Altruism and self-destruction

[Cerril]

A question within a thread asking 'is there such thing as human action motivated by anything except self-interest' got me thinking...

No. Maybe.

The answer to 'is it possible to redefine every motivation in a self-interested way' the answer is (as far as I can tell) yes.

On the other hand, people do things for apparently altruistic reasons that have no real way to be demonstrably beneficial to the individual. The cynic (and I put myself here) would say that these people are at some level deceived or deceiving themselves about their gain versus cost, and I'm not yet bringing in conception of otherworldly gain.

Without going overboard, there are a lot of motivations that if right make a huge class of actions self-interested if true (anything 'good' that will make you more likely to get some eternal reward) and poorly judged if false.

Still it's hard to really classify self-destructive actions to save others in those instances where the thought of some afterlife isn't present. If I save you at the cost of my own life (or if I save a thousand people), how can I rephrase that in a way that looks self-interested without it seeming tortured. You have a couple options:

1) "I wouldn't be able to live with myself..." This one seems a little difficult to buy, that somehow the guilt of failing to act would negate all of the positives attached to 'life.'

2) "I wasn't thinking..." Not too likely to 'hear' this one, but it might be the last thought running through the guy's head as he is made abruptly aware of the truth of his mortality. That a person isn't willing to accept that an action is fatal allows them to have selfish motives, if incorrectly.

3) "Making up for a life of wrongdoing..." and similar answers, this and #1 also fall into the category of suicide, where the manner of death really has very little impact on the simple fact that you are, indeed, going to perish.

4) Insanity. Plain and simple, there is no way to justify a self-destructively altruistic action in a rational way, and so any such action is the result of confusion or poor judgement.

So if we so choose, all actions are motivated by either self-interest (well-informed or not) or insanity. There are a lot of ways to go in this conversation at this point, I think. Or do you (all) feel this is too flat a topic for further investigation?

[Andrew Karpinski]

Once, at a store, I bought the pop for the guy standing behind me.

[DougShrapnel]

[ QUOTE ]
1) "I wouldn't be able to live with myself..." This one seems a little difficult to buy, that somehow the guilt of failing to act would negate all of the positives attached to 'life.'

[/ QUOTE ] This is probably a good example. I imagine this type of rationale is important when people save loved ones at great risk to themselves. Their life would ve so ruined at the loss of a loved one. As for strangers, I'm not really to sure that this rational takes place often, without the rescuer/sacraficer placing some value in the rescuee. For instance A grown man saving a little girl at the expense of his life.

[ QUOTE ]
2) "I wasn't thinking..." Not too likely to 'hear' this one, but it might be the last thought running through the guy's head as he is made abruptly aware of the truth of his mortality. That a person isn't willing to accept that an action is fatal allows them to have selfish motives, if incorrectly.

3) "Making up for a life of wrongdoing..." and similar answers, this and #1 also fall into the category of suicide, where the manner of death really has very little impact on the simple fact that you are, indeed, going to perish.


[/ QUOTE ] I don't really understand.

[ QUOTE ]
4) Insanity. Plain and simple, there is no way to justify a self-destructively altruistic action in a rational way, and so any such action is the result of confusion or poor judgement.


[/ QUOTE ] Insanity might be a bit to harsh of a word.

[ QUOTE ]
So if we so choose, all actions are motivated by either self-interest (well-informed or not) or insanity. There are a lot of ways to go in this conversation at this point, I think. Or do you (all) feel this is too flat a topic for further investigation?


[/ QUOTE ] Like where? How about that people can be concered with others as a matter of self-interest?

[Cerril]

Well I'm specificially discussing self-destructive actions here. I take it for granted that most altruistic actions can be rephrased very easily in a personal value sense, where the feeling of having done something contributes more to your overall happiness than any other possible action in that scenario. The reason I hold the door open for the person behind me is because I feel good.

That was what I meant by it being easy to rephrase almost every action in terms of self interest, and focused on the case of self-destructive actions (and I don't mean merely harmful, I am referring to ones that result in your death), because there is zero gain for the individual after the action itself (barring an afterlife, which is why I restricted the discussion to situations where the individual has no belief in an afterlife or does not factor that in to his motivation), since he no longer exists.

