is not the way these types of ethics hypotheticals are meant to be done.

Most philosophers of ethics would say the relevant moral difference between the two cases is something called "double effect" (I think the name is right). In the train case you are diverting the train away from five people, the person on the other track just happens to be there. It was an unintended result and you could have made the decision regardless of whether or not he was there. In the doctor case the 1 person being killed to save 5 is intimately involved with the act, necessary for it's execution. If that patient weren't there, the other 5 would just be out of luck. So in that case you are using that person's life to save the other 5, in the train case the 1 person dies incidentally.

You can further discuss whether or not you think this difference is relevant... but it is this difference that should be under discussion, not external factors grafted onto the problem such as probabilities and profit margins (at least that is typically the intent of philosophers who pose these types of dillemas).

[/ QUOTE ]

I must take exception with the "unintended result" of which you speak. I think the problem must be understood with the premise that the decisionmaker already knows there is a person on the other track, and that if ve decides to pull the switch, ve's doing it with the full knowledge that ve is engaging in an act to kill one for the benefit of the five.

Now, you could say that even if this is a knowing act, it is still not "intentional" (and we could go into a side-discussion on what is "knowing" and what is "intentional"), but the way you phrased it, it appears you aren't making that distinction anyway, because you say that "you could have made the decision regardless of whether or not he was there" - meaning you believe the one person isn't even a relevant factor.

As for the "external factors" and "profit margins" you mention, we don't even have to get into that to recognize that there are cost-benefit analyses involved with these decisions outside of simply juxtaposing lives and weighing the numbers. Flipping a switch, in a vacuum, is a fairly simple act that doesn't cost you much energy or time. Imagine the same situation, though, except you were chained to a lamppost 3 feet away from the switch and the only way to get to the switch was to amputate your hand, arm, etc.

[/ QUOTE ]

I suppose I wasn't clear in what I meant. I don't mean unintended in the sense that you didn't know about it, I meant something closer to incidental. The point is that the action taken to save 5 in the train case doesn't necessarily have to kill anyone else, it just so happens that a person is on the other track. You could take the same action (flipping the switch) even in the case were nobody else got killed. In the doctor case, it is absolutely necessary that another person dies because the action you're taking to save the 5 is the act of taking the guy's organs. That's where the key difference lies. In the train case you are flipping a switch to save 5 lives, and another dude happens to get killed. In the doctor case you are killing another dude to save 5 lives, if the guy you were killing weren't around, there just simply wouldn't be a "switch" available for you to flip, the person being killed is the switch.

As far as external factors go, all I meant was that you shouldn't add to a hypothetical. Ethics hypotheticals are meant to isolate a single issue and evaluate it (I think it's the issue between direct and indirect killing in this case). They might not be totally explicit by saying something like, "there is a doctor, and five patients, and they're in a vacuum where there is no hospital, and they all have memory loss and get transported back to earth after, so there is absolutely nothing more to the case than what is being presented here...", but this is definitely the spirit in which the excersise is constructed.

Basically, unless something is explicitly stated in one of these situations, be very wary of introducing it in your answer, because then you're probably just answering a different, more convoluted question.

*edit* Note that I haven't stated what my opinion is on how much moral weight we should ascribe to direct vs. indirect killing, I'm just trying to make sure the philosophy is done correctly

[/ QUOTE ]

It's not absolutely necessary that someone else get killed in the hospital situation - i.e. if there are organs already preserved from a previously dead person at hand, or if there is already another patient at the hospital who faces imminent death (assume a hopeless case) and has already agreed to donate his organs.

Sure, that would be changing the hypothetical, but I certainly can do that if you can also postulate that situation 1 does not require a person standing (or tied up, whatever) on the other track.

[nepenthe]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Its a nitpick on 1) but you seem to agree the basic point which is that we want the pilot to take the action that minimises life loss. In 2) we do not.

[/ QUOTE ]
Yes, of course I agree, and as I'm struggling with this issue, I'm trying to figure out why. Your pilot example is a problem for me because it essentially throws out my argument for not throwing the switch.

What right does the trolley guy have to kill the one for the sake of the five? What right does the pilot have to kill those in a sparsely populated area for the sake of the populated area?

[ QUOTE ]
1) doesn't change in nature if some number of deaths is certain.

[/ QUOTE ]
Well, it does in my mind -- to an extent. Unfortunately, not enough to make my argument valid at this point.

[/ QUOTE ]

I'm going to interject here and say the pilot example is distinguishable in that you are the pilot, and like it or not you are tasked with controlling the aircraft and thus responsible for where it lands. In the trolley example, you are presumably just some random guy who happens to be near a switch; you are not the operator of the trolley, and are not tasked with controlling it one way or another.

[RoundGuy]

[ QUOTE ]
thank you for recognizing my contribution toward helping you not suck.

[/ QUOTE ]
I apologize. After re-reading the thread, and slamming a couple of stiff drinks, I must now agree that I did indeed suck. It was certainly not my desire, or intent.

I allowed chezlaw's evasive responses to get under my skin, and that fact was glaringly obvious in the arrogant tone of my subsequent posts.

So, actually, it's all chez's fault. /images/graemlins/cool.gif

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Its a nitpick on 1) but you seem to agree the basic point which is that we want the pilot to take the action that minimises life loss. In 2) we do not.

[/ QUOTE ]
Yes, of course I agree, and as I'm struggling with this issue, I'm trying to figure out why. Your pilot example is a problem for me because it essentially throws out my argument for not throwing the switch.

What right does the trolley guy have to kill the one for the sake of the five? What right does the pilot have to kill those in a sparsely populated area for the sake of the populated area?

[/ QUOTE ]
The moral right comes from the fact its what the people involved want (or at least what its reasonable to believe they would want). That's not saying that those who end up dying would chose to die but that before the fact people generally agree that with minimising deaths in these types of incidents.

Contrast that with the hospital example where before the fact people wont agree to minimising death by harvesting organs.

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
1) doesn't change in nature if some number of deaths is certain.

[/ QUOTE ]
Well, it does in my mind -- to an extent. Unfortunately, not enough to make my argument valid at this point.

[/ QUOTE ]
Maybe the above clears up this problem.

chez

[nepenthe]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Its a nitpick on 1) but you seem to agree the basic point which is that we want the pilot to take the action that minimises life loss. In 2) we do not.

[/ QUOTE ]
Yes, of course I agree, and as I'm struggling with this issue, I'm trying to figure out why. Your pilot example is a problem for me because it essentially throws out my argument for not throwing the switch.

What right does the trolley guy have to kill the one for the sake of the five? What right does the pilot have to kill those in a sparsely populated area for the sake of the populated area?

[/ QUOTE ]
The moral right comes from the fact its what the people involved want (or at least what its reasonable to believe they would want). That's not saying that those who end up dying would chose to die but that before the fact people generally agree that with minimising deaths in these types of incidents.

Contrast that with the hospital example where before the fact people wont agree to minimising death by harvesting organs.

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
1) doesn't change in nature if some number of deaths is certain.

[/ QUOTE ]
Well, it does in my mind -- to an extent. Unfortunately, not enough to make my argument valid at this point.

[/ QUOTE ]
Maybe the above clears up this problem.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

But you're talking about a societal externality issue (i.e. people implicitly "agree[ing]" with certain outcomes in related situations) that OP's problems don't even require. You can look at the problems as purely hypothetical, isolated incidents with no chance of being repeated or replicated in any way, and still distinguish between the two based on the fact that:

Situation #1 does not involve a person who is tasked with a duty to operate the trolley or do anything else for that matter; while
Situation #2 involves a doctor whose duty is to save people, not to harvest them.

If #1 involved the operator of the trolley, then it would be similar to the pilot example. If #2 involved some random guy from the other side of the globe who could magically kill a guy by pulling a magical switch thus assuring that 5 be saved, it would be another story.

[RoundGuy]

[ QUOTE ]
Maybe the above clears up this problem.

[/ QUOTE ]
Actually, all you're telling me is that morality is what the majority thinks it is. Is that your position?

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
But you're talking about a societal externality issue (i.e. people implicitly "agree[ing]" with certain outcomes in related situations) that OP's problems don't even require. You can look at the problems as purely hypothetical, isolated incidents with no chance of being repeated or replicated in any way, and still distinguish between the two based on the fact that:

Situation #1 does not involve a person who is tasked with a duty to operate the trolley or do anything else for that matter; while
Situation #2 involves a doctor whose duty is to save people, not to harvest them.

[/ QUOTE ]
There are many views on morality, mine is entirely based on what people want or would want before the fact. Other views exist but views wont change the fact that the situations aren't similar.

Repetition makes no difference, nor in this case does the job of the people involved. If all the pilots die and a passenger has to steer then we would still want them to try to minimise death.

chez

[nepenthe]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
But you're talking about a societal externality issue (i.e. people implicitly "agree[ing]" with certain outcomes in related situations) that OP's problems don't even require. You can look at the problems as purely hypothetical, isolated incidents with no chance of being repeated or replicated in any way, and still distinguish between the two based on the fact that:

Situation #1 does not involve a person who is tasked with a duty to operate the trolley or do anything else for that matter; while
Situation #2 involves a doctor whose duty is to save people, not to harvest them.

[/ QUOTE ]
There are many views on morality, mine is entirely based on what people want or would want before the fact. Other views exist but views wont change the fact that the situations aren't similar.

Repetition makes no difference, nor in this case does the job of the people involved. If all the pilots die and a passenger has to steer then we would still want them to try to minimise death.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

If the original pilot is dead, then any of the remaining passengers - assuming someone could even operate the aircraft, may choose to do so or not. If one does try to operate the aircraft, then he has effectively and voluntarily taken upon the duty of being the new pilot. Now, the degree of his duties and responsibilities may differ assuming that he isn't a trained/licensed pilot and may not know all the associated rules etc., and therefore if he screws up the landing he may not be subject to the same kinds of repercussions to which the original pilot may be subject. Still, it remains that he's voluntarily taken upon the duties, and for better or for worse, the ball's in his court. If no one volunteers to operate the aircraft, then it isn't the passengers' duty to minimize damage.

