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David Sklansky
11-26-2006, 06:48 PM
There are two main problems with Pascal's wager. You can't control what you believe. And the God you believe in (for instance the one who had a son named Jesus) may not only be the wrong God, but exactly the "god" that the real "God" would be furious at you for believing in. Theists and atheists alike are aware of these flaws.

But the Sklansky-Pascal wager doesn't have these obvious problems. It postulates a tiny but finite chance that there is some sort of consciousness after death (or alternatively the attoseconds before death last forever to you) and that this eternity of time is spent thinking about woulda coulda shouldas. And reminiscing about the good times. Or perhaps just reliving your life over and over again. (This actually could sort of be tested by asking those few poor people who have "locked in syndrome")

If this is even a slight possibility, (and if we commonsensically eliminate the technical possibility that life after death experiences are somehow the opposite of how we lived our lives), how can it not be correct to live your life as if it was true? EV speaking.

Speedlimits
11-26-2006, 07:06 PM
[ QUOTE ]
There are two main problems with Pascal's wager. You can't control what you believe. And the God you believe in (for instance the one who had a son named Jesus) may not only be the wrong God, but exactly the "god" that the real "God" would be furious at you for believing in. Theists and atheists alike are aware of these flaws.

But the Sklansky-Pascal wager doesn't have these obvious problems. It postulates a tiny but finite chance that there is some sort of consciousness after death (or alternatively the attoseconds before death last forever to you) and that this eternity of time is spent thinking about woulda coulda shouldas. And reminiscing about the good times. Or perhaps just reliving your life over and over again. (This actually could sort of be tested by asking those few poor people who have "locked in syndrome")

If this is even a slight possibility, (and if we commonsensically eliminate the technical possibility that life after death experiences are somehow the opposite of how we lived our lives), how can it not be correct to live your life as if it was true? EV speaking.

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You just said you cannot control what you believe. So if someone argues that the probability of this to be true is so low it is miniscule. How can you legitimately ask this question? I could not adopt this philosophy or "wager" into my own life because there is no evidence of it.

The notion that this wager is valid because there is a small probability of it being true follows the same logic as theists.

The burden of proof is on the affirmative. We do not assume something as complex as the reliving of our life over and over again. Just because our life would be better if we followed some far fetched theory doesn't make it true.

Truth not comfort, is the ultimate goal.

chezlaw
11-26-2006, 07:21 PM
Sounds on the right lines to me and approaches chezlaw's wager which is that we should act in the way you believe to be right (chezlaw's wager has the advantage of not requiring an afterlife and sounding more like a law)

The problem with Shoulda's (unless you mean should behave in the way you believe to be right) is that in most important decisions both sides contain a shoulda e.g.I shoulda had that great sex vs I shoulda stayed faithful. do you get to relive the great sex or the regrets you went through afterwards?

If no god then maybe its determined by our sense of guilt self-worth etc. (better not be Rimmer playing better-than-life).

chez

BPA234
11-26-2006, 08:29 PM
"Truth not comfort, is the ultimate goal." For me, that is as right as it gets.

chezlaw
11-26-2006, 09:01 PM
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"Truth not comfort, is the ultimate goal." For me, that is as right as it gets.

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but that makes no difference to the PS wager or chezlaw's law which are about how to live your life.

It comes down to making decisions and if you believe that you shoulda make a decision to put truth above comfort e.g spend the day in the lab rather than at the beach then that's what you shoulda do.

Its not about believing something with no reason to believe its true, but doing what you believe you should.

chez

chrisnice
11-26-2006, 10:03 PM
[ QUOTE ]


But the Sklansky-Pascal wager doesn't have these obvious problems. It postulates a tiny but finite chance that there is some sort of consciousness after death (or alternatively the attoseconds before death last forever to you) and that this eternity of time is spent thinking about woulda coulda shouldas. And reminiscing about the good times. Or perhaps just reliving your life over and over again. (This actually could sort of be tested by asking those few poor people who have "locked in syndrome")

....how can it not be correct to live your life as if it was true? EV speaking.

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If there is no reward or punishment and merely a replaying of your life, I dont see how any EV calculation even comes in to play. It offers no incentive to change behavior. Say you like to murder and rape. With Pascals wager, despite the obv flaws, there is an incentive to stop raping and killing in hopes of avoiding eternal suffering.