Yes, insanity is probably too harsh, delusion or deception might be better, but I mean something that is pervasive and drastically changes the conception of value or which causes the individual to ignore obvious reality (such as impending death).

For 1), loved ones was exactly what I was thinking of. This may fall into a misconception and some psychological issues regarding immediacy (not only that you have to choose NOW, but that the choice takes on greater importance when it's happening at the moment), where the person overvalues the impact their loved one has on their life to the point where they decide that their life would have no worth without them in it, so better to save them then not save them -and- be miserable. But it adds the question whether there's a reason to rephrase the motivation in that manner just because we can, or if we're stretching things just to fit a framework.

Regarding 2) and 3), I was more or less throwing out possible motives that wouldn't stand up terribly well. The suicide comparison is just that someone decides that their current 'net worth' is negative and that they are going to be happier (substitute whatever value term you want here), overall, not existing than continuing to exist. The manner in which they go (saving someone, whatever) is not necessarily relevant. 2) directly falls under the delusion category. A person can do something immediately fatal without being willing to accept that it is going to get them killed. That's what I mean by 'I didn't know...' - just an unwillingness to accept the consequences of your action, and only looking at the benefit (for yourself or others)

[atrifix]

How about kamikaze bees that sacrifice themselves for the good of their nest? It seems wrong to characterize their actions as "insane", and I don't think there is any evidence to suspect that bees believe in an afterlife.

I am always worried about this just collapsing into "people prefer to do what they prefer to do". For the claim to be substantive, it can't be tautologous.

[DougShrapnel]

Ok, I believe to understand you, what are the different directions a conversation that can take place. If you are going where I think you are going. I think you are going to need to establish a very limited view of self, in order to say what I think you might be getting at. If you are going someplace else I think I understand enough for you to continue.

[moorobot]

self-interest is still a very bad way to characterize and explain so many behaviors.

It would be more accurate to say most of human action is a due to reciprocal altruism as well as 'inter family altruism' and adherence to social norms. These things 'cause' our utility functions, at the very least. So while self-interest may be the proximate cause it is definitely not the ultimate cause.

[ QUOTE ]
4) Insanity. Plain and simple, there is no way to justify a self-destructively altruistic action in a rational way, and so any such action is the result of confusion or poor judgement.

[/ QUOTE ] I think you can justify throwing yourself on a grenade to save dozens of people. Either that is 'self-destructive' or nothing is.

[pilliwinks]

Seems to me that the 'everything is self-interest' argument suffers from post hoc ergo propter hoc. Ie, because we observe a satisfying outcome, we reason that this must be the cause of the action. One follows the other, so it must cause the other. When you state it like that, it's an obvious logical fallacy. I think it applies when people attribute selfish motives to superficially (and indeed I suspect fundamentally) altruistic acts.

[madnak]

[ QUOTE ]
A question within a thread asking 'is there such thing as human action motivated by anything except self-interest' got me thinking...

No. Maybe.

The answer to 'is it possible to redefine every motivation in a self-interested way' the answer is (as far as I can tell) yes.

On the other hand, people do things for apparently altruistic reasons that have no real way to be demonstrably beneficial to the individual. The cynic (and I put myself here) would say that these people are at some level deceived or deceiving themselves about their gain versus cost, and I'm not yet bringing in conception of otherworldly gain.

Without going overboard, there are a lot of motivations that if right make a huge class of actions self-interested if true (anything 'good' that will make you more likely to get some eternal reward) and poorly judged if false.

Still it's hard to really classify self-destructive actions to save others in those instances where the thought of some afterlife isn't present. If I save you at the cost of my own life (or if I save a thousand people), how can I rephrase that in a way that looks self-interested without it seeming tortured.

[/ QUOTE ]

You've already made a large number of assumptions. Exactly what do you mean by "benefit" and "gain," why is that the standard you use, and where do you draw the lines? So far you seem to have used three contradictory standards - that of happiness, that of survival, and that of gene propagation. The third would be most relevant IMO, and is pretty easily explained. An individual organism may very well sacrifice its own physical life or happiness in order to ensure the continued survival of its genome. This makes perfect sense according to current evolutionary theory.