The distinction I'm talking about isn't about one's official "job" but rather about responsibilities which one in a particular situation assumes, either via express or implied assent.

[AWoodside]

[ QUOTE ]

It's not absolutely necessary that someone else get killed in the hospital situation - i.e. if there are organs already preserved from a previously dead person at hand, or if there is already another patient at the hospital who faces imminent death (assume a hopeless case) and has already agreed to donate his organs.

Sure, that would be changing the hypothetical, but I certainly can do that if you can also postulate that situation 1 does not require a person standing (or tied up, whatever) on the other track.

[/ QUOTE ]

Sigh, one more time, then I think I'm done. Yes, you're correct, that is changing the hypothetical, which is one of the main things I'm arguing against. If you contantly change the hypothetical and introduce new elements to it (preserved organs that were never mentioned before) you're basically destroying any rigor the discussion may have and making it next to impossible to make any definitive statements about the morality involved (this task is hard enough already).

Furthermore, I'm not changing the train hypothetical in any way by merely pointing out that the causal links are different than in the case of the doctor. I am not "postulating" anything. It's a fact that the death of person 1 is not necessary for saving 5 in the train case in the same way that the death of person 1 is necessary in the organ case. Surely you can see that by merely observing this state of affairs I'm not changing diddly.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Maybe the above clears up this problem.

[/ QUOTE ]
Actually, all you're telling me is that morality is what the majority thinks it is. Is that your position?

[/ QUOTE ]
No that's not right at all. I would hold this moral position even if everyone disagreed with me.

Edit; maybe that's not clear: I believe the right thing to do in these situations is a function of what people want. Other people may believe its about something else e.g they may follow some religous rule or catagorical imperative independent of what people want. Also many will argue its what people should want not what they do want.

chez

[nepenthe]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]

It's not absolutely necessary that someone else get killed in the hospital situation - i.e. if there are organs already preserved from a previously dead person at hand, or if there is already another patient at the hospital who faces imminent death (assume a hopeless case) and has already agreed to donate his organs.

Sure, that would be changing the hypothetical, but I certainly can do that if you can also postulate that situation 1 does not require a person standing (or tied up, whatever) on the other track.

[/ QUOTE ]

Sigh, one more time, then I think I'm done. Yes, you're correct, that is changing the hypothetical, which is one of the main things I'm arguing against. If you contantly change the hypothetical and introduce new elements to it (preserved organs that were never mentioned before) you're basically destroying any rigor the discussion may have and making it next to impossible to make any definitive statements about the morality involved (this task is hard enough already).

Furthermore, I'm not changing the train hypothetical in any way by merely pointing out that the causal links are different than in the case of the doctor. I am not "postulating" anything. It's a fact that the death of person 1 is not necessary for saving 5 in the train case in the same way that the death of person 1 is necessary in the organ case. Surely you can see that by merely observing this state of affairs I'm not changing diddly.

[/ QUOTE ]

Surely the death of *someone* is necessary for the organ transplant in #2. But the question - and the distinction I'm making - is whether the killing of someone is necessary in either #1 or #2. It is not, for the reasons I've stated previously (and quoted here). So once again, I say that I'm not changing hypothetical #2 any more than you are changing hypothetical #1 in this respect.

What seals the case for me doesn't even have to do with the necessity of killing (or lack thereof). It's about the duties and responsibilities that are either assigned to the person in question or which said person assumes.

[RoundGuy]

[ QUOTE ]
It's a fact that the death of person 1 is not necessary for saving 5 in the train case in the same way that the death of person 1 is necessary in the organ case.

[/ QUOTE ]
Unfortunately, in the case OP presented, the trolley guy knows that one person will die. Therefore, it does make it necessary. If the man didn't know whether or not there was someone on the side track, then of course he would throw the switch. This example introduces another dynamic. That is, this trolley guy decides who is to live, and who is to die. I'm not certain his choice of an innocent bystander is the correct decision.

The opposite holds true for chez's pilot. He doesn't know that someone must die. His goal is no deaths. By crashing in a sparsely populated area, he increases his chances of reaching his goal. He isn't looking into the eyes of someone on the ground (as the trolley guy is) and choosing who lives and dies. Obviously, his choice of a sparsely populated area is the correct one.

I still see a real problem with throwing the switch.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
It's a fact that the death of person 1 is not necessary for saving 5 in the train case in the same way that the death of person 1 is necessary in the organ case.

[/ QUOTE ]
Unfortunately, in the case OP presented, the trolley guy knows that one person will die. Therefore, it does make it necessary. If the man didn't know whether or not there was someone on the side track, then of course he would throw the switch. Your example introduces another dynamic. That is, this trolley guy decides who is to live, and who is to die. I'm not certain his choice of an innocent bystander is the correct decision.

The opposite holds true for chez's pilot. He doesn't know that someone must die. His goal is no deaths. By crashing in a sparsely populated area, he increases his chances of reaching his goal. He isn't looking into the eyes of someone on the ground (as the trolley guy is) and choosing who lives and dies. Obviously, his choice of a sparsely populated area is the correct one.

I still see a real problem with throwing the switch.

[/ QUOTE ]
suppose in the trolly example its a 50% chance of killing each of 5 people or a 50% chance of killing 1.

What about 90% or 99.9999%

What changes when the probability becomes 1?

Edit: Plus of course in any real type 1) situation he cannot know that anyone will die so a very high probability is what we should really consider.

chez

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
Minor sideline, I'm not judging based on that at all. That was just padding. The point was the uncertainty.

[/ QUOTE ]
Fair enough. I suppose what really matters is that even if everyone involved had equal utility (by whatever measure) then the scenarios would still be different.

chez

[AWoodside]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]

It's not absolutely necessary that someone else get killed in the hospital situation - i.e. if there are organs already preserved from a previously dead person at hand, or if there is already another patient at the hospital who faces imminent death (assume a hopeless case) and has already agreed to donate his organs.

Sure, that would be changing the hypothetical, but I certainly can do that if you can also postulate that situation 1 does not require a person standing (or tied up, whatever) on the other track.

[/ QUOTE ]

Sigh, one more time, then I think I'm done. Yes, you're correct, that is changing the hypothetical, which is one of the main things I'm arguing against. If you contantly change the hypothetical and introduce new elements to it (preserved organs that were never mentioned before) you're basically destroying any rigor the discussion may have and making it next to impossible to make any definitive statements about the morality involved (this task is hard enough already).

Furthermore, I'm not changing the train hypothetical in any way by merely pointing out that the causal links are different than in the case of the doctor. I am not "postulating" anything. It's a fact that the death of person 1 is not necessary for saving 5 in the train case in the same way that the death of person 1 is necessary in the organ case. Surely you can see that by merely observing this state of affairs I'm not changing diddly.

[/ QUOTE ]

Surely the death of *someone* is necessary for the organ transplant in #2. But the question - and the distinction I'm making - is whether the killing of someone is necessary in either #1 or #2. It is not, for the reasons I've stated previously (and quoted here). So once again, I say that I'm not changing hypothetical #2 any more than you are changing hypothetical #1 in this respect.

What seals the case for me doesn't even have to do with the necessity of killing (or lack thereof). It's about the duties and responsibilities that are either assigned to the person in question or which said person assumes.

[/ QUOTE ]

Killing someone is necessary in case two because that is what the hypothetical stipulates. You have to take his organs, and this will kill him. This is an assumption the hypothetical is making, if you say otherwise you are talking about a different hypothetical. By introducing new organs that the doctor finds in the hospitals closet you are obviously changing the hypothetical.

Obviously in the train case person 1 dies, but it's not directly in the causal chain in the same way as the doctor case. It looks like this if you take the saving 5 option:

Case 1: Flip switch -> (a) save 5 people, (b) one guy dies
Case 2: KILL patient -> (a) save 5 people

It doesn't mean you have to think that this is morally relevant, and certainly under many moral systems it's not (utilitarian for example) but it IS a difference, and I am not changing a thing by pointing that out. Not sure why that's so hard to get across.

**Again, I haven't said what my opinion is either way, just trying to point out the relevant discussion points**

[AWoodside]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
It's a fact that the death of person 1 is not necessary for saving 5 in the train case in the same way that the death of person 1 is necessary in the organ case.

[/ QUOTE ]
Unfortunately, in the case OP presented, the trolley guy knows that one person will die. Therefore, it does make it necessary. If the man didn't know whether or not there was someone on the side track, then of course he would throw the switch. This example introduces another dynamic. That is, this trolley guy decides who is to live, and who is to die. I'm not certain his choice of an innocent bystander is the correct decision.

The opposite holds true for chez's pilot. He doesn't know that someone must die. His goal is no deaths. By crashing in a sparsely populated area, he increases his chances of reaching his goal. He isn't looking into the eyes of someone on the ground (as the trolley guy is) and choosing who lives and dies. Obviously, his choice of a sparsely populated area is the correct one.

I still see a real problem with throwing the switch.

[/ QUOTE ]

The reason I said "not necessary in the same way" is because I recognize that there are different ways of using the word 'necessary' that may make what I'm saying confusing. Of course in the hypothetical it is 'necessary' that he dies if you flip the switch, because that's what the hypothetical says...

What I mean by "not necessary in the same way" is that the causal chains of the events are different. In the train case you have to divert the train to save the 5, and there happens to be another guy in the way; in the doctor case you have to KILL the patient in order to save the 5, there is nothing incidental about it.

A slightly different train situation that would be completely morally analogous to the doctor case would be this:
There is a train that is going to run into 5 people a mile down the road. You see a really fat guy standing on a bridge above the track and know that if you push him in the way it will stop the train. Should you push him?

Does this help clarify the difference I'm trying to get at?

[nepenthe]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]

It's not absolutely necessary that someone else get killed in the hospital situation - i.e. if there are organs already preserved from a previously dead person at hand, or if there is already another patient at the hospital who faces imminent death (assume a hopeless case) and has already agreed to donate his organs.

