John Kilduff
11-07-2006, 10:19 AM
Example of a God Paradox:
"If God is all-powerful, can God create a rock so heavy he can't lift it? If he is all powerful he must be able to do so, but if he does that then he can't lift it, and if he can't lift it then he is not all-powerful."
Answer: If God is actually all-powerful then he ought to be able to supersede the laws of logic, space and time. How he might do this or whether we can understand it, is not the point. The point is that to be truly "all-powerful", God ought to be able to do seemingly impossible things. Heck throw out the "seemingly"--to be truly all-powerful, God ought to be able to do impossible things. Otherwise, God's power is limited by what is possible, so he couldn't rightly be called "all-powerful." But if we deem the "all-powerful" a given pre-condition, as the Paradox does, then nothing is impossible for God--not even the impossible. In fact the condition "impossible" would exist only at the whim or allowance of God (since the Paradox first deems God to be all-powerful). Once the Paradox deems God to be all-powerful, anything the Paradox later asks God to do, God must be able to do--even were it to require superseding the laws of mathematics.
One might well argue that there is no reason the term "all-powerful" should be given more weight than the term "impossible." But the Paradox first ascribes omnipotence to God and then proceeds from there.
Other God Paradoxes might be meaningless for similar reasons.
Is this a trite discussion? Maybe so, but if so, not more trite than the paradox itself.
"If God is all-powerful, can God create a rock so heavy he can't lift it? If he is all powerful he must be able to do so, but if he does that then he can't lift it, and if he can't lift it then he is not all-powerful."
Answer: If God is actually all-powerful then he ought to be able to supersede the laws of logic, space and time. How he might do this or whether we can understand it, is not the point. The point is that to be truly "all-powerful", God ought to be able to do seemingly impossible things. Heck throw out the "seemingly"--to be truly all-powerful, God ought to be able to do impossible things. Otherwise, God's power is limited by what is possible, so he couldn't rightly be called "all-powerful." But if we deem the "all-powerful" a given pre-condition, as the Paradox does, then nothing is impossible for God--not even the impossible. In fact the condition "impossible" would exist only at the whim or allowance of God (since the Paradox first deems God to be all-powerful). Once the Paradox deems God to be all-powerful, anything the Paradox later asks God to do, God must be able to do--even were it to require superseding the laws of mathematics.
One might well argue that there is no reason the term "all-powerful" should be given more weight than the term "impossible." But the Paradox first ascribes omnipotence to God and then proceeds from there.
Other God Paradoxes might be meaningless for similar reasons.
Is this a trite discussion? Maybe so, but if so, not more trite than the paradox itself.