[ QUOTE ]
You have a couple options:

1) "I wouldn't be able to live with myself..." This one seems a little difficult to buy, that somehow the guilt of failing to act would negate all of the positives attached to 'life.'

[/ QUOTE ]

Here you express one of your biggest assumptions: that life is inherently desirable. You won't be able to back that up. If the EV of my life is negative, then suicide is the course dictated by rational self-interest. Regardless of whether any "sacrifice" presents itself.

Suicide is the eighth-leading cause of death overall, the third-leading cause of death among youth, and the second-leading preventable cause of death in the United States. It happens frequently enough to be a relevant behavioral strategy.

[ QUOTE ]
2) "I wasn't thinking..." Not too likely to 'hear' this one, but it might be the last thought running through the guy's head as he is made abruptly aware of the truth of his mortality. That a person isn't willing to accept that an action is fatal allows them to have selfish motives, if incorrectly.

[/ QUOTE ]

There's a common idea that people are perfectly rational. It's false. People are often total idiots. The human brain, despite being the most adaptive mechanism in existence, constantly bumps into situations it can't handle. In an extremely unfamiliar situation, the brain may simply freeze up - this is a very common response to crisis situations, that may actually be a "feature" similar to playing dead, but it certainly doesn't represent a consciously self-interested action. If the brain doesn't get paralyzed, it falls back on general patterns it's learned for dealing with similar situations. These general patterns may or may not apply to the relevant situation. And sometimes the brain functions on pure instinct, which is a very unstable strategy in many situations.

All of these mechanisms might result in actions that are perceived as "self-destructive." There was once a man who dived into a hot spring to save a dog. His flesh melted off and he died. As he was dying he explained that he regretted his decision to jump into the pool. He probably acted on an impulse.

[ QUOTE ]
4) Insanity. Plain and simple, there is no way to justify a self-destructively altruistic action in a rational way, and so any such action is the result of confusion or poor judgement.

[/ QUOTE ]

"Confusion or poor judgment?" Defined according to what standard? Even a clinical definition of insanity can't hold up to philosophical scrutiny.

[ QUOTE ]
So if we so choose, all actions are motivated by either self-interest (well-informed or not) or insanity.

[/ QUOTE ]

People are always trying to reduce biological mechanisms into philosophical principles. I don't believe it will ever work. If you want to call any action that can't be explained philosophically "insane," that's your prerogative of course. But it reduces the concept of insanity to a convenient slop bucket in which to toss everything that doesn't correspond to your approach.

[DougShrapnel]

[ QUOTE ]
It would be more accurate to say most of human action is a due to reciprocal altruism as well as 'inter family altruism' and adherence to social norms. These things 'cause' our utility functions, at the very least. So while self-interest may be the proximate cause it is definitely not the ultimate cause.


[/ QUOTE ] I'm pretty sure you have these backwards. Self-interest is the ultimate cause, and the social norms, reciprocal altruism, "inter family altursim' are the proximate cause.

[ QUOTE ]
I think you can justify throwing yourself on a grenade to save dozens of people. Either that is 'self-destructive' or nothing is.

[/ QUOTE ] Tons of justifiable reasons. You know that you being the closest will die anyways, so there is no additional harm to yourslef. You have been programmed to do what you are told in the military.

I have yet to see any example of pure alruism that wasn't better classified as a dysfunction rather than a merit. I find solace in that since it means that people are for the most part rational.

Somewhere along the way selfishness got a negative connotaion. There is no reason for us to limit our sense of self not to include those that we value and what we value. Alturism is irrational once we include our values and those that we value in our sense of self. It's a semantic game sure, I could just have easily defined altruism as two distinct entities. One where the alrtuist gains something of greater value for something of lessor value, and the other where the altruist sacrifices something of greater value for something of lessor value. One is rational, and if we extend our sense of self to our values, unessesary. The other is irrational, or "insane". I perfer to expand my sense of self, it appears that alot of people perfer not to. Perhaps it is a method of correcting those that are vain, concieted, or egocentric, or at the very least differentiate oneself from those that are only concered with self.