Sure, that would be changing the hypothetical, but I certainly can do that if you can also postulate that situation 1 does not require a person standing (or tied up, whatever) on the other track.

[/ QUOTE ]

Sigh, one more time, then I think I'm done. Yes, you're correct, that is changing the hypothetical, which is one of the main things I'm arguing against. If you contantly change the hypothetical and introduce new elements to it (preserved organs that were never mentioned before) you're basically destroying any rigor the discussion may have and making it next to impossible to make any definitive statements about the morality involved (this task is hard enough already).

Furthermore, I'm not changing the train hypothetical in any way by merely pointing out that the causal links are different than in the case of the doctor. I am not "postulating" anything. It's a fact that the death of person 1 is not necessary for saving 5 in the train case in the same way that the death of person 1 is necessary in the organ case. Surely you can see that by merely observing this state of affairs I'm not changing diddly.

[/ QUOTE ]

Surely the death of *someone* is necessary for the organ transplant in #2. But the question - and the distinction I'm making - is whether the killing of someone is necessary in either #1 or #2. It is not, for the reasons I've stated previously (and quoted here). So once again, I say that I'm not changing hypothetical #2 any more than you are changing hypothetical #1 in this respect.

What seals the case for me doesn't even have to do with the necessity of killing (or lack thereof). It's about the duties and responsibilities that are either assigned to the person in question or which said person assumes.

[/ QUOTE ]

Killing someone is necessary in case two because that is what the hypothetical stipulates. You have to take his organs, and this will kill him. This is an assumption the hypothetical is making, if you say otherwise you are talking about a different hypothetical. By introducing new organs that the doctor finds in the hospitals closet you are obviously changing the hypothetical.

Obviously in the train case person 1 dies, but it's not directly in the causal chain in the same way as the doctor case. It looks like this if you take the saving 5 option:

Case 1: Flip switch -> (a) save 5 people, (b) one guy dies
Case 2: KILL patient -> (a) save 5 people

It doesn't mean you have to think that this is morally relevant, and certainly under many moral systems it's not (utilitarian for example) but it IS a difference, and I am not changing a thing by pointing that out. Not sure why that's so hard to get across.

**Again, I haven't said what my opinion is either way, just trying to point out the relevant discussion points**

[/ QUOTE ]

I really don't see it that way. Under #1, you're killing one guy while saving 5 by actively flipping the switch, because you know that the person is on the other track. You have performed an affirmative action that directly and proximately caused one person's death.

If you did not know that there was a person on the other track, then yes, you could say that the one person's death was incidental..

Basically, in terms of killing, there is no difference between #1 and #2. #1, as presented, does require us to kill one to save 5. #2, as presented, requires us to kill one to save 5. The difference lies in the extent of duty to which I've previously referred.

I think what you're really trying to say is that under #2, you're not only killing the person, but using his organs in addition in order to save others. That is indeed a distinction, and might be relevant in another scope, but not in the way you've been arguing.

[RoundGuy]

[ QUOTE ]
suppose in the trolly example its a 50% chance of killing each of 5 people or a 50% chance of killing 1.

What about 90% or 99.9999%

What changes when the probability becomes 1?

[/ QUOTE ]
You're changing the scenerio, but this is just too easy. If there is any chance at all that no one will die, no matter how remote, then of course you throw the switch. No-brainer. But as soon as the probability becomes 1, and you have the choice, you must be passive. You have no right to decide who lives and who dies.

[RoundGuy]

[ QUOTE ]
Does this help clarify the difference I'm trying to get at?

[/ QUOTE ]
No, it doesn't. You're still deciding who lives and who dies. You would not throw the man off the bridge for the same reason I wouldn't throw the switch and kill the innocent bystander (or kill the man in the hospital) -- because it would be wrong.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
suppose in the trolly example its a 50% chance of killing each of 5 people or a 50% chance of killing 1.

What about 90% or 99.9999%

What changes when the probability becomes 1?

[/ QUOTE ]
You're changing the scenerio, but this is just too easy. If there is any chance at all that no one will die, no matter how remote, then of course you throw the switch. No-brainer. But as soon as the probability becomes 1, and you have the choice, you must be passive. You have no right to decide who lives and who dies.

[/ QUOTE ]
Okay you think its a no-brainer to say definite yes with a probability 99.99999999999999999999999999999 and a definite no with a probability 1. I think I agree with you though we may have a different definition of no-brainer /images/graemlins/wink.gif

chez

[AWoodside]

[ QUOTE ]
I really don't see it that way. Under #1, you're killing one guy while saving 5 by actively flipping the switch, because you know that the person is on the other track. You have performed an affirmative action that directly and proximately caused one person's death.

If you did not know that there was a person on the other track, then yes, you could say that the one person's death was incidental..

Basically, in terms of killing, there is no difference between #1 and #2. #1, as presented, does require us to kill one to save 5. #2, as presented, requires us to kill one to save 5. The difference lies in the extent of duty to which I've previously referred.

I think what you're really trying to say is that under #2, you're not only killing the person, but using his organs in addition in order to save others. That is indeed a distinction, and might be relevant in another scope, but not in the way you've been arguing.

[/ QUOTE ]

Read my alternative train scenario:

There is a train about to run into 5 people down the track, there is a guy you can push in the way that will stop the train (nobody on the train gets hurt, please refrain from changing the hypothetical) from doing so, but it will kill this person.

Do you find this situtation completely analogous to the first train case, or do you see a difference?

[RoundGuy]

[ QUOTE ]
Okay you think its a no-brainer to say definite yes with a probability 99.99999999999999999999999999999 and a definite no with a probability 1. I think I agree with you though we may have a different definition of no-brainer /images/graemlins/wink.gif

[/ QUOTE ]
Hell, yes. I'll take it. Getting you to agree with me on anything in this thread has been a true challenge.

So, given that the probability is indeed 1, are you sticking with your original post in this thread, or have I converted you?

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Okay you think its a no-brainer to say definite yes with a probability 99.99999999999999999999999999999 and a definite no with a probability 1. I think I agree with you though we may have a different definition of no-brainer /images/graemlins/wink.gif

[/ QUOTE ]
Hell, yes. I'll take it. Getting you to agree with me on anything in this thread has been a true challenge.

So, given that the probability is indeed 1, are you sticking with your original post in this thread, or have I converted you?

[/ QUOTE ]
I'm afraid not. makes no difference to me if the probability is 99.99999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 9999999999
99999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 9999999999
9999999999999999 or 1.

chez

[nepenthe]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
I really don't see it that way. Under #1, you're killing one guy while saving 5 by actively flipping the switch, because you know that the person is on the other track. You have performed an affirmative action that directly and proximately caused one person's death.

If you did not know that there was a person on the other track, then yes, you could say that the one person's death was incidental..

Basically, in terms of killing, there is no difference between #1 and #2. #1, as presented, does require us to kill one to save 5. #2, as presented, requires us to kill one to save 5. The difference lies in the extent of duty to which I've previously referred.

I think what you're really trying to say is that under #2, you're not only killing the person, but using his organs in addition in order to save others. That is indeed a distinction, and might be relevant in another scope, but not in the way you've been arguing.

[/ QUOTE ]

Read my alternative train scenario:

There is a train about to run into 5 people down the track, there is a guy you can push in the way that will stop the train (nobody on the train gets hurt, please refrain from changing the hypothetical) from doing so, but it will kill this person.

Do you find this situtation completely analogous to the first train case, or do you see a difference?

[/ QUOTE ]

No qualitative difference here whatsoever. I don't push the guy into the train for the same reason I don't pull the switch knowing I'm killing a guy. The fact that pulling a switch seems less personal than directly manhandling a guy is an aesthetic/emotive distinction that doesn't play a factor in my decision.

I expect you to come back and say something to the effect of, "you're *using* the fat guy to stop the train, but you aren't using anyone in the trolley case." If so, I say irrelevant as far as the decision to kill or not kill is concerned. If not, perhaps you'd like to elaborate on why you think the situations different as you clearly imply you do.

Edit: and while we're at it, perhaps you'd like to just come out and state your answers to the OP's poll instead of proclaiming and repeatedly emphasizing, as you have been doing, that you are not taking a position on the issue.

[RoundGuy]

[ QUOTE ]
I'm afraid not.

[/ QUOTE ]
Dude, you're not making any sense. First, you agree with me that there is a time when you would, and when you wouldn't throw the switch -- now, you're telling me it makes no difference.

I give up. You win. Sleep well.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
I'm afraid not.

[/ QUOTE ]
Dude, you're not making any sense. First, you agree with me that there is a time when you would, and when you wouldn't throw the switch -- now, you're telling me it makes no difference.

I give up. You win. Sleep well.

[/ QUOTE ]
I only agreed with you saying your answer was a no-brainer.

chez

[Sephus]

deleted ha!

[RoundGuy]

[ QUOTE ]
I only agreed with you saying your answer was a no-brainer.

[/ QUOTE ]

[ QUOTE ]
I think I agree with you though we may have a different definition of no-brainer

[/ QUOTE ]
Ok. It's all clear to me now.

[RoundGuy]

[ QUOTE ]
deleted ha!

[/ QUOTE ]
So, does that mean you accepted my apology?

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
I only agreed with you saying your answer was a no-brainer.

[/ QUOTE ]

[ QUOTE ]
I think I agree with you though we may have a different definition of no-brainer

[/ QUOTE ]
Ok. It's all clear to me now.

[/ QUOTE ]
Okay. I did use a grammatical /images/graemlins/wink.gif

sorry for the confusion.

chez

[AWoodside]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
I really don't see it that way. Under #1, you're killing one guy while saving 5 by actively flipping the switch, because you know that the person is on the other track. You have performed an affirmative action that directly and proximately caused one person's death.

If you did not know that there was a person on the other track, then yes, you could say that the one person's death was incidental..

Basically, in terms of killing, there is no difference between #1 and #2. #1, as presented, does require us to kill one to save 5. #2, as presented, requires us to kill one to save 5. The difference lies in the extent of duty to which I've previously referred.