What would be the point of living your life as though the Sklansky/Pascal is true? If you like to rape and murder thats just what you do since you would get to relive it over and over.

RJT
11-26-2006, 10:04 PM
[ QUOTE ]
…But the Sklansky-Pascal wager doesn't have these obvious problems. It postulates a tiny but finite chance that there is some sort of consciousness after death …

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This part is fine (although, I think it more than a tiny chance - but, that is immaterial to your question.)

The problem seems to be in the following part:

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…and that this eternity of time is spent thinking about woulda coulda shouldas. And reminiscing about the good times. Or perhaps just reliving your life over and over again…

[/ QUOTE ]

(Btw, I have similar notions as your example relative to heaven/hell. )


Here, you are taking one possibility and locking into that choice. One could easily take another idea for this second part and then go on to say the rest of your wager:

[ QUOTE ]
…If this is even a slight possibility… how can it not be correct to live your life as if it was true? EV speaking.

[/ QUOTE ]

So, rewording your wager, we have:

But the Sklansky-Pascal wager doesn't have these obvious problems. It postulates a tiny but finite chance that there is some sort of consciousness after death. And that this eternity is based on X.

If this is even a slight possibility… how can it not be correct to live your life as if it X were true? EV speaking.

Where X is any of a number of ideas.

I think you are on the right track. The key is to narrow down X to as few a number of ideas that could possibly make sense. Once we have X down to a relatively manageable number, we can then compare that to what we know in Science.

For example, if the Universe started with the Big Bang then does it make sense that there was a creator, a prime mover, to get the party going? I think this might be a possibility for part of X. Then we say, why would such a prime mover start anything? What would his motives be? Is any of this comprehensible to us now, with our limited intelligence? We then plug in some more ideas here for X.


So, we can say for example that X = there is a Prime Mover and he created the mass that the Big Bang started with. He did this because he was bored out of his skull and just wanted to see where it would go.


Another example would be: X = there is a Prime Mover and he created the mass that the Big Bang started with. In this mass he plugged in some codes that would eventually lead to beings with some intelligence. He wants to see if they can become smart enough to figure out the key to unlock his Operating System. If they figure it out, they can come hang with him in his domain. If they have any sense, they should treat each other well so that their species lasts long enough and evolves enough intellect to figure out this key.

We can see a number of possibilities that can be plugged into X in your wager. Thus,

1)One can live one's life as if the possibility of X exists and it might matter. He then tries to figure out the value of X.

2)decides that there is no way that any X idea makes sense, or

3)shrugs his shoulders and says “I’ll never know, so I can’t be bothered with it.”

BigBuffet
11-26-2006, 11:41 PM
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It postulates a tiny but finite chance that there is some sort of consciousness after death (or alternatively the attoseconds before death last forever to you)...

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I almost died three times. The first two I totally lost consciousness. I had no feeling, no pain, no thoughts. I didn't see a white light, dead people, angels or g-d. Nada.

As far as I know there is nothing after this life, so I would go along with chezlaw:

[ QUOTE ]
...approaches chezlaw's wager, which is that we should act in the way we believe to be right (chezlaw's wager has the advantage of not requiring an afterlife and sounding more like a law)


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In other words, if you are sane, you will do what you believe to be right. If you are not, you will do ill with no choice (barring medical or legal intervention).

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and that this eternity of time is spent thinking about woulda coulda shouldas.

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What sense would that make?

One fault I've always had with the reincarnation believers is: What is the point of reincarneation if we don't have the recollection of past life successes and mistakes to learn from?

Based on that and my two near-death's I reject the concepts of reincarnation, heaven and hell.

moorobot
11-26-2006, 11:53 PM
The biggest problem I've always had with Pascal's wager is: What kind of god would admit a person who only forced themselves into beliving in go for selfish gains (i.e. to get into the afterlife paradise) into the afterlife paradise?

SBR
11-27-2006, 12:21 AM
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But the Sklansky-Pascal wager doesn't have these obvious problems.

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Yes it does. If we grant a slight possibility that we relive our life after we die we must also grant a slight possibility that only people who don't believe in reliving life get to relive their lives.