[atrifix]

[ QUOTE ]
So far you seem to have used three contradictory standards - that of happiness, that of survival, and that of gene propagation.

[/ QUOTE ]

It's not obvious to me that these are incompatible. They are not equivelant, however.

[ QUOTE ]
The third would be most relevant IMO, and is pretty easily explained. An individual organism may very well sacrifice its own physical life or happiness in order to ensure the continued survival of its genome. This makes perfect sense according to current evolutionary theory.

[/ QUOTE ]

Okay, this is entirely possible. If altruism is the neglect of a gene's survival in exchange for some other benefit, though, then there are a number of ways that altruism can evolve. I'm not up to date on current group evolutionary theory, but it's not hard to create an altruistic model.

[ QUOTE ]
Suicide is the eighth-leading cause of death overall, the third-leading cause of death among youth, and the second-leading preventable cause of death in the United States. It happens frequently enough to be a relevant behavioral strategy.

[/ QUOTE ]

The most interesting philosophical work on suicide that I have read, by far, is Durkheim's book by the same name.

[ QUOTE ]
All of these mechanisms might result in actions that are perceived as "self-destructive." There was once a man who dived into a hot spring to save a dog. His flesh melted off and he died. As he was dying he explained that he regretted his decision to jump into the pool. He probably acted on an impulse.

[/ QUOTE ]

I'd be interested in a citation for this. I agree that people are not always rational, though (and even not rational in general).

[ QUOTE ]
People are always trying to reduce biological mechanisms into philosophical principles. I don't believe it will ever work. If you want to call any action that can't be explained philosophically "insane," that's your prerogative of course. But it reduces the concept of insanity to a convenient slop bucket in which to toss everything that doesn't correspond to your approach.

[/ QUOTE ]

I agree with this. Presumably one could define insanity in terms of deleterious traits, but that approach seems to be misguided.

[madnak]

[ QUOTE ]
It's not obvious to me that these are incompatible. They are not equivelant, however.

[/ QUOTE ]

It's trivial to construct a hypothetical situation, at least, in which they contradict themselves. Personally I think such situations often arise in reality, but I don't think that's necessarily a worthwhile avenue to pursue.

[ QUOTE ]
Okay, this is entirely possible. If altruism is the neglect of a gene's survival in exchange for some other benefit, though, then there are a number of ways that altruism can evolve. I'm not up to date on current group evolutionary theory, but it's not hard to create an altruistic model.

[/ QUOTE ]

It might be possible, but it's selected against by definition.

[ QUOTE ]
I'd be interested in a citation for this.

[/ QUOTE ]

Here you go. (http://snopes.com/horrors/freakish/hotsprng.htm)

[Cerril]

To answer both (apologies Doug), this is sort of what was lurking behind my question. Obviously people and animals do things that don't seem to be entirely in keeping with a selfish attitude. It's also apparent that we can ascribe selfish motives to pretty much any action, though it requires some contorted logic to get there.

The behavior of animals we can easily chalk up to instinct or genetic behavior overriding the individual will (or a lack of 'will' as such).

But of course that does lead to possibly more interesting questions about what's sufficient for us to label it a motivation, and whether we're forced to declare all actions either originate with self interest or conditioning (genetic or upbringing) that lies beyond our control. And if that is the case, is it a failure of the will when we do things outside our own self interest? That certainly seems at odds with the accord we give altruism as a noble motive.

This is what I meant by taking things further than my initial comments.

[atrifix]

[ QUOTE ]
It's trivial to construct a hypothetical situation, at least, in which they contradict themselves. Personally I think such situations often arise in reality, but I don't think that's necessarily a worthwhile avenue to pursue.

[/ QUOTE ]

Well, there is a difference between a contradictory situation and mutually contradictory assumptions. I don't think that the assumptions are contradictory, although there are circumstances where some are satisfied and not others.

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
Okay, this is entirely possible. If altruism is the neglect of a gene's survival in exchange for some other benefit, though, then there are a number of ways that altruism can evolve. I'm not up to date on current group evolutionary theory, but it's not hard to create an altruistic model.

