Terminology, Free Will, and 'Act as if'

[Cerril]

From a prior post, Madnak replied to my comment.
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I'm assuming a free will because I feel like I have one. All signs point to 'no' on that matter, but it isn't going to change how I act, so I find the discussion itself to have little significance on my actions (not to say that I don't enjoy the discussion). I assume you see what I'm getting at.[ QUOTE ]



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If all signs point to "no," it's difficult to discuss human actions in the context of free will. I don't think free will is a useful way to classify human action, regardless of whether it exists.

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The question I have then, is if we can establish that free will does not exist or likely does not exist, and that we live in a deterministic universe, what sort of terminology should we use to describe the appearance of choices, suggestions, imperatives, and other situations that must allow for some freedom to choose between alternatives?

I tend to use the terminology of free will in daily life because I feel as if I have the freedom to make choices, whether or not I actually do. I also cannot justify failing to condemn people for their actions

{slight pause for commentary, I have in the past mentioned a disciplinary/justice system that treated all actions as necessary on the part of the agent, and as such is focused more on preventative and restraining measures than punishment or deterrence. Obviously in such a system the major important factors are keeping a crime from being committed and preventing the individual from committing any further crimes.}

The term I used for this (and have mentioned this in the past) is 'act as if.' That is, a philosophical argument/dilemma/problem is an 'act as if' situation if we are incapable of acting in a way that corresponds with the likely 'truth.' Examples include:

- It is impossible to have certain or even strongly probable knowledge of anything.

- We are not justified in predicting the future based on the past (we have no reason to believe, strictly speaking, that the future will resemble the past)

- We do not have free will, our actions are either determined or random.

- There is no reason to believe that the language I am speaking has any meaning to you remotely like the meaning it holds to me.

- I cannot demonstrably prove or have it proven to me that the world, other people, or anything that I sense exists outside my own mind.

Now, there are a number of pro and con arguments and while they're interesting, they all fall (to me) into the category of 'act as if.' No matter what I may find to be true, I am going to be speaking with the assumption that there are other people, and that they do hear and understand me, and that their replies will have meaning to me. I will also assume that my own feelings and apparent choices have force, and that I am responsible for my actions and could choose to act or not act in a given way. I take everything from probabilities to the reality of the ground and air, to the laws of physics to be true and act accordingly (i.e. some things I believe to be safe, and some dangerous, and I can differentiate between them. If I want a given outcome, there are ways to make that more likely through my actions).

All of these things, to me, are philosophical trivialities. They have spurred very in depth and heated discussions, but in the end everyone on both sides of the fence acts as if there were a given outcome (depending on the question) and not necessarily the one they were arguing for.

So one question here is: provided we are all acting in the manner I described, is there a better terminology to conduct these debates in? Would the truth of them going against our beliefs have any positive impact on our actions despite our perception to the contrary?

Anything else along this vein, anything I'm missing the point on completely?

[madnak]

I don't see why the current terminology doesn't apply to a deterministic world. "Free will" and "will" are two very different things. I have will, I make choices, etc. There is nothing in determinism that precludes this. The only implication is that when I make a choice, I do so for a reason (or based on randomness).

I don't understand where "act as if" is relevant to the original point. If certainty is impossible, then all actions are based on unverifiable assumptions, therefore in any action we take we must "act as if" those assumptions are true. How is this relevant to determinism?

It is, in any case, impossible to "act as if" I have free will, as free will by definition indicates action without cause. In a deterministic universe, there is a reason for all my actions, and it's meaningless to say "act as if there's no reason for your actions." I suppose if I'm trying to look insane I might act in random or erratic ways, but that doesn't correspond to "free will" either. I suppose that since free will represents apparent randomness, you could say that to "act as if" I have free will is to act randomly, because that will result in action with the same indicators that action based on free will would have. But that's also meaningless, because the apparent randomness of free will is by definition not actual randomness, and therefore acting randomly isn't the same as "acting as if" I have free will.

[Andrew Karpinski]

There is no possible way for free will to exist.

Hope I cleared this up for you.

[HedonismBot]

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There is no possible way for free will to exist.

Hope I cleared this up for you.