I think what you're really trying to say is that under #2, you're not only killing the person, but using his organs in addition in order to save others. That is indeed a distinction, and might be relevant in another scope, but not in the way you've been arguing.

[/ QUOTE ]

Read my alternative train scenario:

There is a train about to run into 5 people down the track, there is a guy you can push in the way that will stop the train (nobody on the train gets hurt, please refrain from changing the hypothetical) from doing so, but it will kill this person.

Do you find this situtation completely analogous to the first train case, or do you see a difference?

[/ QUOTE ]

No qualitative difference here whatsoever. I don't push the guy into the train for the same reason I don't pull the switch knowing I'm killing a guy. The fact that pulling a switch seems less personal than directly manhandling a guy is an aesthetic/emotive distinction that doesn't play a factor in my decision.

I expect you to come back and say something to the effect of, "you're *using* the fat guy to stop the train, but you aren't using anyone in the trolley case." If so, I say irrelevant as far as the decision to kill or not kill is concerned. If not, perhaps you'd like to elaborate on why you think the situations different as you clearly imply you do.

Edit: and while we're at it, perhaps you'd like to just come out and state your answers to the OP's poll instead of proclaiming and repeatedly emphasizing, as you have been doing, that you are not taking a position on the issue.

[/ QUOTE ]

I think there is some disconnect here. The reason I painstakingly point out that I'm not taking a position and that the difference I'm referencing may not be morally relevant to everyone is to try and pre-emptively stop objections from people that don't really understand how this type of ethical philosophy is done. I failed, obvi.

This is a classic case in ethical philosophy, used to illustrate and question exactly the issues I've brought up.

[Sephus]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
deleted ha!

[/ QUOTE ]
So, does that mean you accepted my apology?

[/ QUOTE ]

actually i intentionally skipped over your response so i wouldn't feel compelled to keep the conversation going.

i deleted my post because i figured something out.

[RoundGuy]

[ QUOTE ]
Okay. I did use a grammatical /images/graemlins/wink.gif

[/ QUOTE ]
Wow. How is it possible that we both speak English, and I have no idea what you're saying? You Brits are crazy mofo's.

[RoundGuy]

[ QUOTE ]
actually i intentionally skipped over your response so i wouldn't feel compelled to keep the conversation going.

[/ QUOTE ]
Too late. Ha! Nice non-answer though...

[ QUOTE ]
i deleted my post because i figured something out.

[/ QUOTE ]
Yeah, I saw it.

Btw, is your caps key broken? Not using caps to start your sentences seems ... unusual for someone with your intelligence and insight. That's not an insult. I do respect your opinions, based on other posts of yours I've read.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Okay. I did use a grammatical /images/graemlins/wink.gif

[/ QUOTE ]
Wow. How is it possible that we both speak English, and I have no idea what you're saying? You Brits are crazy mofo's.

[/ QUOTE ]
maybe language isn't the problem.

I won't respond in kind as I'm not listerine.

chez

[RoundGuy]

[ QUOTE ]
maybe language isn't the problem.

[/ QUOTE ]
I hope it is, for your sake. I hope your inconsistant and contradictory responses, and general incoherence in this thread isn't due to sheer stupidity.

[ QUOTE ]
I won't respond in kind as I'm not listerine.

[/ QUOTE ]
Uh, ok. ???

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]

I won't respond in kind as I'm not listerine.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Uh, ok. ???

[/ QUOTE ]
I assumed you were from the USA. My apologies if that's not the case.

chez

[RoundGuy]

[ QUOTE ]
I assumed you were from the USA. My apologies if that's not the case.

[/ QUOTE ]
I am from the US. Can someone who speaks fluent British/American please translate the last few posts?

[tisthefire]

i skipped some of the later posts because i'm short on time, but to those of you who believe throwing the switch is wrong because we are not to choose who is to live or die, isn't it then equally wrong to not throw the switch, also choosing who dies, or, said another way, is this situation any different for you if the trolly is heading for the one person and the conductor can choose to throw the switch and hit five people?

[MaxWeiss]

The reasoning behind our ethical influences on these questions is pretty clear. In #1, either 5 people die or 1 person dies. The train is going to hit somebody, so it may as well be one instead of five, barring other factors. #2 is "are you kidding me, no!" because the person is is not inherently involved and is a bystander. While we do have a 5:1 person saving ratio, it is unethical to kill the one to save the five because the one is not otherwise involved. If we started killing people against their will in order to save other people, we would have no rights for the minority and everybody would be paranoid about what aspect of them is going to be robbed next for the "greater good". It is tantamount to anarchy and society could not function on that ethical system.

[tshort]

[ QUOTE ]
I hope it is, for your sake. I hope your inconsistant and contradictory responses, and general incoherence in this thread isn't due to sheer stupidity.

[/ QUOTE ]

Chezlaw has been consistent and coherent throughout this thread. He might have had a grammatical error, but certainly not logical.

Nevertheless, I might be able to see where you are coming from if I re-read this thread a after quite a few "stiff drinks."

[vhawk01]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
1) is a fairly easy flip the switch. 2) is a stunningly easy not ok.

[/ QUOTE ]
How so? What's the difference between the two?

[/ QUOTE ]
I'd start from the other way round. I can't see any similarity between the two. What similarities do you see?

[/ QUOTE ]
In both cases you are choosing to sacrifice one to save five. Is it really that difficult to figure out?

In both cases you are killing someone who, without your intervention, would otherwise remain alive. Get it now?

[/ QUOTE ]

The meta-type consquences of the two are very different. If people knew that, when they entered a hospital, there was a chance Doctors would just kill you for your organs, people would be less likely to enter hospitals, which would more than compesate for the gain in lives in these rarer circumstances.

[/ QUOTE ]

Where were you in the "Is lying ok, kill vhawk" thread with your meta-consequences?

[vhawk01]

[ QUOTE ]
Wow, I'm surprised at how some people think these are similar.

1. People(s) WILL die.

2. People(s) MIGHT die.

It's the difference between knowing and guessing at. The 5 in 2. will die if not helped but helping them via the 1 does not guarantee their survival or their ongoing usefullness to society. On the other hand, by killing the 1, you have definately destroyed a useful individual.

[/ QUOTE ]

Uhhh....what? I think its safe to assume that harvesting the organs will save the 5 lives, at least temporarily. No reason the train-track people can't get hit by a car tomorrow. Not sure I get your objection. The probabilities of life and death in each scenario are identical.

[vhawk01]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
your tone in this thread is obnoxious.

[/ QUOTE ]
Nice contribution. Would you like the discuss the OP, or is a comment on my tone the only thing you can come up with....

[/ QUOTE ]

obviously i wouldn't like to discuss the OP else i would have.

thank you for recognizing my contribution toward helping you not suck.

[/ QUOTE ]

/images/graemlins/grin.gif

[vhawk01]

By the way, do any of you guys see a fundamental difference from scenario 2 and the doctors who fudge insurance forms or hospital orders to get their patients the treatments they need? I imagine most doctors would find them significantly different, but to me is just seems a matter of magnitude, no fundamental difference.

[vhawk01]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]

It's not absolutely necessary that someone else get killed in the hospital situation - i.e. if there are organs already preserved from a previously dead person at hand, or if there is already another patient at the hospital who faces imminent death (assume a hopeless case) and has already agreed to donate his organs.

Sure, that would be changing the hypothetical, but I certainly can do that if you can also postulate that situation 1 does not require a person standing (or tied up, whatever) on the other track.

[/ QUOTE ]

Sigh, one more time, then I think I'm done. Yes, you're correct, that is changing the hypothetical, which is one of the main things I'm arguing against. If you contantly change the hypothetical and introduce new elements to it (preserved organs that were never mentioned before) you're basically destroying any rigor the discussion may have and making it next to impossible to make any definitive statements about the morality involved (this task is hard enough already).

Furthermore, I'm not changing the train hypothetical in any way by merely pointing out that the causal links are different than in the case of the doctor. I am not "postulating" anything. It's a fact that the death of person 1 is not necessary for saving 5 in the train case in the same way that the death of person 1 is necessary in the organ case. Surely you can see that by merely observing this state of affairs I'm not changing diddly.

[/ QUOTE ]

Surely the death of *someone* is necessary for the organ transplant in #2. But the question - and the distinction I'm making - is whether the killing of someone is necessary in either #1 or #2. It is not, for the reasons I've stated previously (and quoted here). So once again, I say that I'm not changing hypothetical #2 any more than you are changing hypothetical #1 in this respect.

What seals the case for me doesn't even have to do with the necessity of killing (or lack thereof). It's about the duties and responsibilities that are either assigned to the person in question or which said person assumes.

[/ QUOTE ]

Killing someone is necessary in case two because that is what the hypothetical stipulates. You have to take his organs, and this will kill him. This is an assumption the hypothetical is making, if you say otherwise you are talking about a different hypothetical. By introducing new organs that the doctor finds in the hospitals closet you are obviously changing the hypothetical.

Obviously in the train case person 1 dies, but it's not directly in the causal chain in the same way as the doctor case. It looks like this if you take the saving 5 option:

Case 1: Flip switch -> (a) save 5 people, (b) one guy dies
Case 2: KILL patient -> (a) save 5 people

It doesn't mean you have to think that this is morally relevant, and certainly under many moral systems it's not (utilitarian for example) but it IS a difference, and I am not changing a thing by pointing that out. Not sure why that's so hard to get across.

**Again, I haven't said what my opinion is either way, just trying to point out the relevant discussion points**

[/ QUOTE ]

Why can't you look at the removal of the man's organs in the same light as the flipping of the switch? Its not like you cut his throat and then remove his organs. If you want to be a dick about it, you can just remove his organs and watch him inevitably die. Of course he is going to die, and of course the one person is going to die in the train example, but the causal chain is:

Flip the switch -> Save 5 lives, 1 dies

Remove organs -> Save 5 lives, 1 dies.

[vhawk01]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
suppose in the trolly example its a 50% chance of killing each of 5 people or a 50% chance of killing 1.

What about 90% or 99.9999%

What changes when the probability becomes 1?