[/ QUOTE ]

It might be possible, but it's selected against by definition.

[/ QUOTE ]

There is a unit of selection problem here--although it may be selected against with respect to the gene, it may be selected for with respect to the group. I don't know much about group selection, but the selection for altruism should be entirely possible with this definition.

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
I'd be interested in a citation for this.

[/ QUOTE ]

Here you go. (http://snopes.com/horrors/freakish/hotsprng.htm)

[/ QUOTE ]

Thanks. That is certainly something.

[moorobot]

[ QUOTE ]

It would be more accurate to say most of human action is a due to reciprocal altruism as well as 'inter family altruism' and adherence to social norms. These things 'cause' our utility functions, at the very least. So while self-interest may be the proximate cause it is definitely not the ultimate cause.



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I'm pretty sure you have these backwards. Self-interest is the ultimate cause, and the social norms, reciprocal altruism, "inter family altursim' are the proximate cause.

[/ QUOTE ] I'm pretty sure evolutionary theory shows that I am correct.

The closest position to yours is that our genes are selfish; but that still makes us non-selfish creatures.

Self interested genes might have caused the social norms (etc.), and than self-interest (also caused by genes in part) dictates following them.
[ QUOTE ]

Tons of justifiable reasons. You know that you being the closest will die anyways, so there is no additional harm to yourslef. You have been programmed to do what you are told in the military.

I have yet to see any example of pure alruism that wasn't better classified as a dysfunction rather than a merit

[/ QUOTE ]
What if, as is often done, these things are done without thinking but instead in sudden reaction; and you haven't been 'programmed' to do it by anybody?

[ QUOTE ]
Somewhere along the way selfishness got a negative connotaion

[/ QUOTE ] At least in western thought, selfishness had a far, far more negative connotation 250 years ago. Adam Smith really was a trailblazer in arguing that selfishness is actually very useful in many situations.

He wrote a whole other book showing cases in which it was not, but that one isn't read by the economists who usually read "wealth of nations" (It's really good, Theory of the Moral Sentiments

[moorobot]

It seems that sucide is almost always irrational, based on what I know about it and the people who perform it and why they do it.

I find it funny that anybody thinks otherwise, actually. But hey, anything to uphold the theory!

[moorobot]

[ QUOTE ]

So far you seem to have used three contradictory standards - that of happiness, that of survival, and that of gene propagation.


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It's not obvious to me that these are incompatible. They are not equivelant, however.

[/ QUOTE ] But all three cannot be the ultimate cause of action.

The final one is incompatible with the first very, very often and occasionally is contrary to the second (e.g. kamikaze pilots, people who risk themselves to save a child, etc.).

[madnak]

[ QUOTE ]
To answer both (apologies Doug), this is sort of what was lurking behind my question. Obviously people and animals do things that don't seem to be entirely in keeping with a selfish attitude. It's also apparent that we can ascribe selfish motives to pretty much any action, though it requires some contorted logic to get there.

[/ QUOTE ]

I agree with you but I think that's very semantic; based on how we define "self-interest" we can make anything "self-interested" or "altruistic."

[ QUOTE ]
The behavior of animals we can easily chalk up to instinct or genetic behavior overriding the individual will (or a lack of 'will' as such).

[/ QUOTE ]

Humans aren't animals? As far as I can tell, animals have wills. I definitely wish my dogs weren't so willful.

[ QUOTE ]
But of course that does lead to possibly more interesting questions about what's sufficient for us to label it a motivation, and whether we're forced to declare all actions either originate with self interest or conditioning (genetic or upbringing) that lies beyond our control. And if that is the case, is it a failure of the will when we do things outside our own self interest? That certainly seems at odds with the accord we give altruism as a noble motive.

[/ QUOTE ]

All of our choices ultimately lie beyond our control. It seems that you're assuming the existence of a "free will." I don't think that's a step forward, but if you're not interested in discussing the subject with determinists, I'll step out. Still I think those pushing the "self-interest" idea are typically determinists themselves, and I don't know how much discussion is possible under the premise of free will.