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Go on

[Metric]

Possibility: "Free will" is just the statement that my large-scale actions hinge on some extremely subtle (and very often non-predictable due to complexity -- though fundamentally deterministic) chemical processing of info (thoughts) in my brain.

Maybe trivial or maybe wrong, but this is philosophy -- who can tell?

[madnak]

That's not free will.

[Lestat]

I still say free will exists... From everything I've read, since the last discussion on here about Free Will Vs. Determinism, it's mostly agreed that randomness does in fact exist at the quantum level.

[Lestat]

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There is no possible way for free will to exist.

Hope I cleared this up for you.

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Why not? What if randomness exists? Why would free will be impossible?

[chezlaw]

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I still say free will exists... From everything I've read, since the last discussion on here about Free Will Vs. Determinism, it's mostly agreed that randomness does in fact exist at the quantum level.

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but its also been shown that such randomness is equivalent to a deterministic system and so can't be significant.

Also, doing stuff at random is not free will.

chez

[Lestat]

The only argument that came close to convincing me of a deterministic world was the fact that there is no such thing as randomness. That is, the big bang occured and started a causal chain in where everything that occurs is based on an antededent event. Of course, this makes sense. You break a rack of billiard balls and it appears to be chaotic, yet the final outcome can be no other way.

However, the presence of randomness (to me at least), means a non-deterministic universe. This is because there is more than one possible outcome for any given event. At least this appears to be the case on a molecular level. If my day tomorrow has more than one possible outcome then my actions also have a chance to affect those outcomes.

[madnak]

Quantum randomness provides a possible mechanism for free will, that's all.

[Lestat]

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Quantum randomness provides a possible mechanism for free will, that's all.

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That's good enough for me. I really had a hard time dealing with a deterministic world, but it was really starting to make sense to me. Since a definitive answer isn't forthcoming and there's a chance for free will, I'll choose to have faith in free will.

[chezlaw]

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However, the presence of randomness (to me at least), means a non-deterministic universe. This is because there is more than one possible outcome for any given event. At least this appears to be the case on a molecular level. If my day tomorrow has more than one possible outcome then my actions also have a chance to affect those outcomes.

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Imagine you have a random world in which free will exists meaningfully. Logically an identical deterministic world could exist and the free-will would still be there.

Hence, if determism and free will are incompatible then randomness can't help.

chez

[madnak]

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Logically an identical deterministic world could exist and the free-will would still be there.

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If free will is meaningful in the original world, then it's logically impossible for an identical deterministic world to exist. Free will can never be physically meaningful, it's a metaphysical construct. So a series of physical coincidences can't be considered a duplication of free will.

This is like the concept of a philosophical zombie. Just because the zombie is identical to a "real" person in every measurable and observable way doesn't necessarily mean the zombie is in fact a "real" person.

[chezlaw]

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If free will is meaningful in the original world, then it's logically impossible for an identical deterministic world to exist. Free will can never be physically meaningful, it's a metaphysical construct. So a series of physical coincidences can't be considered a duplication of free will.

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Exactly. So if the phenomena of quantum randomness is compatible with a deterministic world then is can't be helpful in providing free-will.

chez

[madnak]

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So if the phenomena of quantum randomness is compatible with a deterministic world then is can't be helpful in providing free-will.

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But neither can it disprove free will, like other more causal theories would.

[carlo]

Determinism has relagated free will to the idea of choice of which such as Spinoza has said that even though we act as we will we are much like a thrown stone which is stateing to himself that he chooses to fly , having no knowledge of the thrower. All perspectives of free will give credence to the idea of the unknowing doer. Examples are placement into our body(free?),state,clan,religion,etc. of which we are born into or enter into unknowingly. This is tantamount to saying that the fish does not care for the water.

But there is the question of the "knowing doer". Man, in his activity, may choose to perform an act under the aegis of qualities such as duty, convention, laws of the state, religious credo, etc. in which he is not acting freely. Implicit in this is the cognitive understanding of why the action comes about is not clear to the doer. But the "knowing doer" performs his act with complete understanding as to why and how he acts. He need no outer enforcement as to source of his actions. So we are all acting unfreely in so far as we place our activities under the law of a "higher power" whether it again is duty, state, creed,etc. The "knowing doer" knows no enfoecement in this sense and acts out of pure thought and performs the action of his own volition(free will). He has made the judgement and acts accordingly.