[/ QUOTE ]
You're changing the scenerio, but this is just too easy. If there is any chance at all that no one will die, no matter how remote, then of course you throw the switch. No-brainer. But as soon as the probability becomes 1, and you have the choice, you must be passive. You have no right to decide who lives and who dies.

[/ QUOTE ]

There is always a chance that no one will die. It might changing the hypothetical, but any answer that depends essentially on a probability of 1 of a certain outcome is a uselss hypothetical in every conceivable sense.

[vhawk01]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
I assumed you were from the USA. My apologies if that's not the case.

[/ QUOTE ]
I am from the US. Can someone who speaks fluent British/American please translate the last few posts?

[/ QUOTE ]

Sure, no problem. You are a caustic jackass, chez is tired of your jawing, but is too polite (really just too British?) to stoop to your level.

At least, thats my read.

[Matt R.]

Wow, this is an interesting question. I chose the common responses (flip the switch to save the 5, do not harvest the organs to save the 5), but I can't for the life of me think of a good reason why this should be correct.

BTW, I haven't read the responses, but I did come up with a little theory.

It is a psychological response due to evolutionary reasons. In example 1, we have no information about the 6 people. Each individual in the trolly of 5 could be of equal health to the one individual. Therefore it is a numbers game, and 5 > 1.

In example 2, we are actively harming a perfectly healthy individual to save 5 who are sick and going to die. Thus we are actively helping the "inferior" individuals (from a health, ability to reproduce, evolutionary perspective... roughly /images/graemlins/tongue.gif) by killing off a perfectly healthy individual.

This seems like a logical reason, and I think its also why my subconscious made me answer the way I did without analyzing it.

Another possibility: it seems "wrong" that we are kidnapping the individual in question #2 without asking him permission first. Since we have a time interval to decide whether to kill 1 to save 5, it seems reasonable that it should be the one guy's choice. In question #1, it doesn't appear we have the luxury of time to make such an inquiry.

Interesting hypothetical, nonetheless.

[Matt R.]

[ QUOTE ]
I'm going to be a nit for a minute here. Sure there are a lot of external problems associated with the doctor case (trust in doctors, future profit loss, etc) that serve to differentiate it, if it were happening in the real world, for what it's worth this is not the way these types of ethics hypotheticals are meant to be done.

Most philosophers of ethics would say the relevant moral difference between the two cases is something called "double effect" (I think the name is right). In the train case you are diverting the train away from five people, the person on the other track just happens to be there. It was an unintended result and you could have made the decision regardless of whether or not he was there. In the doctor case the 1 person being killed to save 5 is intimately involved with the act, necessary for it's execution. If that patient weren't there, the other 5 would just be out of luck. So in that case you are using that person's life to save the other 5, in the train case the 1 person dies incidentally.

You can further discuss whether or not you think this difference is relevant... but it is this difference that should be under discussion, not external factors grafted onto the problem such as probabilities and profit margins (at least that is typically the intent of philosophers who pose these types of dillemas).

[/ QUOTE ]

I also like this answer. Seems like a more general/logical way to frame my evolution answer (i.e. the 5 sickies "need" to kill the healthy individual to survive, not the case in the train example where the one guy unfortunately happens to be standing in the wrong place)

[nepenthe]

[ QUOTE ]
The reasoning behind our ethical influences on these questions is pretty clear. In #1, either 5 people die or 1 person dies. The train is going to hit somebody, so it may as well be one instead of five, barring other factors. #2 is "are you kidding me, no!" because the person is is not inherently involved and is a bystander. While we do have a 5:1 person saving ratio, it is unethical to kill the one to save the five because the one is not otherwise involved. If we started killing people against their will in order to save other people, we would have no rights for the minority and everybody would be paranoid about what aspect of them is going to be robbed next for the "greater good". It is tantamount to anarchy and society could not function on that ethical system.

[/ QUOTE ]

"not otherwise involved"? I see what you're trying to say, but what would your answer be in the following scenario:

Instead of 1 switch in hypo #1, make it 10 switches and 10 (or is it 11?) different tracks, each containing one person. Rest is the same: if you do nothing, 5 people on the first track will inevitably die. If you decide to pull one of the 10 switches, one person will inevitably die. Zero deaths is impossible. So is everyone inherently "involved" in this situation, and do you still pull a switch? If so, do you decide randomly which one to pull? Do you find this decision more troubling than the original hypo #1?

[Sephus]

[ QUOTE ]
Too late. Ha! Nice non-answer though...

[/ QUOTE ]

not too late, this a separate conversation. i was telling the truth in my non-answer.

i generally don't capitalize because i've always done "the internet" this way and i can't think of a reason to stop. oddly enough, i'm also huge grammar nit/snob.

[RoundGuy]

[ QUOTE ]
i'm also a huge grammar nit/snob.

[/ QUOTE ]
/images/graemlins/laugh.gif

Anyway, I've been called both "obnoxious" and "caustic" in this thread by two separate people. So, I guess I'm done. I'll leave it to you more cerebral types.

I'll return to OOT, where I just found out that an anagram of my name is, "your dung". Go figure.

[vhawk01]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
i'm also a huge grammar nit/snob.

[/ QUOTE ]
/images/graemlins/laugh.gif

Anyway, I've been called both "obnoxious" and "caustic" in this thread by two separate people. So, I guess I'm done. I'll leave it to you more cerebral types.

I'll return to OOT, where I just found out that an anagram of my name is, "your dung". Go figure.

[/ QUOTE ]

For the record, I didn't call you caustic, I was just translating for chez. Don't shoot the messenger and all that.

[Ben K]

Balls. I'd actually read scenario 1 in the past and followed it with the slight change to make it into scenario 2. A Woodside pointed them it out a few posts earlier.

Thing was I couldn't quite remember how it all worked through and balls'd it up. The 1 dying in scenario 1 is just unlucky as it's the sidetrack that saves the 5, the 1 dying in scenario 2 is murder as it's his organs that save the 5. I.e. the post of mine you quoted was utter [censored]. Hope this is clearer.

[Sephus]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
i'm also a huge grammar nit/snob.

[/ QUOTE ]
/images/graemlins/laugh.gif

[/ QUOTE ]

yeah i'm totally looking down on myself right now.

[vhawk01]

[ QUOTE ]
Balls. I'd actually read scenario 1 in the past and followed it with the slight change to make it into scenario 2. A Woodside pointed them it out a few posts earlier.

Thing was I couldn't quite remember how it all worked through and balls'd it up. The 1 dying in scenario 1 is just unlucky as it's the sidetrack that saves the 5, the 1 dying in scenario 2 is murder as it's his organs that save the 5. I.e. the post of mine you quoted was utter [censored]. Hope this is clearer.

[/ QUOTE ]

I'm with you on this distinction, and its one thats been made and called important by several people. But to me it isn't quite that cut and dried, although it is extremely important to me, as it pertains to my ethical beliefs on several other topics (abortion for one).

In scenario 1, we can say that the death is an unavoidable but unintended side-effect of saving the 5 lives, in that it is the switching which saves the lives, not the 'train hitting the poor sap.' I'm with you so far. But now, in scenario 2, we are no longer able to say this? Why? It isn't the murder of the poor sap that is saving these peoples lives...that is an unavoidable, but unintended, consequence of removing his organs. We can remove his organs in such a way that he does not immediately die, but he will inexorably die as a result of our actions. But it is the removal of his organs that save the lives. I know there is a distinction here, but it isn't as obvious to me as it apparently is to others. We can understand removing blood as not killing someone, we can understand removing kidneys as not killing someone, even if these procedures do sometimes lead to a death. And we've established that it isn't the CERTAINTY of his death that matters, since the death is certain in both scenarios. What is it about 'removing organs' that is different than 'flipping a switch?'

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
By the way, do any of you guys see a fundamental difference from scenario 2 and the doctors who fudge insurance forms or hospital orders to get their patients the treatments they need? I imagine most doctors would find them significantly different, but to me is just seems a matter of magnitude, no fundamental difference.

[/ QUOTE ]
Depends what you mean by fundemental. Fraud (possibly minor fraud) is generally considered signifiantly different to murder even if we agree they are wrong.

If you're suggesting that the fraud means other people are denied treatment then I think that is not the case.

chez

[vhawk01]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
By the way, do any of you guys see a fundamental difference from scenario 2 and the doctors who fudge insurance forms or hospital orders to get their patients the treatments they need? I imagine most doctors would find them significantly different, but to me is just seems a matter of magnitude, no fundamental difference.

[/ QUOTE ]
Depends what you mean by fundemental. Fraud (possibly minor fraud) is generally considered signifiantly different to murder even if we agree they are wrong.

If you're suggesting that the fraud means other people are denied treatment then I think that is not the case.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

I think fraud does mean that, that other people are denied treatment, because we are dealing with a finite resource pool. At the very least, allow my assertion that it is the same for the purpose of a hypothetical. Lets say its zero sum, and every resource you use to help someone is a resource you are stealing from someone else. Is it more like scenario 1 or 2? I suppose its more like 1, since it is the fraudulent billing or allocation that is saving the lives of your five patients, with the inevitable harm to the other patient (actually, its probably helping one and hurting 5, but it doesn't necessarily have to be that way).

This is probably a different enough scenario that it would be a thread hijack, maybe I'll start another thread on it at some point. Probably not.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
By the way, do any of you guys see a fundamental difference from scenario 2 and the doctors who fudge insurance forms or hospital orders to get their patients the treatments they need? I imagine most doctors would find them significantly different, but to me is just seems a matter of magnitude, no fundamental difference.

[/ QUOTE ]
Depends what you mean by fundemental. Fraud (possibly minor fraud) is generally considered signifiantly different to murder even if we agree they are wrong.

If you're suggesting that the fraud means other people are denied treatment then I think that is not the case.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

I think fraud does mean that, that other people are denied treatment, because we are dealing with a finite resource pool. At the very least, allow my assertion that it is the same for the purpose of a hypothetical. Lets say its zero sum, and every resource you use to help someone is a resource you are stealing from someone else. Is it more like scenario 1 or 2? I suppose its more like 1, since it is the fraudulent billing or allocation that is saving the lives of your five patients, with the inevitable harm to the other patient (actually, its probably helping one and hurting 5, but it doesn't necessarily have to be that way).