[madnak]

[ QUOTE ]
Well, there is a difference between a contradictory situation and mutually contradictory assumptions. I don't think that the assumptions are contradictory, although there are circumstances where some are satisfied and not others.

[/ QUOTE ]

I don't think I understand. How can you describe self-interest if you don't accept a single ultimate standard to represent it? If you have such a standard, it stands to reason that it would be exclusive with every other such standard - they can't all be "the" standard.

[ QUOTE ]
There is a unit of selection problem here--although it may be selected against with respect to the gene, it may be selected for with respect to the group. I don't know much about group selection, but the selection for altruism should be entirely possible with this definition.

[/ QUOTE ]

I think for this to be true, the gene would have to be present in the group. Therefore, the gene would be selecting for itself. I believe this applies even in heterogeneous groups - bees are a good example.

[madnak]

[ QUOTE ]
It seems that sucide is almost always irrational, based on what I know about it and the people who perform it and why they do it.

[/ QUOTE ]

That's going to be hard to back up. Let's say a kid has a life that is extremely unpleasant for him. He has no reasonable expectation of improvement (in fact he expects his condition to deteriorate) and is (at least by his own estimation based on all the information he has available to him) an emotional and financial drain on everyone around him.

How is suicide irrational in this context?

That's not even going into the cases of euthanasia, I assume your comment didn't apply to them.

[moorobot]

No, it didn't apply to euthanasia.

Most of the time suicide is not thought out to that extent; it is often done while on heavy drugs, for one thing, or in moments of passion. Many of the times that it is thought out, it is by people have emotional disorders and physiological problems that prescription drugs, psychiatry and or/time are likely to treat to a considerable degree, either now or in the future.

Furthermore, there are suicide 'cascades'; if you will. That is, if a suicide is reported in the news, more often follow after that; it's part of a twisted following of social proof, apparently. The people who kill themselves after the reported suicide often cite very similar reasons for doing so if they leave some kind of note.

The kid may think he is acting rationally at the time, but he has many years left to improve on that.

Human beings just don't have the ability to predict the future to the degree of accuracy you are attributing to them; they don't know how different they are going to be several years down the road, or how long current strife is going to last.

and in general don't you think a person killing themselves has a bigger 'emotional and financial drain on everyone around them' then before? Is there many people who are rational that everyone around would prefer to have dead?

What I'm saying is that on any measure of rationality that we have, it is unlikely that many people who committ suicide are acting more rationally than if they didn't; because they have a whole lifetime otherwise to pursue their interest.

For some (non-euthansia cases) it may be rational, but I doubt there are very many.

[madnak]

You're probably right, on thinking about it.

[AlphaWice]

It boils down to frames. Of course every action can be re-framed into a self-interested action. In fact, every action can be re-framed into an action of any motivation. The key is the strength and scope of such frames. In general, understanding this on a deeper level requires more research and thought than most people want to go into.

[Borodog]

[ QUOTE ]
I am always worried about this just collapsing into "people prefer to do what they prefer to do". For the claim to be substantive, it can't be tautologous.

[/ QUOTE ]

I am always slightly annoyed when people (fallaciously) bring up the "tautology" accusation regarding both human action and the theory of evolution. Very often the claim is made that something that is self-evidently true is somehow a tautology, and hence somehow meaningless.

All purposeful human action (i.e., voluntary actions) can be said to be self-interested in a very real and meaningful sense; people choose their actions amongst alternatives. They clearly prefer the actions they choose above the actions they don't. The opposite proposition is non-sensical except for useless definitions of "prefer".

That this is self-evidently true does not make it tautologous nor meaningless.

[Philo]

[ QUOTE ]
A question within a thread asking 'is there such thing as human action motivated by anything except self-interest' got me thinking...


On the other hand, people do things for apparently altruistic reasons that have no real way to be demonstrably beneficial to the individual.


[/ QUOTE ]

Even if it were true that everything we did was 'beneficial' (which is being left unelaborated) to us that would not be sufficient to show that we do everything out of self-interest. I may feel good about myself for donating food to a charity for the homeless, but that does not mean that the reason I did it was so I could feel good about myself. This is a pretty simple point that lots of people miss for some reason.