An objection may be that a criminal may perform a henious crime and that he is acting in free will. That the performance of this henious act is "free" is a falsehood. In consideration of acts such as this the state of the doer must be considered. Acting under the aegis of passion, vengence, envy, etc. is not a free act and careful consideration will prove this to be so. And in fact this type of activity is performed under the most clouded of consciousness.

We are all acting freely and unfreely in our lives and the more we take on the mores of another the more unfree we become. This is not to say that one should break the laws of the state, or creed,etc. but the "knowing doer" cognizes the particular more he is acting under and will reason to the validity of the law. The "knowing doer" comes to complete cognizant clarity to a maxim such as "thou shall not kill" and acts accordingly.

Of course it may be apparent to some that the idea of "free will" lives in the moral sphere and in fact is what morality is all about. What are the tenets of the human race but the maxims of "knowing doers" brought to others in their time. The laws of the land, commandments of the spirit, social conventions and thoughts are all the result of human beings as knowing doers and therefore acting freely. In this sense the movements of nations,religions, creeds, are a history of human morality as what we are seeing is the evolution of morals which are being brought to the world by human beings acting in freedom.

Free Will is not a fixed state given to us like our daily food but that which each individual man works for in the human future.

carlo

[chezlaw]

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So if the phenomena of quantum randomness is compatible with a deterministic world then is can't be helpful in providing free-will.

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But neither can it disprove free will, like other more causal theories would.

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Yes. I have been trying to make it clear that it just doesn't make any difference.

Either determinism and free-will are compatible or something other than quantum randomness is required.

chez

[Andrew Karpinski]

Ok.

Free will, is in essence, having a choice between options. This is the heart of the matter, that if you have 'free will' all of a sudden you can choose whether or not you are going to smoke, or eat fast food, or have sex with animals. On the surface this looks obvious. We've all had to make tough decisions etc.

What makes our decisions? Leaving metaphysics and religion out of this for the moment, I think it is safe to say our brain makes our decisions. If our brain was made in a different form than it currently is, i.e. if you had a big whole in the middle you wouldn't be making the same decisions. Well, you'd be dead. And not making decisions at all. But if your brain was slightly different, you would probably make slightly different decisions. The point is you're not making a choice. Your decisions are a product of your genetics and your enviroment; every single factor in your life that you have ever experienced leads up to your actions. This is what makes your decisions, not some mysterious free will.

Think of it in this manner :
Situation A : I am sitting on my computer, typing out my response, and decide light up a cigarette. Ahhh... welcome to flavour country.

Now, situation B : We have a model universe, exactly the same as the first one to every single degree, including time etc. Everything is exactly the same. I am sitting on my computer, writing up this response. Can I possibly not light up a cigarrete? How? What could decide for me to not do that, aside from my brain (which controls my actions). My brain is exactly the same as in the first example (obv. I have no memory of it happening the 'first' time because everything is exactly the same), so what could possibly have changed?

The answer is nothing. Free will is a glorious illusion.

[chezlaw]

I think its even simpler than that. Those who wants to rgue for free-will cant even say what they mean. There's always an attempt to introduce some random element (because determinism is considered anti-free-will) but randomness is a removal of will altogther.

Its not so much an illuion as a misnomer. Free-will is the ability of a person to act freely according to their will. It doesn't matter that their will is determined for them by some rich deterministic unplanned history.

chez

[atrifix]

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Quantum randomness provides a possible mechanism for free will, that's all.

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That's good enough for me. I really had a hard time dealing with a deterministic world, but it was really starting to make sense to me. Since a definitive answer isn't forthcoming and there's a chance for free will, I'll choose to have faith in free will.

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How does randomness (leaving quantum out of it) provide a mechanism for free will? It seems to me that randomness provides even less of an opportunity for free will.

[madnak]

Apparent randomness could be the manifestation of outside "forces" such as free will.