This is probably a different enough scenario that it would be a thread hijack, maybe I'll start another thread on it at some point. Probably not.

[/ QUOTE ]
I disagree its zero sum and I think there's a decent chance that this type of fraud in the system increases the number of people treated.

but its a dull economic argument not a dull philosophical one /images/graemlins/smile.gif

[vhawk01]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
By the way, do any of you guys see a fundamental difference from scenario 2 and the doctors who fudge insurance forms or hospital orders to get their patients the treatments they need? I imagine most doctors would find them significantly different, but to me is just seems a matter of magnitude, no fundamental difference.

[/ QUOTE ]
Depends what you mean by fundemental. Fraud (possibly minor fraud) is generally considered signifiantly different to murder even if we agree they are wrong.

If you're suggesting that the fraud means other people are denied treatment then I think that is not the case.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

I think fraud does mean that, that other people are denied treatment, because we are dealing with a finite resource pool. At the very least, allow my assertion that it is the same for the purpose of a hypothetical. Lets say its zero sum, and every resource you use to help someone is a resource you are stealing from someone else. Is it more like scenario 1 or 2? I suppose its more like 1, since it is the fraudulent billing or allocation that is saving the lives of your five patients, with the inevitable harm to the other patient (actually, its probably helping one and hurting 5, but it doesn't necessarily have to be that way).

This is probably a different enough scenario that it would be a thread hijack, maybe I'll start another thread on it at some point. Probably not.

[/ QUOTE ]
I disagree its zero sum and I think there's a decent chance that this type of fraud in the system increases the number of people treated.

but its a dull economic argument not a dull philosophical one /images/graemlins/smile.gif

[/ QUOTE ]

If you really think that, and could expand on it a bit and explain it to me (using small words and speaking slowly, since I know less about economics than I do about science and philosophy, if you can believe that) perhaps it would be worth starting another thread after all. It seems extremely counter-intuitive to me, and worse, seems like a self-serving and convenient argument for doctors whose emotions drive them to help the patient in front of them at any cost.

[Kaj]

[ QUOTE ]
The goal of the pilot is to kill no one, not kill less.

[/ QUOTE ]

Arguing is fun when you make blanket statements that are silly.

A plane crashing into the ground is going to kill people. Pilots often attempt to keep the planes from hitting densely populated areas. They may kill others on the ground in the process and still get an airfield named after them.

[Kaj]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
2) do you want to live in a world where if you vist hospital you are available for harvesting if required to save more than one life? Would you work there?, would you live nearby? Would you let your wife/daughter give birth there?

[/ QUOTE ]
No.

[/ QUOTE ]

Case closed.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
By the way, do any of you guys see a fundamental difference from scenario 2 and the doctors who fudge insurance forms or hospital orders to get their patients the treatments they need? I imagine most doctors would find them significantly different, but to me is just seems a matter of magnitude, no fundamental difference.

[/ QUOTE ]
Depends what you mean by fundemental. Fraud (possibly minor fraud) is generally considered signifiantly different to murder even if we agree they are wrong.

If you're suggesting that the fraud means other people are denied treatment then I think that is not the case.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

I think fraud does mean that, that other people are denied treatment, because we are dealing with a finite resource pool. At the very least, allow my assertion that it is the same for the purpose of a hypothetical. Lets say its zero sum, and every resource you use to help someone is a resource you are stealing from someone else. Is it more like scenario 1 or 2? I suppose its more like 1, since it is the fraudulent billing or allocation that is saving the lives of your five patients, with the inevitable harm to the other patient (actually, its probably helping one and hurting 5, but it doesn't necessarily have to be that way).

This is probably a different enough scenario that it would be a thread hijack, maybe I'll start another thread on it at some point. Probably not.

[/ QUOTE ]
I disagree its zero sum and I think there's a decent chance that this type of fraud in the system increases the number of people treated.

but its a dull economic argument not a dull philosophical one /images/graemlins/smile.gif

[/ QUOTE ]

If you really think that, and could expand on it a bit and explain it to me (using small words and speaking slowly, since I know less about economics than I do about science and philosophy, if you can believe that) perhaps it would be worth starting another thread after all. It seems extremely counter-intuitive to me, and worse, seems like a self-serving and convenient argument for doctors whose emotions drive them to help the patient in front of them at any cost.

[/ QUOTE ]
Its not a finite rresource pool (at least not in practice) and generally treatment reduces the cost of treatment for others, I don't think that's equalled or outweighed by the those unable to afford treament because of the money effectively stolen from them.

chez

[Kaj]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Maybe the above clears up this problem.

[/ QUOTE ]
Actually, all you're telling me is that morality is what the majority thinks it is. Is that your position?

[/ QUOTE ]

No, my definition of morality is what I think it is.

[Kaj]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
By the way, do any of you guys see a fundamental difference from scenario 2 and the doctors who fudge insurance forms or hospital orders to get their patients the treatments they need? I imagine most doctors would find them significantly different, but to me is just seems a matter of magnitude, no fundamental difference.

[/ QUOTE ]
Depends what you mean by fundemental. Fraud (possibly minor fraud) is generally considered signifiantly different to murder even if we agree they are wrong.

If you're suggesting that the fraud means other people are denied treatment then I think that is not the case.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

I think fraud does mean that, that other people are denied treatment, because we are dealing with a finite resource pool. At the very least, allow my assertion that it is the same for the purpose of a hypothetical. Lets say its zero sum, and every resource you use to help someone is a resource you are stealing from someone else. Is it more like scenario 1 or 2? I suppose its more like 1, since it is the fraudulent billing or allocation that is saving the lives of your five patients, with the inevitable harm to the other patient (actually, its probably helping one and hurting 5, but it doesn't necessarily have to be that way).

This is probably a different enough scenario that it would be a thread hijack, maybe I'll start another thread on it at some point. Probably not.

[/ QUOTE ]
I disagree its zero sum and I think there's a decent chance that this type of fraud in the system increases the number of people treated.

but its a dull economic argument not a dull philosophical one /images/graemlins/smile.gif

[/ QUOTE ]

It may be dull, but I think you need to be open to the alternative.

More fraud --> Higher health care costs --> Fewer people afford it --> Fewer covered

I can't prove it and I doubt any of us have the data to support either way quantitatively, but the logic suggests that there must be an effect.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
By the way, do any of you guys see a fundamental difference from scenario 2 and the doctors who fudge insurance forms or hospital orders to get their patients the treatments they need? I imagine most doctors would find them significantly different, but to me is just seems a matter of magnitude, no fundamental difference.

[/ QUOTE ]
Depends what you mean by fundemental. Fraud (possibly minor fraud) is generally considered signifiantly different to murder even if we agree they are wrong.

If you're suggesting that the fraud means other people are denied treatment then I think that is not the case.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

I think fraud does mean that, that other people are denied treatment, because we are dealing with a finite resource pool. At the very least, allow my assertion that it is the same for the purpose of a hypothetical. Lets say its zero sum, and every resource you use to help someone is a resource you are stealing from someone else. Is it more like scenario 1 or 2? I suppose its more like 1, since it is the fraudulent billing or allocation that is saving the lives of your five patients, with the inevitable harm to the other patient (actually, its probably helping one and hurting 5, but it doesn't necessarily have to be that way).

This is probably a different enough scenario that it would be a thread hijack, maybe I'll start another thread on it at some point. Probably not.

[/ QUOTE ]
I disagree its zero sum and I think there's a decent chance that this type of fraud in the system increases the number of people treated.

but its a dull economic argument not a dull philosophical one /images/graemlins/smile.gif

[/ QUOTE ]

It may be dull, but I think you need to be open to the alternative.

More fraud --> Higher health care costs --> Fewer people afford it --> Fewer covered

I can't prove it and I doubt any of us have the data to support either way quantitatively, but the logic suggests that there must be an effect.

[/ QUOTE ]
I am open to it but there's the competing reductuion in costs caused by more treatment and absolutely no reason to believe they are equal and opposite. I think there's a good economic argument (capitalism 101) that the net result is more treatment not less.

I'd also argue that outside vhawk's ideal world (and in the real messy world) a significant amount of minor fraud may be optimum.

chez

[RoundGuy]

[ QUOTE ]
Arguing is fun when you make blanket statements that are silly.

[/ QUOTE ]
Well, I've been called obnoxious, caustic, and now....silly. At least I'm not stupid.

[ QUOTE ]
They (pilots) may kill others on the ground in the process and still get an airfield named after them.

[/ QUOTE ]
You're stupid.

[RoundGuy]

[ QUOTE ]
No, my definition of morality is what I think it is.

[/ QUOTE ]
No [censored], Sherlock. You're brilliant.

[vhawk01]

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By the way, do any of you guys see a fundamental difference from scenario 2 and the doctors who fudge insurance forms or hospital orders to get their patients the treatments they need? I imagine most doctors would find them significantly different, but to me is just seems a matter of magnitude, no fundamental difference.

[/ QUOTE ]
Depends what you mean by fundemental. Fraud (possibly minor fraud) is generally considered signifiantly different to murder even if we agree they are wrong.

If you're suggesting that the fraud means other people are denied treatment then I think that is not the case.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

I think fraud does mean that, that other people are denied treatment, because we are dealing with a finite resource pool. At the very least, allow my assertion that it is the same for the purpose of a hypothetical. Lets say its zero sum, and every resource you use to help someone is a resource you are stealing from someone else. Is it more like scenario 1 or 2? I suppose its more like 1, since it is the fraudulent billing or allocation that is saving the lives of your five patients, with the inevitable harm to the other patient (actually, its probably helping one and hurting 5, but it doesn't necessarily have to be that way).

This is probably a different enough scenario that it would be a thread hijack, maybe I'll start another thread on it at some point. Probably not.