[atrifix]

[ QUOTE ]
I am always slightly annoyed when people (fallaciously) bring up the "tautology" accusation regarding both human action and the theory of evolution. Very often the claim is made that something that is self-evidently true is somehow a tautology, and hence somehow meaningless.

All purposeful human action (i.e., voluntary actions) can be said to be self-interested in a very real and meaningful sense; people choose their actions amongst alternatives. They clearly prefer the actions they choose above the actions they don't. The opposite proposition is non-sensical except for useless definitions of "prefer".

That this is self-evidently true does not make it tautologous nor meaningless.

[/ QUOTE ]

I disagree. Tautologies, by definition, tell you nothing about the world. Including a tautology in an argument lends no logical force to the argument. Anytime I see an argument that has a tautology in it, I immediately look for a fallacy.

There are some tautologies that are useful methodologically. Mathematics is composed entirely of tautologies. But those tautologies are sufficiently complex that it is worthwhile to understand them even if they do not contribute logical force. "People prefer to do what they prefer to do" is worthless methodologically. It's totally uninteresting.

Now, if you are going to make a claim that people prefer to do whatever gives them the most happiness, or that people always do what will advance their genes, then that is something else. But collapse into tautology with arguments of this kind is almost always bad philosophically.

Edit: I also don't understand what you mean by "fallaciously" bring up an accusation. I don't even understand what it is for an accusation to be fallacious.

[Borodog]

What you're calling "tautologies" are not, in fact tautologies. They are either definitions or premises.

Your first two paragraphs are entirely contradictory. You claim that tautologies tell you nothing about the world (meaning they are useless), that mathematics is entirely composed of tautologies, yet mathematics is useful to know.

Which is it?

Mathematics works, so does the theory of evolution, and so does praxeological analysis. All are extremely useful in describing the real world, all are based on self-evident truths, and none are tautological.

[atrifix]

[ QUOTE ]
I don't think I understand. How can you describe self-interest if you don't accept a single ultimate standard to represent it? If you have such a standard, it stands to reason that it would be exclusive with every other such standard - they can't all be "the" standard.

[/ QUOTE ]

I think I see what you are saying. The use of the word contradictory confused me.

[ QUOTE ]
I think for this to be true, the gene would have to be present in the group. Therefore, the gene would be selecting for itself. I believe this applies even in heterogeneous groups - bees are a good example.

[/ QUOTE ]

The gene is present in the group, but it doesn't select for itself (at least, on usual definitions of "gene"). Bees sacrifice themselves when there are intruders to the hive; this results in the loss of the gene. But the sacrifice helps the hive as a whole, and so the gene is selected for with respect to the hive. I don't know if this example fits, but you could construct a model where one would.

[atrifix]

[ QUOTE ]
What you're calling "tautologies" are not, in fact tautologies. They are either definitions or premises.

[/ QUOTE ]

I don't agree with this at all.

[ QUOTE ]
Your first two paragraphs are entirely contradictory. You claim that tautologies tell you nothing about the world (meaning they are useless),

[/ QUOTE ]

This doesn't follow, either.

[ QUOTE ]
that mathematics is entirely composed of tautologies, yet mathematics is useful to know.

Which is it?

[/ QUOTE ]

Can't it be both? I don't think mathematics tells us anything about the world (have you ever seen a 2?), and yet mathematics is useful to know.

[ QUOTE ]
Mathematics works, so does the theory of evolution, and so does praxeological analysis. All are extremely useful in describing the real world, all are based on self-evident truths, and none are tautological.

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I would say that the theory of evolution is hardly self-evidently true. Mathematics is tautological. And praxeology falls somewhere in between, depending on who's doing it.

The difference between the theory of evolution and mathematics is that mathematics is a set of conditional statements. Given certain axioms, certain other things follow. Whether the axioms are true or not is an open question. The theory of evolution makes substantive claims about the world, e.g., that traits found in contemporary populations are present because those populations were descended from ancestral populations in which those traits were the fittest available. Clearly that statement is neither tautological nor self-evidently true.

[madnak]

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The gene is present in the group, but it doesn't select for itself (at least, on usual definitions of "gene"). Bees sacrifice themselves when there are intruders to the hive; this results in the loss of the gene. But the sacrifice helps the hive as a whole, and so the gene is selected for with respect to the hive. I don't know if this example fits, but you could construct a model where one would.

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Then the gene is ultimately selected for. If it weren't, it would be selected against by definition.

[atrifix]

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Then the gene is ultimately selected for. If it weren't, it would be selected against by definition.

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Yes, the gene is ultimately selected for. I think that it can be both selected for and selected against simultaneously. The individual action selects against the gene, but it is ultimately selected for because of the benefits it brings to the group.

[madnak]

But the selection for must be greater than the selection against in order for the gene to be propagated. If the gene isn't present in the group it benefits, and there's no reciprocation, then the gene really is self-destructive and will fail to survive.

[Cerril]

Yeah... actually that was the whole point of the post. The idea that we -can- describe any action as self-interested, but should we just because we can.


--I didn't mean to imply that humans aren't animals or that animals don't have some sort of will, merely that it appears that animals are more instinctually motivated than humans (tend to have more predictable behavior). Whether that's to say that human behavior is more random, or driven by more complex motivations, or merely that being human makes it far more difficult to anticipate the actions of individual humans
I'm assuming a free will because I feel like I have one. All signs point to 'no' on that matter, but it isn't going to change how I act, so I find the discussion itself to have little significance on my actions (not to say that I don't enjoy the discussion). I assume you see what I'm getting at. But if I'm wrong in any of those respects I'm very interested in continuing the discussion.

Thing is, the comments I made themselves are pretty modest, (and to some extent meaninglessly tautological), but they seem to be bringing up a lot of other very interesting topics

[Cerril]

Hmm... that's a good point. I guess this all ties in to a discussion I had yesterday that involved the idea that you need to have a point where you can no longer ask 'why'...

Personally my motivations, when I think on them, boil down to happiness (what I meant by 'benefit') which I define in a very detailed way, involving accomplishment of goals as well as pleasure. I think 'contentment' might be a better word than happiness, or 'satisfaction.' In any case, the question then is what other motives there can be that don't reduce to some form of that same 'happiness.'

Certainly 'programming' in some form or other (most often psychological upbringing or genetics) determines certain actions that might otherwise be irrational, or add weight to decisions. But at the same time, can these be reduced to happiness because you're conditioned to be happier when you do these things?

An idea of an absolute standard of virtuous behavior might answer the question as well, but there is a huge 'why' to be asked there if certain actions can't be justified in any other way as well. And if the only reason you do good things is that they make you feel good (or make you not feel guilty, and I equate avoidance of bad feelings to be an increase in good feelings).

So one question then becomes whether we -do- have any reason for our actions other than self-interest, and if so, whether we -should-. And of course, 'why?'

[madnak]

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Yeah... actually that was the whole point of the post. The idea that we -can- describe any action as self-interested, but should we just because we can.

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Should we? I don't think so, on moral and scientific and cultural grounds. The idea of altruistic versus self-interested actions has value in all of these contexts, so it would be "against our interests" to destroy the distinction with tautology.

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I'm assuming a free will because I feel like I have one. All signs point to 'no' on that matter, but it isn't going to change how I act, so I find the discussion itself to have little significance on my actions (not to say that I don't enjoy the discussion). I assume you see what I'm getting at.

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If all signs point to "no," it's difficult to discuss human actions in the context of free will. I don't think free will is a useful way to classify human action, regardless of whether it exists.

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Thing is, the comments I made themselves are pretty modest, (and to some extent meaninglessly tautological), but they seem to be bringing up a lot of other very interesting topics

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They are. It's been an interesting thread.

[atrifix]

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But the selection for must be greater than the selection against in order for the gene to be propagated. If the gene isn't present in the group it benefits, and there's no reciprocation, then the gene really is self-destructive and will fail to survive.

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Yes, I think this is correct. But if there is reciprocation, then we can get selection of self-destructive genes.

[madnak]

If there's reciprocation, I'd say they aren't really self-destructive. But I suppose that's a matter of perspective.