[/ QUOTE ]
I disagree its zero sum and I think there's a decent chance that this type of fraud in the system increases the number of people treated.

but its a dull economic argument not a dull philosophical one /images/graemlins/smile.gif

[/ QUOTE ]

It may be dull, but I think you need to be open to the alternative.

More fraud --> Higher health care costs --> Fewer people afford it --> Fewer covered

I can't prove it and I doubt any of us have the data to support either way quantitatively, but the logic suggests that there must be an effect.

[/ QUOTE ]
I am open to it but there's the competing reductuion in costs caused by more treatment and absolutely no reason to believe they are equal and opposite. I think there's a good economic argument (capitalism 101) that the net result is more treatment not less.

I'd also argue that outside vhawk's ideal world (and in the real messy world) a significant amount of minor fraud may be optimum.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

You'd argue it or you'd assert it? Just asking, not taking a jab. If you can argue it I'll make the thread.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
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By the way, do any of you guys see a fundamental difference from scenario 2 and the doctors who fudge insurance forms or hospital orders to get their patients the treatments they need? I imagine most doctors would find them significantly different, but to me is just seems a matter of magnitude, no fundamental difference.

[/ QUOTE ]
Depends what you mean by fundemental. Fraud (possibly minor fraud) is generally considered signifiantly different to murder even if we agree they are wrong.

If you're suggesting that the fraud means other people are denied treatment then I think that is not the case.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

I think fraud does mean that, that other people are denied treatment, because we are dealing with a finite resource pool. At the very least, allow my assertion that it is the same for the purpose of a hypothetical. Lets say its zero sum, and every resource you use to help someone is a resource you are stealing from someone else. Is it more like scenario 1 or 2? I suppose its more like 1, since it is the fraudulent billing or allocation that is saving the lives of your five patients, with the inevitable harm to the other patient (actually, its probably helping one and hurting 5, but it doesn't necessarily have to be that way).

This is probably a different enough scenario that it would be a thread hijack, maybe I'll start another thread on it at some point. Probably not.

[/ QUOTE ]
I disagree its zero sum and I think there's a decent chance that this type of fraud in the system increases the number of people treated.

but its a dull economic argument not a dull philosophical one /images/graemlins/smile.gif

[/ QUOTE ]

It may be dull, but I think you need to be open to the alternative.

More fraud --> Higher health care costs --> Fewer people afford it --> Fewer covered

I can't prove it and I doubt any of us have the data to support either way quantitatively, but the logic suggests that there must be an effect.

[/ QUOTE ]
I am open to it but there's the competing reductuion in costs caused by more treatment and absolutely no reason to believe they are equal and opposite. I think there's a good economic argument (capitalism 101) that the net result is more treatment not less.

I'd also argue that outside vhawk's ideal world (and in the real messy world) a significant amount of minor fraud may be optimum.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

You'd argue it or you'd assert it? Just asking, not taking a jab. If you can argue it I'll make the thread.

[/ QUOTE ]
That's a fair jab and I'd argue for it. But its not something I can demonstrate but would argue that you can't demonstrate your point of view is more correct. I'd also produce some hopefully impressive gesticulatory arguments for my view.

chez

[vhawk01]

[ QUOTE ]
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[ QUOTE ]
By the way, do any of you guys see a fundamental difference from scenario 2 and the doctors who fudge insurance forms or hospital orders to get their patients the treatments they need? I imagine most doctors would find them significantly different, but to me is just seems a matter of magnitude, no fundamental difference.

[/ QUOTE ]
Depends what you mean by fundemental. Fraud (possibly minor fraud) is generally considered signifiantly different to murder even if we agree they are wrong.

If you're suggesting that the fraud means other people are denied treatment then I think that is not the case.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

I think fraud does mean that, that other people are denied treatment, because we are dealing with a finite resource pool. At the very least, allow my assertion that it is the same for the purpose of a hypothetical. Lets say its zero sum, and every resource you use to help someone is a resource you are stealing from someone else. Is it more like scenario 1 or 2? I suppose its more like 1, since it is the fraudulent billing or allocation that is saving the lives of your five patients, with the inevitable harm to the other patient (actually, its probably helping one and hurting 5, but it doesn't necessarily have to be that way).

This is probably a different enough scenario that it would be a thread hijack, maybe I'll start another thread on it at some point. Probably not.

[/ QUOTE ]
I disagree its zero sum and I think there's a decent chance that this type of fraud in the system increases the number of people treated.

but its a dull economic argument not a dull philosophical one /images/graemlins/smile.gif

[/ QUOTE ]

It may be dull, but I think you need to be open to the alternative.

More fraud --> Higher health care costs --> Fewer people afford it --> Fewer covered

I can't prove it and I doubt any of us have the data to support either way quantitatively, but the logic suggests that there must be an effect.

[/ QUOTE ]
I am open to it but there's the competing reductuion in costs caused by more treatment and absolutely no reason to believe they are equal and opposite. I think there's a good economic argument (capitalism 101) that the net result is more treatment not less.

I'd also argue that outside vhawk's ideal world (and in the real messy world) a significant amount of minor fraud may be optimum.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

You'd argue it or you'd assert it? Just asking, not taking a jab. If you can argue it I'll make the thread.

[/ QUOTE ]
That's a fair jab and I'd argue for it. But its not something I can demonstrate but would argue that you can't demonstrate your point of view is more correct. I'd also produce some hopefully impressive gesticulatory arguments for my view.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

Trust me, I'd be thrilled to be convinced that fudging charts and orders is actually in the best interests of everyone. I'm subject to the same emotional pulls as everyone else, and my patient sitting right in front of me is more important to me than some nameless douchebag three states over.

[chezlaw]

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By the way, do any of you guys see a fundamental difference from scenario 2 and the doctors who fudge insurance forms or hospital orders to get their patients the treatments they need? I imagine most doctors would find them significantly different, but to me is just seems a matter of magnitude, no fundamental difference.

[/ QUOTE ]
Depends what you mean by fundemental. Fraud (possibly minor fraud) is generally considered signifiantly different to murder even if we agree they are wrong.

If you're suggesting that the fraud means other people are denied treatment then I think that is not the case.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

I think fraud does mean that, that other people are denied treatment, because we are dealing with a finite resource pool. At the very least, allow my assertion that it is the same for the purpose of a hypothetical. Lets say its zero sum, and every resource you use to help someone is a resource you are stealing from someone else. Is it more like scenario 1 or 2? I suppose its more like 1, since it is the fraudulent billing or allocation that is saving the lives of your five patients, with the inevitable harm to the other patient (actually, its probably helping one and hurting 5, but it doesn't necessarily have to be that way).

This is probably a different enough scenario that it would be a thread hijack, maybe I'll start another thread on it at some point. Probably not.

[/ QUOTE ]
I disagree its zero sum and I think there's a decent chance that this type of fraud in the system increases the number of people treated.

but its a dull economic argument not a dull philosophical one /images/graemlins/smile.gif

[/ QUOTE ]

It may be dull, but I think you need to be open to the alternative.

More fraud --> Higher health care costs --> Fewer people afford it --> Fewer covered

I can't prove it and I doubt any of us have the data to support either way quantitatively, but the logic suggests that there must be an effect.

[/ QUOTE ]
I am open to it but there's the competing reductuion in costs caused by more treatment and absolutely no reason to believe they are equal and opposite. I think there's a good economic argument (capitalism 101) that the net result is more treatment not less.

I'd also argue that outside vhawk's ideal world (and in the real messy world) a significant amount of minor fraud may be optimum.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

You'd argue it or you'd assert it? Just asking, not taking a jab. If you can argue it I'll make the thread.

[/ QUOTE ]
That's a fair jab and I'd argue for it. But its not something I can demonstrate but would argue that you can't demonstrate your point of view is more correct. I'd also produce some hopefully impressive gesticulatory arguments for my view.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

Trust me, I'd be thrilled to be convinced that fudging charts and orders is actually in the best interests of everyone. I'm subject to the same emotional pulls as everyone else, and my patient sitting right in front of me is more important to me than some nameless douchebag three states over.

[/ QUOTE ]
If I can't convince you that some lies are good then I'm not going to convince you here.

I'm not arguing that its better if people do things they believe are wrong, but that its may be better for there to be a significant level of minor fraud committed by people who believe its the right thing to do.

(It may also be optimum to have a certain level of straightforward criminality.)

chez

[vhawk01]

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By the way, do any of you guys see a fundamental difference from scenario 2 and the doctors who fudge insurance forms or hospital orders to get their patients the treatments they need? I imagine most doctors would find them significantly different, but to me is just seems a matter of magnitude, no fundamental difference.

[/ QUOTE ]
Depends what you mean by fundemental. Fraud (possibly minor fraud) is generally considered signifiantly different to murder even if we agree they are wrong.

If you're suggesting that the fraud means other people are denied treatment then I think that is not the case.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

I think fraud does mean that, that other people are denied treatment, because we are dealing with a finite resource pool. At the very least, allow my assertion that it is the same for the purpose of a hypothetical. Lets say its zero sum, and every resource you use to help someone is a resource you are stealing from someone else. Is it more like scenario 1 or 2? I suppose its more like 1, since it is the fraudulent billing or allocation that is saving the lives of your five patients, with the inevitable harm to the other patient (actually, its probably helping one and hurting 5, but it doesn't necessarily have to be that way).

This is probably a different enough scenario that it would be a thread hijack, maybe I'll start another thread on it at some point. Probably not.

[/ QUOTE ]
I disagree its zero sum and I think there's a decent chance that this type of fraud in the system increases the number of people treated.

but its a dull economic argument not a dull philosophical one /images/graemlins/smile.gif

[/ QUOTE ]

It may be dull, but I think you need to be open to the alternative.

More fraud --> Higher health care costs --> Fewer people afford it --> Fewer covered

I can't prove it and I doubt any of us have the data to support either way quantitatively, but the logic suggests that there must be an effect.

[/ QUOTE ]
I am open to it but there's the competing reductuion in costs caused by more treatment and absolutely no reason to believe they are equal and opposite. I think there's a good economic argument (capitalism 101) that the net result is more treatment not less.

I'd also argue that outside vhawk's ideal world (and in the real messy world) a significant amount of minor fraud may be optimum.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

You'd argue it or you'd assert it? Just asking, not taking a jab. If you can argue it I'll make the thread.

[/ QUOTE ]
That's a fair jab and I'd argue for it. But its not something I can demonstrate but would argue that you can't demonstrate your point of view is more correct. I'd also produce some hopefully impressive gesticulatory arguments for my view.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

Trust me, I'd be thrilled to be convinced that fudging charts and orders is actually in the best interests of everyone. I'm subject to the same emotional pulls as everyone else, and my patient sitting right in front of me is more important to me than some nameless douchebag three states over.

[/ QUOTE ]
If I can't convince you that some lies are good then I'm not going to convince you here.

I'm not arguing that its better if people do things they believe are wrong, but that its may be better for there to be a significant level of minor fraud committed by people who believe its the right thing to do.

(It may also be optimum to have a certain level of straightforward criminality.)

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

Just curious, but do you actually mean 'optimum?' To use a poker analogy, there is often more than one +EV line, but there is only one optimal play. You really think the OPTIMAL strategy is some amount of straightforward criminality, or is this just a 'local maximum,' to abuse yet another statistical term.

[RoundGuy]

[ QUOTE ]
Just curious,

[/ QUOTE ]
You're arguing with a Brit. Would you like me to translate? /images/graemlins/cool.gif

[vhawk01]

[ QUOTE ]

[ QUOTE ]
Just curious,

[/ QUOTE ]
You're arguing with a Brit. Would you like me to translate? /images/graemlins/cool.gif

[/ QUOTE ]

Nope, I'm good. I follow chez just fine. Its those damn Aussies (Midge) I have a problem understanding.

[chezlaw]

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By the way, do any of you guys see a fundamental difference from scenario 2 and the doctors who fudge insurance forms or hospital orders to get their patients the treatments they need? I imagine most doctors would find them significantly different, but to me is just seems a matter of magnitude, no fundamental difference.

[/ QUOTE ]
Depends what you mean by fundemental. Fraud (possibly minor fraud) is generally considered signifiantly different to murder even if we agree they are wrong.

If you're suggesting that the fraud means other people are denied treatment then I think that is not the case.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

I think fraud does mean that, that other people are denied treatment, because we are dealing with a finite resource pool. At the very least, allow my assertion that it is the same for the purpose of a hypothetical. Lets say its zero sum, and every resource you use to help someone is a resource you are stealing from someone else. Is it more like scenario 1 or 2? I suppose its more like 1, since it is the fraudulent billing or allocation that is saving the lives of your five patients, with the inevitable harm to the other patient (actually, its probably helping one and hurting 5, but it doesn't necessarily have to be that way).

This is probably a different enough scenario that it would be a thread hijack, maybe I'll start another thread on it at some point. Probably not.

[/ QUOTE ]
I disagree its zero sum and I think there's a decent chance that this type of fraud in the system increases the number of people treated.

but its a dull economic argument not a dull philosophical one /images/graemlins/smile.gif

[/ QUOTE ]

It may be dull, but I think you need to be open to the alternative.

More fraud --> Higher health care costs --> Fewer people afford it --> Fewer covered

I can't prove it and I doubt any of us have the data to support either way quantitatively, but the logic suggests that there must be an effect.

[/ QUOTE ]
I am open to it but there's the competing reductuion in costs caused by more treatment and absolutely no reason to believe they are equal and opposite. I think there's a good economic argument (capitalism 101) that the net result is more treatment not less.

I'd also argue that outside vhawk's ideal world (and in the real messy world) a significant amount of minor fraud may be optimum.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

You'd argue it or you'd assert it? Just asking, not taking a jab. If you can argue it I'll make the thread.

[/ QUOTE ]
That's a fair jab and I'd argue for it. But its not something I can demonstrate but would argue that you can't demonstrate your point of view is more correct. I'd also produce some hopefully impressive gesticulatory arguments for my view.

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

Trust me, I'd be thrilled to be convinced that fudging charts and orders is actually in the best interests of everyone. I'm subject to the same emotional pulls as everyone else, and my patient sitting right in front of me is more important to me than some nameless douchebag three states over.

[/ QUOTE ]
If I can't convince you that some lies are good then I'm not going to convince you here.

I'm not arguing that its better if people do things they believe are wrong, but that its may be better for there to be a significant level of minor fraud committed by people who believe its the right thing to do.

(It may also be optimum to have a certain level of straightforward criminality.)

chez

[/ QUOTE ]

Just curious, but do you actually mean 'optimum?' To use a poker analogy, there is often more than one +EV line, but there is only one optimal play. You really think the OPTIMAL strategy is some amount of straightforward criminality, or is this just a 'local maximum,' to abuse yet another statistical term.

[/ QUOTE ]
Its a bit vague but suppose we have some shared concept of a perfect system and it is the case that all possible real world system are imperfect.

Then by saying some criminality may be optimal I mean that it may be that the possible real world systems nearest to perfection include some criminality.

It has to be vague because the concepts of 'nearest' is vague.

chez

[RoundGuy]

[ QUOTE ]
Nope, I'm good. I follow chez just fine.

[/ QUOTE ]
Really? Please translate the following:

[[[[ "Its a bit vague but suppose we have some shared concept of a perfect system and it is the case that all possible real wolld system are imperfect. ... Then by saying some criminality may be optimal I mean that it may be that the possible real world systems nearest to perfection include some criminality. ... It has to be vague because the concepts of 'nearest' is vague. ... ]]]]]]

If you can do so -- you are a far greater mind than I ...

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Nope, I'm good. I follow chez just fine.

[/ QUOTE ]
Really? Please translate the following:

[[[[ "Its a bit vague but suppose we have some shared concept of a perfect system and it is the case that all possible real wolld system are imperfect. ... Then by saying some criminality may be optimal I mean that it may be that the possible real world systems nearest to perfection include some criminality. ... It has to be vague because the concepts of 'nearest' is vague. ... ]]]]]]

If you can do so -- you are a far greater mind than I ...

[/ QUOTE ]
'wolld' should have been 'world'. Sorry for any confusion.

chez

[RoundGuy]

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'wolld' should have been 'world'. Sorry for any confusion.

[/ QUOTE ]
Yep, that cleared it up. Thanks. [and they call me silly....]

[chezlaw]

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'wolld' should have been 'world'. Sorry for any confusion.

[/ QUOTE ]
Yep, that cleared it up. Thanks. [and they call me silly....]

[/ QUOTE ]
Your welcome. Why would anyone call you silly?

chez

[RoundGuy]

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You're welcome. Why would anyone call you silly?

[/ QUOTE ]
Fixed your error. Only stupid people call me silly.

[chezlaw]

[ QUOTE ]
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You're welcome. Why would anyone call you silly?

[/ QUOTE ]
Fixed your error.

[/ QUOTE ]
well done.

Now we've cleared that up, what's your view on criminality in optimal imperfect systems?

chez

[RoundGuy]

[ QUOTE ]
Now we've cleared that up, what's your view on criminality in optimal imperfect systems?

[/ QUOTE ]
#1 = murder
#2 = murder

What's your view?

[MaxWeiss]

In this instance, it's still close enough and it is basically the same situation. I would randomly pull one and still pick one over five. I see what you are getting at, and you are right---as the situation branches out more and more and everybody ends up involved, then everybody is "involved" but not really. HOWEVER that is a hypothetical extrapolation and in reality as the situation branched out further, the core of the problem would likely still center around the main five and potentially some other small number of people. All of society is not going to happen to be walking on X number of tracks. So the situation in any practical scenario is still enclosed, IMHO.

The guy in scenario 2 represents an arbitrary member of society in a place where all members of society go at some point and is not implicitly involved. Five people on a train track is an uncommon situation and hence enclosed. My point in the first post was not that 5 people outweigh one, but that the circumstances dictate when sacrificing one is acceptable. In the latter scenario, the psychological damage and civil unrest in a society where 5 ALWAYS outweighs 1 does more damage than the uncommon occurance where one person is sacrificed but another (arbitrary) person on the same tracks has no expectation of being sacrificed.

The specific circumstances and moral obligations to the minority in everyday situations make the cases separate.

Good point though. I understand what you are saying, and admittedly my view is a bit of a stretch, but I stand by it.

[Ben K]

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Balls. I'd actually read scenario 1 in the past and followed it with the slight change to make it into scenario 2. A Woodside pointed them it out a few posts earlier.

Thing was I couldn't quite remember how it all worked through and balls'd it up. The 1 dying in scenario 1 is just unlucky as it's the sidetrack that saves the 5, the 1 dying in scenario 2 is murder as it's his organs that save the 5. I.e. the post of mine you quoted was utter [censored]. Hope this is clearer.

[/ QUOTE ]

I'm with you on this distinction, and its one thats been made and called important by several people. But to me it isn't quite that cut and dried, although it is extremely important to me, as it pertains to my ethical beliefs on several other topics (abortion for one).

In scenario 1, we can say that the death is an unavoidable but unintended side-effect of saving the 5 lives, in that it is the switching which saves the lives, not the 'train hitting the poor sap.' I'm with you so far. But now, in scenario 2, we are no longer able to say this? Why? It isn't the murder of the poor sap that is saving these peoples lives...that is an unavoidable, but unintended, consequence of removing his organs. We can remove his organs in such a way that he does not immediately die, but he will inexorably die as a result of our actions. But it is the removal of his organs that save the lives. I know there is a distinction here, but it isn't as obvious to me as it apparently is to others. We can understand removing blood as not killing someone, we can understand removing kidneys as not killing someone, even if these procedures do sometimes lead to a death. And we've established that it isn't the CERTAINTY of his death that matters, since the death is certain in both scenarios. What is it about 'removing organs' that is different than 'flipping a switch?'

[/ QUOTE ]

When you're flicking a switch the only people involved are you and the switch and your decision is final.

When you're removing organs, the organ owner is involved and his opinion on keeping his organs is, at least, equal to that of you, the organ taker.

This is the difference.